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ABSTRACT 
Between self and other: An investigation into behavioural and neural correlates of 
ambiguity in agency.  By Christophe Emmanuel de Bézenac 
 
Background: In most circumstances we easily distinguish changes to the external world 
brought about by our own actions from those with external origins. However, there are 
contexts where the sense of agency is put into question. Little is known about ambiguity 
characterised by a lack of information for self-other differentiation, despite its relevance to 
symptoms and levels of consciousness associated with certain mental health conditions. In 
this PhD thesis by publication, behavioural and neuroimaging methods are used to explore 
self-other processing capacities in ambiguous conditions. Individual differences are 
examined in relation to brain response with the aim of shedding light and generating further 
testable hypotheses on mechanisms of agency in both health and psychosis. 
Chapter 2: Building on ideas from developmental and perceptual psychology, Chapter 2 
lays out the theoretical framework and rationale behind the experimental work. The paper 
defines the concept of ambiguity in relation to self-other processing. With caregiver-infant 
interactions and social interactions more generally described as inherently ambiguous, a key 
proposal is that experience in ambiguity-promoting settings provide conditions necessary for 
developing reality-testing abilities and a flexible sense of self-other associated with mental 
heath. Such abilities may be malleable, however, continuing to develop through experience 
in activities involving intricate joint action such as social dialogue. It is argued that activities 
such as music-making which require self-other distinctions, yet make differentiation 
challenging may particularly hone these skills. Implications for phenomena such as 
hallucinations associated with reduced attributional abilities are discussed.  
Chapter 3: In the first experimental study, a task was developed that manipulates ambiguity 
by controlling the probability that a participant’s finger taps results in auditory tones as 
opposed to tones generated by ‘another’s finger taps’. The ability to accurately attribute 
actions to self and to other was negatively related to hallucination proneness (HP) and 
positively related to musical experience (ME). This pattern of results was accentuated by 
ambiguous conditions where the probability of self- and other-generated tones was equal. 
This not only associates HP with specific difficulties in dealing with ambiguity, but also 
supports the notion that attribution abilities are malleable and can improve through 
experience in ambiguous settings such as those involving intricate joint action.  
Chapter 4: Chapter 4 investigated neural responses to modulating the degree of control 
belonging to self and other using the probability method tested in Chapter 3 in a parametric 
fMRI block design. Linear and non-linear stimulus-response functions highlighted a network 
of brain regions previously associated with motor control and self-other processing to be 
particularly sensitive to control belonging to self. All regions also displayed significant non-
linearity with decreased response in ambiguous conditions. This study provides initial insight 
into attributional ambiguity-processing in the brain. 
Chapter 5: In Chapter 5, neural responses to the task were examined in relation to individual 
differences. Combining whole-brain univariate and a task-based ICA approach, results 
showed increased ambiguity-related response in sensory and DMN regions to be related to 
positive schizotypy and difficulties in processing ambiguity, in contrast to task performance 
and musical experience which correlated with reduced response.     
Chapter 6: The final study examined the effects of attribution performance, including 
performance specifically related to ambiguity, on resting-state functional connectivity using 
ICA, dual regression and a network analysis. Findings showed connectivity between frontal 
networks and other brain regions increased with reduced task performance.     
Conclusions: The thesis concludes with a discussion of these collective findings and 
implications for future research. Together the behavioural and imaging findings point 
towards the importance of ambiguity in self-other processing. Increased insight into the topic 
may enhance our understanding of agency mechanisms underlying ‘self-disorders’ such as 
schizophrenia and eventually contribute to extending the range of therapeutic possibilities. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In normal circumstances we are able to easily distinguish between changes to the 
external world brought about by our own actions from those with external causes. 
However, there are contexts where the causal boundaries of self and other (the sense 
of agency and body ownership) are thrown into question. Despite the recent flurry of 
theoretical and empirical investigations into agency, little is known about ambiguous 
contexts characterised by a lack of information for self-other differentiation; yet 
ambiguous states are important in relation to symptoms and levels of consciousness 
that characterise certain mental health conditions. This PhD uses behavioural and 
neuroimaging methods to explore self-other processing and, in particular, ambiguity 
in differentiating between action outcomes belonging to self in relation to those 
belonging to other/s. Individual differences in response to ambiguity are investigated 
with the aim of generating testable hypotheses about mechanisms of agency in both 
health and psychosis. 
 
 
2. Thesis format and outline 
 
This thesis is presented in the alternative format as a series of papers that have either 
been submitted to, or published in peer-reviewed journals. It should be noted, 
however, that compared to a traditional thesis format, this document contains a 
higher degree of repetition/redundancy, given the need for individual journal articles 
to present a self-contained argument. The document is divided into 6 chapters. 
Following the preface, Chapter 1 outlines the rationale and theoretical framework 
behind the experimental investigations. The experimental studies are presented in 
Chapters 2-5, while Chapter 6 provides a summary and discussion of findings and 
their implications for future research. 
 
 
 20 
3. Authorship Contributions 
 
All of studies included in this thesis were conceived of designed by Christophe de 
Bézenac with guidance from supervisors Prof Rhiannon Corcoran and Dr Vanessa 
Sluming. The author completed data collection, analysis and interpretation, and the 
writing of associated research papers. Undergraduate student Oran Quinn McKie and 
postgraduate student Joe Furlong (see acknowledgements in Chapter 4) assisted in 
data collection. Listed co-author Dr Rachel Swindells provided critical revisions for 
Chapter 1. Dr Noreen O’Sullivan aided in the design of the behavioural statistical 
analyses (multi-level modeling) used in Chapter 2. Dr Andre Gouws advised on the 
parametric fMRI analysis described in Chapter 3 while David Clewett advised on the 
design of the task-based ICA analysis conducted in Chapter 4. 
  
 21 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Ambiguity in self-other processing: a theoretical framework with implications 
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1.1. Abstract 
 
While distinguishing between the actions and physical boundaries of self and other 
(non-self) is usually straightforward there are contexts in which such differentiation 
is challenging. For example, self-other ambiguity may occur when actions of others 
are similar or complementary to those of the self. Even in the absence of such 
situational challenges, individuals experiencing hallucinations have difficulties with 
this distinction, often experiencing thoughts or actions of self as belonging to other 
agents. This paper explores the role of ambiguity in self-other differentiation with the 
aim of contributing to a theoretical framework for understanding prerequisites for 
mental health. A key proposal is that engagement in ambiguous contexts that 
challenge distinctions between self and other may provide optimal conditions for 
refining reality-testing skills related to self-other differentiation. With attunement in 
early caregiver-infant interactions framed as one such context, the argument 
positions vulnerability to psychosis within a developmental framework. However, as 
these early-acquired skills are likely to be malleable, they will improve through 
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practice. Using music-making to illustrate, we postulate that increasing engagement 
in ambiguous situations such as those involving intricate joint action contributes to 
the continued development of an adaptive sense of self and other essential to healthy 
social functioning. Increased insight into the role of ambiguity may enhance our 
understanding of mechanisms underlying ‘self-disorders’ such as schizophrenia and 
may eventually extend the range of social and arts-based therapeutic possibilities. 
 
“The brain abhors ambiguity, yet we are curiously attracted to it” Ramachandran & 
Ramachandran, 2008 
 
 
1.2. Introduction 
 
Being alive is to possess a boundary or membrane that delimitates the inside from the 
outside, regulating what is kept in and let out, as well as what is kept out and let in. 
Awareness of the dynamic relationships that exist between oneself, one’s 
surroundings and other agents is a primary, on-going task of the perceptual system 
(Gibson, 1978; Gallagher, 2005; Critchley et al., 2004; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011; 
Damasio, 2012). But how do we do this? When we do things, how do you know that 
it is ‘us’ as opposed to another that is doing it? In most situations identifying one’s 
own self as separate from surroundings and other individuals and being able to 
attribute behaviours and events to their respective sources seems relatively 
straightforward and an essential part of everyday actions and interactions. However, 
there are times when this task is challenging, where information for distinguishing 
self from other (non-self) is either reduced or cannot be identified. While perceptual 
challenges of this sort have commonly been associated with phenomena such as 
hallucinations and delusions, self-other ambiguity can also exist as a characteristic of 
the external environment. Drawing from perceptual and developmental psychology, 
neuroscience, and psychodynamic theory, we explore the interaction between 
individual and environmental factors, proposing that ambiguity plays an important 
role in the development of an adaptive, flexible and coherent sense of self essential 
to mental health and wellbeing through life.  
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1.3. Defining the self  
 
The sense of self (and of ‘other selves’), is a perceptual, cognitive, and conceptual 
organising system by which we encounter the world (e.g., James, 1891; Baumeister 
& Bushman, 2011; Damasio, 2003; Stern, 1985; Rogers, 1961), which is central to 
any understanding of human psychology and mental health. Yet still, its 
conceptualisation remains mired in a theoretical quagmire (Gallagher, 2013; Berrios 
& Markova, 2003; Klein, 2012; Baumeister, 1987; Guignon, 2004) because sense of 
self is a complex and multifaceted construct involving over-arching and over-lapping 
processes like consciousness, agency, memory and social and cultural identity (Leary 
& Tangney, 2012; Gallagher, 2000; Klein & Gangi, 2010). Typically, however, 
theoretical accounts share a similar focus on the sensory-motor and mental processes 
which endow one with feelings of singularity, stability and coherence as an 
individual human being (Siegal, 2001; Damasio, 2003). A distinction is also 
commonly made between a ‘minimal’ or ‘core’ self, accessible to immediate self-
consciousness as moment-to-moment streams of multisensory, perceptual and 
affective experience, and a narrative or ‘extended’ self drawing, for example, on 
higher order mental representations and episodic memory (Gallagher, 2005; Sass & 
Parnas, 2003; Stern, 1985; Siegel, 2001; Klein & Gangi, 2010). The former – the 
main focus of the current paper – is an essentially embodied phenomenon 
encompassing a sense of body (bodily unity/coherence,) ownership and agency, 
which, crucially, allows the differentiation of self from other/environment. The latter 
encompasses a sense of self-identity and personhood often over a longer time-frame 
(Gallagher, 2013). Though discrete phenomena, theorists have emphasised the inter-
dependency between these lower and higher order configurations, with multiple 
layers of self regarded as operating in parallel throughout life. For Stern (1985), for 
example, the achievement of a ‘core self’ between two to seven months of age not 
only sets the ground work for the subsequent emergence of ‘verbal’ and ‘narrative’ 
selves, but also establishes a sense of one’s self as a unified and integrated but 
separate being. Thus, this functioning core self is essential for maintaining mental 
health across the lifespan, keeping at bay feelings such as dissociation and 
fragmentation (Fink, 1988).   
 
Aside from the identification of different types of self (Klein, 2012), researchers 
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across domains have emphasised the inherent malleability of these differing ‘selves’. 
Anthropologists argue that definitions of self are, at least in part, culturally 
determined and vary across time and place, where sense of self is regarded as more 
or less fluid in distinct socio-cultural contexts   (Christopher & Hickenbottom, 2008; 
Benning, 2013; Baumeister, 1987; Guignon, 2004). Childhood researchers likewise 
highlight how the emergence of a sense of self across developmental milestones and 
in tandem with wider developmental achievements occurs in transaction with 
necessary environmental inputs.  While not denying the influence of genetic 
inheritance, the neurological/biological basis of one’s sense of self is shaped to a 
large extent through interactions in the infant’s social environment and interpersonal 
relationships (Damasio, 1999; Siegal, 2001; Schore, 2015, 2003; Tronick, 2007). 
 
 
1.4. Physical and agentic boundaries of self and other 
 
From the very start of life, we learn that there are fundamental differences between 
the outcomes of our own actions and the outcomes that results from the behaviour of 
others around us (see White 1995:50-56); we come to experience direct control over 
our actions and an ability to move and manipulate objects, surfaces and even, 
eventually and to a certain extent, the actions and thoughts of other agents (Gibson 
and Pick 2000:160). This experience relies on knowing the boundaries of entities, 
where one thing ends and another begins. But how are such boundaries determined, 
particularly those that exist between self and other agents? Put in more concrete 
terms, how can sensory signals deriving from the presence or movements of one 
entity be disentangled from those belonging to another?  
 
It has been argued that we do this by relying on invariants – gestalt-like regularities 
about the characteristics of animate and inanimate objects (Stern 1985; Palmer, 2003; 
Bregman, 1994; Gibson, 1966). For example, an object tends to possess unity: its 
parts move together when they move or are moved. The stimuli generated by such 
movement, whether picked up in the form of sound, light, taste, or pressure, are 
therefore likely to seem coherent and perceived as belonging together (Rock & 
Palmer, 1990). The sounds of a person speaking, for instance, derive from a similar 
location and change together gradually rather than suddenly, sharing a common 
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temporal and intensity structure. Sounds that do not share this coherence, such as an 
utterance that is suddenly much louder or derives from a different location, suggest 
the presence of another speaker. Therefore, while coherence is the norm (an 
invariant) within entities, incoherence is expected between them and is therefore 
used to mark their distinction. Separate entities segregate by virtue of their 
distinctness: they occupy different locations to other nearby objects and surfaces and 
tend to move independently, generating stimuli with temporal and intensity profiles 
that are incoherent in relation to one another.  
 
As the above examples indicate, the boundaries of entities and, in particular, those of 
animate entities are determined by how stimulus features such as intensity, timing 
and shape vary over time (Stern, 2010). Stimuli with matching profiles are perceived 
as belonging together and having derived from a coherent entity (see Fig. 1.1). As 
Stern argues (1985:154), such dynamic features are amodal in the sense that they 
describe variation in signals picked up in all sensory modalities, including those 
originating from within the body (also see Stein & Meredith, 1993; Deneve & 
Pouget, 2004; Pascual-Leone & Hamilton, 2001; Lewkowicz & Turkewitz, 1980; 
Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1982). For example, a sudden increase of intensity does not only 
refer to changes in aspects of sound, light, touch and smell, but also to variation in 
more covert signals such as proprioceptive feedback or an affective sensation such as 
fear. Significant to agency, it can also describe the content of sensorimotor as well as 
longer-term predictions that one forms about the results of actions as they unfold 
over time.  
 
Coherence between stimuli originating outside and inside the body provides essential 
information about which entity corresponds to self as opposed to other, contributing 
to the feeling of self-agency, the sense that “I am the source of my thoughts and 
actions” (Gallagher, 2000). This derives in part from basic physiological systems of 
the body in relation to sensory stimuli (Poulet & Hedwig, 2007; Jeannerod, 2003; 
Von Holst, 1954). As the ‘comparator model’ suggests, events that match the 
predicted consequences of action are experienced as belonging to self (prediction 
error is small), while mismatch (or large prediction error) is attributed to an external 
cause (Wolpert & Miall, 1996; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Trinity & 
Sommer, 2008; Gandevia & Burke, 1992). In other words, an invariant of agency is 
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that the difference between predicted variation in the intensity, timing, and shape of 
an action and the actual intensity, timing, and shape of the resulting stimuli is likely 
to be small when that action belongs to self, compared to when it belongs to another 
individual. Stimuli belonging to self as opposed to another agent are likely to vary 
with a number of other covert (internally-derived) signals not directly accessible to 
other individuals. The latter could include signals that precede, accompany or follow 
actions, such as volition (as well as higher-order intentions and goals), action 
prediction, sensory and proprioceptive feedback, affective sensation, as well as the 
evaluation of past behaviour (Gallagher, 2000; Stern, 1985; Wegner, 2002; Wegner 
& Sparrow, 2004). 
 
 
1.5. Ambiguity between self-other boundaries 
 
In most situations, stimulus features either vary coherently or incoherently in relation 
to one or more entities, with available sensory modalities pointing in the same 
direction. This enables boundaries that exist between entities including self and other 
and the control that these have over occurrences to be clearly defined. However, 
rather than seen as binary opposites, there is evidence that coherence and 
incoherence are better conceptualised as opposite ends of a continuum (Farrer et al., 
2003). With effort, an agent can generate stimuli that are partially incoherent, 
adopting a characteristic more commonly associated with a number of unrelated 
objects or agents. A ventriloquist, for example, rapidly changes the quality of her/his 
voice to promote the illusion of being in the presence of more than one individual 
(Soto-Faraco et al., 2002; Alais & Burr, 2004; Howard, & Templeton, 1966). 
Autonomous agents can also act with partial coherence in relation to one another, 
generating stimuli that vary with a degree of synchrony more typical of a single 
agent, such as a group of individuals marching together (McNeill, 1995).  
 
Furthermore, actions belonging to self can display a degree of incoherence between 
internal signals such as action predictions and external feedback: consider the 
experience of using a malfunctioning computer mouse where visual feedback does 
not correspond to intended and performed actions. Experiments set up to investigate 
mechanisms of agency typically introduce spatial or temporal distortions to the 
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outcome of a participant’s actions to manipulate the authorship that a person feels 
over that action (Farrer & Franck, 2007; Blakemore et al., 2000; Franck et al., 2001; 
Sato & Yasuda, 2005). As action-outcome discordance increases (e.g., using delay or 
spatial displacement), the participant is more likely to disown the sensory feedback, 
attributing it instead to an external cause. The opposite is also possible. Signals 
related to actions of self, including intentions, predictions, proprioception and 
affective sensation, can be coherent with externally generated stimuli. This is 
demonstrated by Wegner and Sparrow (1999) who found that having thoughts that 
happened to be coherent with an action performed by the experimenter made 
participants more likely to experience ownership over that action – a phenomena that 
they called vicarious agency. 
 
Invariants can, therefore, be weakened. In summary, although it is the case that 
changes in intensity, timing and shape are expected to be coherent within but not 
between entities, and interoceptive-exteroceptive coherence is the norm for self-
generated but not for externally-generated actions, such regularities can be partially 
violated. This can result in the emergence of conflicting groupings, with some 
features pointing towards illusory boundaries or causal relationships and others 
specifying ‘reality’ – the actual boundaries or causal relationships that exist in the 
world. Informational conflicts may cause us to momentarily misperceive stimuli 
deriving from multiple agents as belonging to a single coherent agent (e.g., the 
marching group) or, vice versa, stimuli from a single agent as belonging to multiple 
agents (e.g., the ventriloquist). In relation to agency, we may also feel that our own 
thoughts, emotions, and actions and their consequences belong to another 
individuals. The ouija board game exemplifies the latter: the combined force that a 
number of participants exert on the centrepiece makes individual contributions 
difficult to ascertain, promoting the misattribution of movement to an external force 
(under-attribution to self) (Ansfield and Wegner, 1996). Conversely, the illusory 
experience of controlling externally caused events can also occur (over-attribution to 
self). One example is a conductor who experiences a high degree of coherence 
between his/her actions (and associated internal signals such as volition and 
sensorimotor predictions) and the sensory outcomes of orchestra members’ collective 
actions (Epstein, 1987). However, given that invariants can never be completely 
violated, such misperceptions are fleeting and rarely complete. Even in controlled 
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settings where there is an explicit attempt to promote misperceptions, there is 
generally always sensory information available that continues to point towards the 
state of the world as it is (Gibson, 1966; 1979).  
 
Ambiguity emerges when invariants are weakened to an extent that multiple 
conflicting groupings are perceivable, whether these are actual or illusory entity 
boundaries or causal relationships (see Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004; Roach et al., 2006). 
In such contexts, there is insufficient information available to determine which 
alternative is preferred due to a balance between coherence and incoherence 
specified by dynamic features of stimuli across sensory modalities (see Rimmon 
1977:17). The perceiver is driven to explain or find meaning in the experience. They 
conduct a series of overt and covert reality tests when faced with inadequate or 
conflicting information, such as head movements or attention shifts, to search for 
“information that will reinforce one or the other alternative” (Gibson 1966:303–304). 
As Ramachadran and Ramachandran (2008) contend, “the brain abhors ambiguity, 
yet we are curiously attracted to it” – an attraction which may have evolved due to 
the need for organisms to have an incentive to uncover objects, such as predators, 
from complex environments (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999). Where 
disambiguating information is limited, the perceptual process is necessarily 
prolonged, as exemplified by the incessant alternation between the possible 
alternatives that characterise the viewing of bistable images (e.g., duck or rabbit) 
(Wernery, 2013). Ambiguity in effect disrupts habitual perception and subjective 
experience – one is compelled to look and listen again (Rose, 2004:148-149). Artists, 
writers and performers have long understood and exploited this (Rimmon, 
1977:229). Gibson (1979:44) explains that picture-makers enhance aesthetic 
experience by introducing “a discrepancy of information, an equivocation or 
contradiction in the same display”, whilst restricting the amount of additional 
information that can be gathered through objective scrutiny.  
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Fig. 1.1. Defining ambiguity between self and other boundaries. Time-series represent sensory 
signals/stimuli (lines). These signals can either be overt (externally accessible, e.g., sound; vision, 
smell) or covert (inner-body signals accessible to self, e.g., proprioception, volition, action prediction, 
emotion sensations). All signals can vary in multiple ways, e.g., modulating in intensity, timing, 
shape, location and form over time. Coherence between such signals within entities (e.g., self) and 
incoherence between entities (self and other) is the default (invariant) and allows us to easily perceive 
the world as it is, i.e., the actual physical and agentic boundaries that exist between entities (A). 
Invariant can be disrupted: incoherence within and coherence between entities, resulting in illusory 
boundaries (C). Ambiguity (B) emerges when invariants are weakened to the extent that signals are 
partially coherent/incoherent within and/or between entities. Both actual and illusory boundaries 
(physical and agentic) are available for perception and the perceiver can switch between these 
alternatives.  
 
 
1.6. Ambiguity and the developing self  
 
Ambiguity in the perception of entity boundaries, particularly relating to self and 
other, is a pervasive feature in accounts of infantile experience and early processes of 
separation, individuation and sensory integration. Although rudimentary processes of 
self-other differentiation including self-agency are commonly thought to be evident 
from birth (Rochat, 2003; Meltzoff & Moore, 1995), it is generally accepted that an 
infant’s sense of self emerges at psychological and neurobiological levels through its 
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relationships with others (Damasio, 1999; Siegal, 2001; Bowlby, 1973; Perry, 2002; 
Tronick, 2007; Schore, 2015). This is supported by evidence for shared neural 
networks for processing self and other in multiple brain areas including cortical 
midline, frontal and parietal structures (reviewed in Lieberman, 2007; Uddin et al., 
2007; Frith, 2007). 
 
Following the physical separation that begins from the first moments of post-natal 
life, the human baby is primed to respond to and attract the social contact required 
for its survival and development (Siegal, 2001; 2010; Schore 2015; 2003; Tronick, 
2007; Stern, 1985). The caregiver’s first role is not only to provide physiological 
protection and nourishment but also emotional containment and feelings of self-
coherence by regulating his or her changing levels of arousal associated with 
internally and externally derived sensations. Responding to fluctuating sensorimotor 
and affective cues, the caregiver seeks, for example, to calm a distressed or over-
excitable infant, entertain a passive infant, and temporarily withdraw when an infant 
is overstimulated, while also attributing intent and agency to such covert behaviours 
(Brazleton, Koslowski & Main, 1974; Fonagy, 2003; Gergely et al., 2002). Ensuring 
the infant enjoys sufficient periods of calm to engage in self-perception-based 
exploratory play also contributes to the early sense of self by means of “the 
intermodal calibration of the body” (Rochat, 1998). 
 
Drawing on micro-observational studies examining infant-caregiver interactions on a 
moment-to-moment basis, Stern’s work (1985) emphasises the importance of 
attunement processes, achieved as the caregiver matches to or mirrors the dynamic 
features of behaviours, particularly those expressing variation in an infant’s internal 
affective states. By minimising the separateness that typically exists between entities, 
caregivers intuitively seeking to reduce a younger baby’s potential frustrations and 
distress allow the infant to experience an illusion of oneness and pleasurable feelings 
of agency and extended control over surroundings (Winnicott, 1971; 1960; Fosha, 
2001; Glover, 2009; Dowds, 2014; Gergely & Watson, 1996). An example of this is 
a parent who attunes to the intensity, timing and shape of a baby’s animated 
movements (e.g. raised and lowered arms) by means of accompanying vocalisations 
(e.g. “wheee!”) matching the rise, fall and overall excitation levels inherent in the 
infant’s gestures.  
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As this scenario exemplifies, empirical work suggests that rather than solely 
imitating the infant’s behaviour, the caregiver, over time, begins to translate the 
contours of that behaviour into an alternative sensory modality (Crown et al., 2002; 
Beebe et al., 2010; Jonsson et al., 2001). In perceptual terms, this transformation not 
only emphasises the dynamic features of behaviour (given that these remain the 
same), but also provides the infant with opportunities to learn to weigh up and 
synthesise information from differing modalities that specify internal and external 
states. That dynamic features are matched in one modality but not another functions 
to educate attention and help promote sensory integration – the development of a 
normal sense of self depends on emerging abilities to integrate multisensory input 
(Postmes et al., 2014). According to Stern (1985), however, it does much more than 
this in that it also helps the infant to grasp that the caregiver is not only able to mimic 
his or her literal behaviour, but has understood the affective sensations underlying it. 
Ultimately, this conveys to the infant that external actions but also internal subjective 
states of mind in the self and other can be known and shared – an important step in 
the acquisition of what has variously been called a mentalizing capacity (Frith & 
Frith, 2006; Fonagy, Gergely & Jurist, 2004), theory of mind and empathy (Premack 
& Woodruff, 1978; Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995; Baron-Cohen, 1991). 
 
Given that some aspects of behaviour are attuned to, while others are not, and that 
dynamic features may be matched in one modality but not another, there will always 
be sensory information continuing to point to the caregiver-infant as separate, 
distinct entities. With reference to the illustration of cross-modal attunement above, 
while coherence or ‘oneness’ is specified in the correspondence between the infant’s 
motions and caregiver’s sounds, there is a mismatch between the agents’ arm 
movements which make conflicting cues available to the infant. The fact is there is 
no such thing as a perfect attunement with a degree of incoherence always pointing 
towards to divergences between infant and caregiver as distinct agents. Indeed, 
moments of misattunement, whether purposeful or unintentional (the over or under 
shooting of behaviour contours), are as necessary as episodes of attunement to help 
the growing infant identify and integrate the invariants that distinguish its experience 
of itself from an other as an embodied, feeling and, eventually, thinking being (Stern, 
1985; Tronick, 2007; Fonagy & Target, 1996). As clinicians and researchers have 
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noted, too much, as well as too little attunement coherence are both detrimental to 
developmental outcomes in this regard (Fonagy, 2003; Jaffe et al., 2001; Stern, 
1985). There may be a critical tipping point that is key to life chances and outcomes 
between enough, not enough and too much attunement. 
 
The overall implicit goal is healthy ambiguity: a balance emerges over shorter and/or 
longer periods of time in the fluctuation of attunement/misattunement, between 
stimuli pointing towards caregiver-infant togetherness (coherence) and separateness 
(incoherence). In the ‘wider-world’ situations that do not allow self and its outcomes 
to be distinguished from surroundings can be dangerous and perceived as such. The 
infant’s gradual awareness of his/her separateness and agentic limits (the reality of 
self/other bounds) is likely to rouse unpleasant feelings associated with helplessness 
and dependency. The sensitive caregiver responds by creating a safe yet sufficiently 
motivating context in which the infant is invited to explore and play with the 
boundaries between self and other and, at the same time, his or her own internal and 
external experiences. While the precise manner in which the caregiver facilitates 
such implicit learning varies across development, perceptual play in a variety of 
forms continues to promote awareness of self-other boundaries by bridging the 
subjective world of the imagination and the outer world of people and things 
(Winnicott, 1971; Milner, 2010). Being continuously called upon to compare 
fluctuations in the degree of coherence that exists between entity boundaries and 
internally and externally derived signals provides the individual with optimal 
conditions for honing the perceptual, social and cognitive competencies required for 
a functioning sense of self and of agency. As Winnicott, Milner, Segal and others 
contend (see Glover, 2009), this in-between space is also the basis of creativity and a 
capacity to symbolise (to be non-literal or pretend) in the context of verbal thinking 
and communication with others. In contrast to persisting romantic notions of 
creativity as the cathartic endeavour of a lone genius, these authors argue that it 
emerges not by losing touch with reality or with others, retreating into one’s inner 
world, but instead by an increasingly refined awareness of, and playful engagement 
with the boundaries between internal and external experience – through a fluid 
interplay between the two.  
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1.7. Implications for mental health 
 
Closely allied to this facility to differentiate self and other is an ability to distinguish 
between what is real from what is imagined, made up or simulated (Fonagy, 2003; 
Sutton-Smith, 1997). Ecological psychologists contend that the perception of the 
tangible, external world is always distinguishable from that of mental life such as 
dreams and hallucination, in that the latter does not yield additional information 
when subject to scrutiny or ‘reality testing’ (e.g., scanning with eye, head, hand and 
body movements). Gibson (1970) argues that the reason individuals experience 
hallucinations or ‘psychedelic experiences’ as external reality reflects either an 
inability or disinclination to apply the necessary perceptual tests, for example, when 
under the influence of drugs or during periods of psychological distress. This is 
supported by theoretical models that understand psychosis as a deficiency in 
information processing (Aleman, 2014; Bellack et al., 1990; Savla et al., 2012; Green 
& Horan, 2010) or impaired salience assignment also associated with 
hyperdopaminergic neural state (Kapur, 2003; Winton-Brown et al., 2014). Though, 
conflicting cues in the environment are what motivates the search for additional 
information, ambiguity can stimulate anxiety, impacting on the efficiency and 
conclusions of ongoing thinking as well as the capacity to apply appropriate reality 
tests when required (Maule, Hockey, & Bdzola, 2000; Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck 
& Calvo, 1992). One result can be a tendency to over-rely on biases or prior 
knowledge that no longer apply (Corcoran et al., 2006; Bennett and Corcoran, 2010), 
with an urge to adopt new certainties too quickly, before a new pattern has had the 
chance to emerge (Bion, 1970: 124). Notably, an inability to tolerate ambiguity and a 
proclivity to jump to conclusions in uncertain contexts has been consistently linked 
to psychopathological disorders including psychosis (Garety et al., 2011; Budner, 
1962; Colbert & Peters, 2002; Grube, 2002; Broome et al., 2007; Linney, Peters, & 
Ayton, 1998; Van Dael et al., 2006).  
 
Early experience in a safe environment that allows actual and illusory boundaries to 
be evaluated and compared one with the other without confusing the two, develops 
the ability and propensity to conduct appropriate reality tests on the corporeal and 
agentic boundaries of self and other. The ambiguous play facilitated by the caregiver 
enables the infant to experiences different states of self and other over time, leading 
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to a sense of self that is more resilient and adaptive to the internal and external 
changes that occur throughout life. By contrast, situations where reality is always or 
never clear-cut, where invariants specifying entity or agency boundaries remain 
unchallenged and rarely come into conflict, are not likely to afford such 
opportunities for psycho-social development. Fonagy (2003) contends that the most 
crucial outcome of a secure attachment relationship in childhood is the ability to 
distinguish between and realistically appraise self and other, rather than the usually 
cited engendered feelings of safety and self-confidence per se. Individuals who do 
not acquire the competencies required to maintain a distinction between 
representations of self and other – where the actions and/or feelings of one are 
habitually confused and misattributed to the other – may have to develop less 
adaptive strategies to amplify the differences between the two, through for example 
forms of social withdrawal or preoccupation with other. More generally, all mental 
illness may be viewed as the mind misinterpreting its own experience of itself and of 
other (Fonagy & Campbell, 2015), with a failure to establish developmentally 
appropriate constructs of self in the early years implicated in the aetiology of various 
disorders (Fink, 1988; Kyrios, 2015). This is particularly apparent in agency-related 
phenomena such as hallucinations and delusions of control thought to be rooted in 
difficulties in differentiating between thoughts, intentions and actions belonging to 
self from those belonging to others (Sass & Parnas, 2003; Bentall et al., 2007; 
Spence et al., 1997; Parnas & Handest, 2003; Jeannerod, 2009; Ditman & 
Kuperberg, 2005; Lindner et al., 2005; Frith, 2005; Woodruff, 2004).  
 
Behavioural and neuroimaging research has begun to shed additional light on 
mechanisms underlying the sense of self and of agency (Sperduti et al., 2011; Nahab 
et al., 2011; David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008) and on the impact of development on 
such processes (e.g., Kircher & David, 2003). Early attachment experiences can 
positively or negatively shape genetically primed neural structures that underpin 
perceptual and cognitive organisation of self (Siegal, 2001; Bowlby, 1973; 1982, 
Schore, 2015, 2003; Tronick, 2007). For example, a body of research has focused on 
experience-dependent maturation and stabilisation of interconnections between the 
orbitofrontal cortex with cortical and sub-cortical areas in early life, and the essential 
role these associated pathways play in self-regulatory behaviour and self-monitoring 
(reviewed in Schore, 2015). Likewise, a number of studies have shown that 
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disrupting parent-infant interactions during early development can have significant 
impact on the development of the prefrontal cortex in humans and other mammals 
(reviewed in Kolb et al., 2012). This region, which has been associated with guiding 
motor, affective, cognitive, and social behaviour over time (Wood & Grafman, 2003; 
Mitchell, Banaji, & MacRae, 2005), is thought to have a prolonged, experience-
dependent development, making it particularly susceptible to abnormal functioning 
as expressed in multiple neuropsychiatric disorders (Braun & Bock, 2011; Stuss, 
Gallup, & Alexander, 2001; Tekin & Cummings, 2002).  
 
While the development of a core sense of self/other in infancy is a specific keystone 
achievement associated with critical periods in infancy (Stern, 1985; Fink, 1988; 
Kyrios, 2015), a ‘mature’ sense of self must be honed through life’s experiences. 
Indeed, the development of psychotherapeutic interventions attests to an 
understanding that enhancing self-awareness and adjusting to ever-changing realities 
is a long-term endeavour. As evidenced by research into behavioural and brain 
plasticity (Pascual-Leone et al., 2011; Keller & Just, 2016; Ponti, Peretto, & 
Bonfanti, 2008), the manner in which a person perceives surroundings is always 
susceptible to learning and development, with encounters in the world presenting 
limitless opportunities for fine-tuning attention and sensitivity to novel or previously 
undetected information (Gibson, 1979: 254). Below we argue that contexts that blur 
the distinctions between self and other, inner and outer, reality and non-reality, such 
as artistic or aesthetic pursuits involving intricate joint behaviour, may be especially 
helpful in this regard. We suggest that in terms of cognitive and affective outcomes 
they are analogous to the caregiver-infant interaction processes by providing a route 
to guide reality monitoring reflexes and self other attribution, leading to an adaptable 
sense of self. If correct, it follows that individual differences in self-other attribution 
and reality monitoring will be related to experience in these pursuits. Furthermore, 
long-term engagement in these pursuits may itself be predicted by the quality of 
early caregiver interactions. 
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1.8. Ambiguity-promoting behaviours: the case of music-making 
 
In any social contexts, events tend to be co-produced, neither fully belonging to self 
or to other but resulting from the mutually regulated actions of both (Badino et al., 
2014; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Konvalinka et al., 2010). Interaction 
always involves, indeed demands, a weakening of invariants. The coherence that 
typifies stimuli deriving from an individual agent and the incoherence that comes to 
be expected between autonomous agents is partially reduced as participants match to 
the varying intensities, timings, shapes or forms of each others’ behaviour outcomes. 
In effect, this allows a quality of ‘we-ness’ to emerge. Those involved momentarily 
function as a larger ‘whole’ or system with its own emergent properties.  
 
Music-making provides a particularly clear illustration of this. A musician, through 
thousands of hours of practice, learns to accurately coordinate highly intricate 
movements with those of others to produce specific auditory effects (Sloboda, 2000; 
Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). The manner in which musical instruments are 
constructed and played indicates that controlling the degree of coherence and 
incoherence in sound (termed integration and segregation in this context) is of 
fundamental importance to all forms of music-making (Bregman, 1994:458, 674; 
Stein, 2005). In contrast to most listening experiences where the goal is to detect 
actual sound-sources in the environment, music often tries to create illusory sources 
or what Bregman (1994:460) calls “auditory chimeras”: “It [music] may want the 
listener to accept the simultaneous roll of the drum, clash of the cymbal, and brief 
pulse of noise from the woodwinds as a single coherent event with its own striking 
emergent properties”. This is achieved by going against invariants of coherence 
within and incoherence between entities or sound-sources. It is this skill that much of 
the effort of acquiring musical expertise is focused on – whether it be by learning to 
play in tune and in time with others or via the technical dexterity that enables an 
individual’s sounds to segregate whilst blending with sounds produced by other 
musicians. 
 
The literal meaning of symphony is ‘sounding together’ and there are many 
examples where the contributions of individual musicians are blurred by introducing 
coherence between separate entities. This is particularly evident in contexts such as 
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choirs or percussion ensembles where sound-sources are similar to one another. In 
the gamelan traditions of Southeast Asia, for instance, two or more musicians 
commonly perform interlocking patterns designed to be heard as deriving from a 
single coherent sound source (Tenzer, 1998; Bakan, 2007). This illusion of oneness 
is made possible by virtue of the coherence that exists between the sounds generated 
by the two musicians: their close proximity to one another, the similarity of the 
timbres produced by their respective instruments and in the coherence of intensity, 
timing, and pitch material between the contributions. Features specifying coherence, 
however, are at the same time balanced by cues that continue to point towards the 
incoherence that persists between autonomous agents both within and between 
sensory modalities. In other words it is still possible to see and partially hear that the 
two musicians are separate entities through (albeit slight) differences in spatial 
location, and in the variation of intensity, shape and form associated with each agent.  
The fact that this is an effortful task for many of us might attest to the social 
processing default of the human brain. 
 
Conversely, by introducing incoherence characteristic of stimuli belonging to more 
than one entity, whether it be through abrupt changes of pitch range, intensity, timbre 
or spatial location, the sounds of a single musician (sound-source) can also split and 
be misperceived as deriving from separate entities. Partial segregation may be heard 
in many music traditions: examples include the abrupt changes of timbre produced 
by Chinese dizi flute music (Tsai, 2004), Mongolian diaphonic chatting (Lindestad et 
al., 2001), and the pseudo-polyphony in late Baroque music generated by rapidly 
switching between pitch range/register (Davis, 2006). Regarding the latter, Bregman 
(1994:464) writes: “these alternations were not fast enough to cause compulsory 
segregation, so the experience was ambiguous between one and two streams”. 
Frequently in music partial incoherence within entities is combined with partial 
coherence between them, with sounds belonging to one musician made to segregate 
from other sounds generated by the same musician whilst merging with components 
of sound belonging to other musicians.  
 
Music, among other intricate joint behaviours such as dance, theatre and certain 
sports (McNeill, 1995; Pacherie, 2011; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Hove, 
2008; Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009), may therefore be seen as implicitly 
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promoting ambiguous perception, ensuring that entity boundaries are sufficiently 
blurred and that an equilibrium is reached between multimodal sensory conflicts that 
point towards togetherness, on the one hand, and separateness, on the other. As also 
described in relation to attunement processes during early development (often 
described using musical metaphors, e.g., proto-musicality, Malloch & Trevarthen, 
2009), going against invariants in this way promotes a drive to test reality 
characterised by shifts between actual and illusory boundary alternatives.  
 
When a person is directly involved in ambiguity-promoting behaviour, blurred 
boundaries extend not only to those between entities but also to feelings of agency. 
Take for example the experience of not being able to distinguish one’s own voice 
from those belonging to other group members when singing in a choir. One moment 
it might feel that another’s voice belongs to self  (a case of over-attribution to self) 
and the next that one’s own voice is not of our own making (over-attribution to 
other). This involves semi-coherence between internally- and externally-derived 
signals: the effects of others’ behaviour partially match the manner in which one’s 
own predictions, as well as the proprioceptive and affective sensations belonging to 
self, vary over time. Ambiguity and the associated feelings of a weakening of self-
other boundaries, which has been referred to as boundary loss (McNeill, 1995), we-
agency (Pacherie, 2011), coupling (Benzon, 2001), and rhythmic entrainment 
(Becker, 2004), may account for some of the powerful perceptual and emotional 
responses associated with certain joint behaviours (McLachlan 2000:67). Recounting 
memorable experiences, musicians as well as dancers commonly describe the feeling 
of oneness with others and the music, of losing themselves and the sense of their 
body to the moment, and even becoming possessed by an external force (Benzon, 
2001:147). It is notable that, in many cultures, such behaviours are associated with, 
indeed used to induce, altered states of consciousness, such as trance, in which 
delusions of control and altered bodily sensations commonly occur (Rouget, 1985; 
Aldridge & Fachner, 2006; Becker, 1994).  
 
It has been proposed that collective pursuits involving joint action may have evolved 
to establish and maintain group cohesion (Tarr, Launay, & Dunbar, 2014; Kirschner 
& Tomasello, 2010; Reddish, Fischer, & Bulbulia, 2013; Mithen, 2005). This has 
been supported by findings that associate movement synchrony between individuals 
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with increased feelings of social closeness and affiliation (Decety & Sommerville, 
2003; Valdesolo & Desteno, 2011; Hove & Risen, 2009) – a process possibly 
mediated by the concomitant release of neurohormones such as endorphins (Dunbar 
et al., 2012; Launay, Tarr & Dunbar, in press). However, the experience resulting 
from participating in such joint activities is not typically one of complete and 
involuntary abandonment. This is because effortful cohesion demands self-awareness 
and some ability to integrate with others. Indeed, coordinating actions with others to 
an extent that permits the blurring of boundaries requires effective monitoring of self 
in relation to others to ensure that adjustments of behaviour that enable the desired 
emergent ambiguity to persist. For example, not being able to simultaneously 
monitor one’s own voice and those of other ensemble members when singing in a 
choir – completely immersing in the illusion of oneness – is likely to result in going 
out of tune or out of time with others, reemphasising the differences that exist 
between participants. Thus, the performance of joint behaviours requires fluid shifts 
of attention between monitoring the outcomes of self, other, and the illusory 
composite sources of self with other.  
 
 
1.9. Experience-driven plasticity of self 
 
In keeping with findings from research into expert performance (Ericsson et al., 
1993), the more time a person spends engaged in activities which challenge accurate 
self-other attributions, the better that person is likely to become at making such 
distinctions. If this is the case, individuals with extensive joint-action experience 
might be expected to be better than average at self-other processing. Music-making 
experience has already been associated with fundamental behavioural and cognitive 
changes related to agency that are reflected in functional as well as structural 
alterations in the brain (reviewed in Benz et al., 2015; Jäncke, 2009). For example, 
musical training has been associated with more pronounced auditory and motor 
system coupling (Zatorre et al., 2007), enhanced working memory (e.g., George & 
Coch, 2011), practice-induced efficiency in motor regions (Jäncke et al., 2000; Chen 
et al., 2012), and the refinement of cognitive control (e.g., Helmbold, Rammsayer, & 
Altenmüller, 2005; Lee, Lu, & Ko, 2007; Moreno & Besson, 2006). Longitudinal 
and experimental studies suggest that such improvements result from experience and 
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the intensity of training rather than from any innate musical predisposition (e.g., 
James et al., 2014; Hyde et al., 2009; Lahav, Saltzman, & Schlaug, 2007; Moreno et 
al., 2009). In fact, the reliability of such findings has meant that expert musicians 
have been identified as an ideal cohort to demonstrate mechanisms of experience-
driven neuroplasticity (reviewed in Müente, Altenmüller, and Jäncke, 2002). 
 
The idea that music-making develops self-monitoring abilities with observable 
impacts on brain development may have wider clinical implications. Many of the 
neural changes that result from extensive musical practice implicate functions and 
brain regions that have been highlighted in studies of individuals who report 
symptoms of schizophrenia. Importantly however, the neural patterns are in the 
opposite direction (Table 1).  
 
For example, compared to individuals without musical experience, musicians show 
increased volume in the cerebellum (Hutchinson et al., 2003; Gaser & Schlaug, 
2003; Amunts, 1997; Schlaug, 2001), premotor cortex (Gaser and Schlaug, 2003), 
hippocampus (Sluming et al., 2007), left planum temporale (Schlaug et al., 1995), 
Heschl’s gyrus (Schneider et al., 2002), corpus callosum (Schlaug et al., 1995), and 
superior parietal areas (Gaser and Schlaug, 2003). Music-making expertise has also 
been associated with increased reliability and amplitude of mismatch negativity 
(MMN) (Rüsseler et al., 2001; Lappe et al., 2008), equilateral interhemispheric 
transfer (Patston et al., 2007), weaker cerebral blood flow (CBF) in the cerebellum 
during finger movements (Koeneke et al., 2004), lower CBF in the temporoparietal 
junction during improvised music-making (Berkowitz and Ansari, 2010), greater left 
hemisphere activity (Ohnishi et al., 2001), higher white matter integrity (Han et al., 
2009; Halwani et al., 2011) and grey matter density (Han et al., 2009). In contrast, 
when compared to healthy individuals, people with schizophrenia tend to show 
reduced volume in the cerebellum (Bottmer et al., 2005; Keller et al., 2003), 
premotor cortex (Douaud et al., 2007), hippocampus (Heckers & Konradi, 2010), left 
planum temporale (Petty et al., 1995), Heschl’s gyrus (Hirayasu et al., 2000), corpus 
callosum (Woodruff et al., 1995), and superior parietal areas (Schiffer et al., 2010). 
Symptoms associated with this population have also been correlated to reduced 
MMN amplitude (Niznikiewicz et al., 2009), hemispheric imbalances (Gruzelier, 
1984; Endrass et al., 2002), higher CBF in the cerebellum (Loeber et al., 1999), and 
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the temporoparietal junction during action attribution tasks (Farrer et al., 2004), 
reduced cerebral lateralization or right hemisphere dominance (Heckers, Goff & 
Weiss, 2002), and lower white matter integrity (Di, Chan & Gong, 2009) and grey 
matter density (Glahn et al., 2008). 
 
To develop this idea further, the functional and anatomical differences between these 
cohorts would need to be tested directly. What is noteworthy and may justify such 
comparative investigation is that many of the results pointing in opposing directions 
implicate brain regions and processes that have been associated with agency (see, 
e.g., David et al., 2008). If the ability to accurately differentiate self from other at a 
perceptual level is malleable and can improve through practice, might such changes 
impact on the symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions that are specifically 
thought to be rooted in impairments in self-other processing (Frith, 2000; Jeannerod, 
2009; Bentall et al., 2007)? To date there is evidence to suggest music’s 
effectiveness in suppressing symptoms of psychosis (Silverman, 2003; Peng, Koo & 
Kuo, 2010; Na & Yang, 2009; Gold et al., 2009), with musical competence 
negatively related to symptom severity in schizophrenia (Kantrowitz et al., 2013). 
There are also precedents for using music as a tool for neuro-rehabilitation (reviewed 
in François et al., 2015; Whipple, 2004; Raglio et al., 2008). 
 
Table 1.1. Comparing differences in brain structure and function between musicians compared to non-
musicians and schizophrenia patients compared to controls  
 
Musicians compared to non-musicians  
 
Schizophrenic patients compared to controls 
 
Increased corpus callosum size (Schlaug et al., 1995) 
 
Reduced corpus callosum size (Woodruff et al., 
1995) Reduced interhemispheric transmission 
(Endrass et al., 2002) 
Equilateral interhemispheric transfer for visual 
information (Patston et al., 2007) 
Hemispheric imbalances in schizophrenia. 
(Gruzelier, 1984) 
Leftward planum temporale asymmetry (Schlaug et 
al., 1995) 
 
Reversal of normal asymmetry (left larger than right) 
of the planum temporale surface area (Petty et al., 
1995). 
Larger tract volume and higher fractional anisotropy 
values of the right and left arcuate fasciculus 
(Halwani et al., 2011) 
 
Reduced fractional anisotropy in the left uncinate 
fasciculus and left arcuate fasciculus (Burns et al., 
2003); White matter reduction (Di, Chan & Gong, 
2009) 
 
Higher gray matter density and white matter 
integrity (Han et al., 2009) 
Reduced gray matter density in bilateral insular 
cortex, anterior cingulate, left parahippocampal 
gyrus, left middle frontal gyrus, postcentral gyrus, 
and thalamus. (Glahn et al., 2008) 
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Greater cerebellar volume (Hutchinson et al., 2003; 
Gaser & Schlaug, 2003; Amunts, 1997; Schlaug, 
2001) 
 
Reduced cerebellar volume (Bottmer et al., 2005; 
Keller et al., 2003) 
 
 
Weaker hemodynamic responses in the cerebellum 
(Koeneke et al., 2004) 
 
Higher cerebellar blood volume (Loeber et al., 1999) 
 
Increased hippocampal volumes (Sluming et al., 
2007) 
 
Smaller hippocampal volumes and abnormal 
hippocampal activity (Heckers & Konradi, 2010) 
 
Right temporoparietal junction deactivation during 
melodic improvisation (Berkowitz and Ansari, 2010) 
 
 
 
Higher baseline activation level in the inferior 
parietal lobule (Farrer et al., 2004; Spence et al., 
1997); Reduced functional connectivity of the 
temporoparietal area. (Vercammen et al., 2010) 
Amusia due to Right Temporoparietal Infarct. 
(McFarland & Fortin, 1982) 
 
 
Anatomical abnormalities of the Temporoparietal 
junction linked to auditory hallucination (Plaze et al., 
2009) 
 
Increased MMN amplitude and reliability (Rüsseler 
et al., 2001; Lappe et al., 2008)  
Reduced MMN amplitude (Niznikiewicz et al., 
2009) 
Increased heschl gyrus gray matter volume 
(Schneider et al., 2002) 
Reduced heschl gyrus gray matter volume (Hirayasu 
et al., 2000) 
Increased gray matter volume in premotor  
cortex (Gaser and Schlaug, 2003) 
 
Reduced gray matter volume in premotor  
cortex (Douaud et al., 2007) 
 
Left hemisphere dominance (Ohnishi et al., 2001) 
 
Right hemisphere dominance (Heckers, Goff & 
Weiss, 2002) 
 
Volume increases in superior parietal areas (Gaser 
and Schlaug, 2003) 
Volume decreases in superior parietal regions 
(Schiffer et al., 2010) 
 
 
1.10. Wider discussion  
 
It is suggested here that a resilient sense of self, essential to mental health, equates to 
a flexible self and, as such, requires development in contained environments which 
afford ongoing opportunities for reality-testing. Experience in contexts that sustain a 
high level of ambiguity and allow individuals to ‘play’ with actual and illusory 
object boundaries, particularly those that exist between control belonging to self and 
other, provide optimal conditions for forging a sense of self and provide a buffer to 
the inevitable individual/internal and environmental changes and stressors that occur 
throughout life.  
 
Somewhat paradoxically, it may be by weakening self-other and internal-external 
boundaries – physical and agentic limits and mental attributions – that an individual 
comes to an enhanced awareness of, and ability to negotiate, perceived shifts in such 
boundaries. Epstein (1999) suggests that academic psychology has traditionally 
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focused on the individual self as something to be strengthened, without sufficient 
consideration given to the everyday reality of more fluid, unintegrated states of mind, 
which have typically only been associated with early infancy (the imaginary friend) 
and mental illness. As with the young child at play, adult self-awareness routinely 
vacillates to include states of bodily dissociation, as, for example, when one escapes 
into the imaginary world of a novel or film (Rochat, 2003). Comparing the Western 
notion of the self in relation to understandings in Buddhist philosophies, Epstein 
(1999: 85) contrasts the self as something to be “developed or improved throughout 
its one-way journey toward separateness” in the former, to the self as variously 
“expanding and contracting, coalescing and dissolving, separating and merging” in 
the latter. Milner (2010: 181) concurs that experiences of loss of self, for example as 
achieved through play, meditation, or absorbed participation in music and arts, 
should not be dismissed as a regression to an earlier, less developed state, but as a 
normal phenomenon that enriches perception through the re-encountering of self in 
novel ways: “there is a plunge into no-differentiation which results (if all goes well) 
in a re-emerging into a new division of me-not-me, one in which there is more of the 
‘me’ in the ‘not-me’, and more of the ‘not-me’ in the ‘me’”. In this way, playing 
with realities and non-realities and in the gap between self and non-self, without 
confusing them lies at the heart of creativity as a dimension of ordinary wellbeing. In 
contrast to involuntary experiences such as the distressing hallucinations and 
delusions associated with mental illness, purposive ambiguity-promoting behaviours, 
involve a deliberative and ultimately contained surrendering of conscious control. 
The extent to which a participant is able to monitor and influence when and how self 
disintegrates and/or merges with others may make the difference between an 
ambiguous context that is playful, creative, and promotes engagement from one that 
is anxiety-inducing, and potentially annihilating.  
 
Not all pursuits are equal in this regard. With reference to collective activities 
Pacherie (2011) provides a helpful distinction between ‘hierarchical’ and 
‘egalitarian’ joint action. Using the Western symphony orchestra as an illustration, 
she argues that in the former, tasks are centralised and specialised, with individual 
musicians limited in their capacity to control overall outcomes and instead reliant on 
diktats from the conductor and the constraints imposed by the score/composer. In 
more egalitarian music systems (often reflecting the collectivist societal structures in 
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the cultures in which these systems tend to emerge), such as African drumming, jazz 
and gamelan, governance tends to be distributed across the ensemble. Participants 
are called upon to predict and monitor individual and combined outcomes, 
controlling for themselves to differing degrees the variation in coherence and 
incoherence in relation to one another. This is more reminiscent of the reciprocal 
dynamic that exists between caregiver-infant interactions where the infant is an 
active agent and it is safe to momentarily ‘go to pieces’ or merge with the other, 
“without falling apart” (Epstein, 1999). Thus, distinct forms of music-making or joint 
action afford qualitatively different subjective experiences of self and other and are 
likely to mould self-development in diverse ways. In more general terms, although 
all human interactions involve the need to make behavioural decisions with 
inadequate information, cultures or communities of practice can promote ambiguity 
to greater and lesser extents. This may be reflected in the tools and symbols that are 
used to relate to others. For example, anthropologist Edward Hall (1992) describes 
languages as being lower or higher context. The former refers to linguistic 
information that is complete, explicitly contained within the message itself, while a 
higher context language is one that relies on a greater degree of implicit shared 
knowledge and interpretation from recipients (Hall 1992:229-230). Understanding 
and questioning the quality of attunement promoted by social, cultural and political 
structures, the extent to which practices promote or thward ambiguity between self 
and other may inform conceptualisations of mental health and strategies put in place 
for addressing mental illness.  
 
 
1.11. Conclusions and future directions 
 
This paper argues that ambiguity (as fundamental characteristic of many everyday 
social encounters) plays a key role in developing the sense of self and in learning to 
differentiate between the boundaries of objects including those that exist between 
self and other as agents in the world. We propose that engagement in challenging 
activities that require self-other differentiation may provide optimal conditions for 
refining reality-testing abilities related to self-other processing. With cross-modal 
attunement in early infancy framed as one such ‘healthy’ ambiguous context that 
blurs the boundary between caregiver and infant, the argument positions 
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vulnerability to psychosis-related phenomena within this developmental framework 
(Bentall et al., 2007). However, the case is also made that attribution competencies 
negatively associated with hallucinations and delusions in previous research may be 
malleable and improve through practice. Indeed, certain collective behaviours that 
put the sense of self into question by introducing a high degree of coherence between 
autonomous agents (e.g., such as music-making, dance and certain sports), may be 
understood as having the functional role of promoting social bonding by improving 
self-other monitoring capabilities. Experience in ambiguity-promoting contexts may 
also allow those involved to become better able to tolerate and creatively ‘play with’ 
modulating self-other sensations, freeing up capacity to refine appropriate reality-
testing reflexes. This may serve to reduce the likelihood of experiencing unsolicited 
and distressing misattributions associated with psychosis.  
 
The argument presented here allow specific hypotheses to be generated and tested 
using behavioural and neuroimaging methods. For example, one over-riding question 
is whether experience in situations of intricate joint action (such as music-making) 
positively correlates with the ability to distinguish between action outcomes 
belonging to self and other, particularly in ambiguous contexts, in contrast to 
hallucination proneness. What are the neural correlates of this type of ambiguity and 
of competencies related to self-other differentiation? One might then ask whether 
improvements in self-other processing, at a perceptual level, generalises across 
domains in adulthood. If so, would such improvement impact on phenomena such as 
hallucinations that have been associated with reduced attribution performance? 
Related to this are questions around the optimal conditions for bringing about change 
in self-other processing skills – for example, what types of activities, and constituent 
elements therein, work best? Such research may not only offer insights into 
mechanisms mediating the emergence of mental health difficulties, but also has the 
potential to extend the range of therapeutic possibilities. As Postmes et al. (2014) 
argue, models of self-disorders such as schizophrenia that focus on lower-level 
perceptual mechanisms are under-represented in research and clinical literatures. 
Despite evidence for inter-dependency between top-down and bottom-up processes 
(e.g., Adcock et al., 2009; Shea, 2014), few therapies target ‘lower’ configurations of 
self (e.g., core sense of self) that involve more primitive sensations of the body as a 
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coherent entity/agent and its relation to surroundings including other agents over 
time. We believe that more insight into behavioural and neural responses to 
ambiguity will contribute to the design of environments and opportunities that 
maximise such development and will increase our understanding of self-disorders 
more generally. 
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2.1. Abstract 
 
Individuals differ in their ability to attribute actions to self or other. This variance is 
thought to explain, in part, the experience of voice-hearing. Misattribution can also 
be context-driven. For example, causal ambiguity can arise when the actions of two 
or more individuals are coordinated and produce similar effects (e.g., music-making). 
Experience in such challenging contexts may refine skills of action attribution. Forty 
participants completed a novel finger-tapping task which parametrically manipulated 
the proportion of control that ‘self’ versus ‘other’ possessed over resulting auditory 
tones. Results showed that action misattribution peaked in the middle of the self-to-
other continuum and was biased towards other. This pattern was related to both high 
hallucination-proneness and to low musical-experience. Findings suggest not only 
that causal ambiguity plays a key role in agency but also that action attribution 
abilities may improve with practice, potentially providing an avenue for remediation 
of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. 
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Highlights 
 
• Method for examining action attribution in ambiguous conditions 
• Self-to-other continuum: manipulating the proportion of tones generated by 
self versus other 
• Misattribution peaked in ambiguous conditions biased towards other 
• Hallucination proneness increased misattribution in ambiguous conditions 
• Musical experience reduced misattribution in ambiguous conditions 
 
 
2.2. Introduction 
 
The ability to distinguish between events caused by the actions of self from those 
caused by others is a fundamental aspect of social behaviour, contributing to self-
consciousness and sense of agency (Gallagher, 2000; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; 
Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007; David et al., 2008; Synofzik et al., 2008). The 
‘comparator model’ suggests that we monitor ‘who is in control of what’ by 
comparing predicted to actual action outcomes. If a sensory outcome matches the 
predicted result of an action of self the event is experienced as self-initiated. In the 
case of a discordance, the act is attributed externally (Wolpert & Miall, 1996; Frith et 
al., 2000; Von Holst, 1954; Trinity & Sommer, 2008). Although likely to involve 
higher-order retrospective judgements (such as the allocation of credit or blame) and 
intention formation (Pacherie, 2006; Wegner, 2003; Gallagher, 2010), this 
comparator mechanism is thought to be fast, automatic and perceptually-driven 
(Frith, 2005).  
 
However, individuals’ traits, mental states, intentions, beliefs, and expectations can 
result in errors of attribution (misattributions) (Wegner, 2003; Farrer et al., 2008; 
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Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Synofzik et al., 2006; Sato, 2009). In particular, the 
inability to know what is self-produced from what is externally caused constitutes 
one of the core deficits of schizophrenia, most clearly reflected in passivity 
phenomena including delusions of control and auditory verbal hallucinations (Spence 
et al., 1997; Parnas & Handest, 2003; Jeannerod, 2009; Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005; 
Lindner et al., 2005; Frith, 2005; Woodruff, 2004). Evidence for perturbed 
attribution in this group comes from a number of different paradigms, including 
feedback distortion typically using delay or spatial displacement to introduce a 
discordance between a participant’s action and the visual, tactile or auditory outcome 
of those actions (Farrer & Franck, 2007; Blakemore et al., 2000; Franck et al., 2001; 
Sato & Yasuda, 2005). Compared to healthy controls (HC), schizophrenic patients 
(SZ) make more errors of attribution, with a tendency to misattribute their actions to 
another agent (although some studies have show a bias towards self (e.g., Daprati et 
al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001)). These findings are consistent with those from studies 
using other source-monitoring paradigms (Bentall et al., 1991; Baker & Morrison, 
1998; Brebion et al., 2000; Johns et al., 2001, Farrer & Franck, 2007). As increased 
misattribution has also been observed in healthy individuals with schizotypal 
personality traits (Asai et al., 2008; Johns et al., 2010; Sugimori et al., 2011; Strauss, 
1969), dimensional measures of psychosis-proneness can be used to explore the 
attributional biases associated with psychosis without the confounding effects of 
medication or long-term chronic illness (Raine, 2006).  
 
While the focus of much of the clinically-oriented agency literature has been on 
mechanisms internal to the perceiver (see review by Moore & Fletcher, 2012), 
misattribution can also be driven by external, situational factors (Wegner, 2002, 
2003). For example, when one coordinates behaviours/thoughts with others to 
achieve a common goal, actions often take place at approximately the same time, in 
close proximity with complementary effects (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Sebanz et al., 
2006). This can lead to causal ambiguity, where distinguishing between self-control 
and other-control is not clear-cut. According to the comparator model, such 
situations can introduce discordance between action and outcome which are neither 
negligible (where self-control would be inferred) nor substantial (where other-control 
would be inferred), but somewhere in between. This middle ground, or state of semi-
discordance, effectively limits the amount of information available for self-other 
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differentiation, making moments of misattribution more likely where either an 
individual experiences control over outcomes that belong to others or experiences 
loss of control over the results of one's own actions. The ouija board where the 
commingled actions of two or more individuals blur the locus of control is an 
example of this latter attribution to other bias (see Ansfield and Wegner, 1996). 
Studies that examine behaviours involving intricate between-individual coordination 
(such as music-making, dance, marching, rowing) have highlighted the potential for 
such behaviour to weaken the boundary between self and other (Benzon, 2001; 
McNeill, 1995; Pacherie, 2011; Hove, 2008). Furthermore, there is growing, 
converging evidence suggesting that the sense of self is a surprisingly flexible, 
ongoing construct, open to rapid influence from encounters with surroundings (see 
Clark, 2003). However, little is known about the role that ambiguity plays in action 
attribution, particularly in relation to individual-differences such as schizotypy 
(Gallagher, in press; Fukushima et al., 2013). Given that individual differences are 
likely to be most pronounced in ambiguous contexts where attribution is most 
challenging, understanding causal ambiguity has potential to shed light on agency-
related traits or deficits.  
 
Previous studies have tended to take a categorical approach to agency, either by not 
including conditions between self and other or by asking participants to provide 
binary (yes/no) rather than graded attribution responses. Findings from feedback 
distortion studies that do include intermediate conditions between self and other 
(e.g., Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Franck et al., 2001; Farrer et al., 2003; 2004) support the 
view that processes underlying action attribution are continuous being based on 
sensorimotor signals that vary continuously (e.g., spatial and temporal features of 
stimuli). In a PET imaging study, Farrer et al., (2003) asked subjects to draw random 
lines using a joystick under four conditions that provided varying degrees of control 
over the results of actions. These authors found that the degree of a subject’s control 
over action outcomes modulates activity continuously in the insula (negative 
correlation with loss of control) and the right inferior parietal lobe (positive 
correlation with loss of control). However, this pattern was not seen in participants 
with positive symptom schizophrenia who showed significantly less functional 
sensitivity to the manipulation (Farrer et al., 2004). This supports the idea that the 
feeling of being the cause of an event may be better represented along a self-to-other 
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continuum. A closer look at Farrer et al’s findings reveals that the most significant 
differences between healthy and schizophrenia participants occurred in the two 
conditions between self and other suggesting that passivity phenomena might be best 
understood as an impairment arising in the context of low value information.  
 
More generally, coping with ambiguity plays an important role in a range of emotion 
and psychopathological disorders including general anxiety disorder (Buhr & Dugas, 
2002), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Tolin et al., 2003), and schizophrenia 
(Broome et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2008). Imaging research has implicated a 
network of brain regions involved in conflict detection and resolution in tasks that 
manipulate ambiguity (Krain et al., 2006), including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC; Huettel et al., 2005), inferior parietal lobe (IPL; Britz et al., 2009; Volz et 
al., 2003), amygdala (Hsu et al., 2005; Zaretsky et al., 2010), and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC; Botvinick et al., 2001; Stern et al., 2010; Critchley et al., 2001). These 
same areas have also been implicated in both sense of agency and the pathogenesis 
of schizophrenia (Minzenberg et al., 2009; Yildiz et al., 2011; Cannon et al., 2002; 
Potkin et al., 2009; Callicott et al., 2000; Zhou et al., 2007; Adams & David, 2007; 
Eisenberg & Berman 2010) and social cognition (Weissman et al., 2008; Adolphs, 
2001).  – a domain also consistently shown to be deficient in schizophrenia (e.g., 
Green & Horan, 2010). 
 
While the study of neurological disorders and mental illness has contributed 
significantly to empirical and theoretical advances in agency research, the 
investigation of individuals who are better than average at distinguishing between 
actions of self and other is under-explored. A possibility in keeping with findings 
from research into expert performance (Ericsson et al., 1993) is that the more time a 
person spends engaged in activities which require accurate self-other distinctions to 
be made under sufficiently challenging conditions, the better that person is likely to 
become at making such distinctions. As previously noted, joint-action makes self-
other differentiation challenging, creating ambiguity about the action source. At the 
same time, the ability to distinguish self from other contributions or outputs is 
typically a prerequisite for effective between-individual action coordination. Given 
this imperative, action attribution abilities may develop alongside, or even as a result 
of, engaging in ambiguity-promoting activities such as those requiring intricate 
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between-individual coordination. If this is so, expert joint-actors, such as musicians, 
and dancers, may have more honed attribution skills than individuals with less 
experience of joint-action.  
 
A musician, through thousands of hours of deliberate practice, learns to accurately 
coordinate highly intricate movements with others to produce specific auditory 
effects (Sloboda, 2000; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). Consistent with the literal 
meaning of symphony – ‘sounding together’ – music from around the world is often 
deliberately structured to blur the contribution of individual musicians in the 
resulting sonic texture. What is often desired is to hear composite lines, that 
themselves don’t exist in reality, made up of the combined actions of multiple 
individuals (Bregman, 1990). Conventions of counterpoint, harmony, of melodic and 
temporal structure, may be understood as ways of promoting causal ambiguity by 
ensuring a high level of ‘togetherness’ between musicians (de Bezenac, 2000). In 
fact, much of the effort of acquiring musical expertise is focused around achieving 
this goal, whether by learning to play ‘in tune’ and ‘in time’ with others or by 
acquiring the technical dexterity necessary to commingle one’s action with others in 
a sufficiently intricate manner. This means that misattribution during music-making 
is more likely than during involvement in other more solitary activities. At the same 
time, the ability to play music does require that musicians know what parts of the 
sound are being produced by self versus other. How else could they monitor or 
correct their actions in relation to those of others? Behavioural and imaging studies 
show a pronounced auditory and motor system coupling in musicians (Zatorre et al., 
2007). We argue that the combination of requiring action-attribution in contexts that 
make it difficult to attribute means that music-making is an activity that provides 
ideal conditions for sharpening self-other differentiation abilities.  
 
If musical experience is found to negatively correlate with misattribution, it would 
suggest that self-other action attribution abilities are mutable throughout life. Given 
that passivity phenomena are thought to be rooted in misattribution (Frith 2000; 
Jeannerod, 2009), it presents the possibility that engaging in intricate joint-behaviour 
could have protective or remediative effects, explaining findings from music therapy 
research of music’s effectiveness in suppressing symptoms of psychosis (Silverman, 
2003; Peng et al., 2010; Na & Yang, 2009), as well as findings showing musical 
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competence to be negatively related to symptom severity in schizophrenia 
(Kantrowitz et al., 2013).  
 
In the neuroscience literature, a number of differences have been found in musicians 
compared to non-musicians, such as: increased volume in the cerebellum, premotor 
cortex, superior parietal areas and Heschl's gyrus (Gaser & Schlaug, 2003a; 2003b), 
higher white matter integrity (Halwani et al., 2011) and gray matter density (Han et 
al., 2008), as well as lower cerebral blood flow in the temporoparietal junction 
(Berkowitz & Ansari, 2010) and increased reliability/amplitude of mismatch 
negativity (Rüsseler et al., 2001; Lappe et al., 2008). Interestingly, these structural 
and functional differences have all also been associated with schizophrenia but 
pointing in the opposite direction (Bottmer et al., 2005; Douaud et al., 2007; Di et al., 
2009; Hirayasu et al., 2000; Glahn et al., 2008; Farrer et al., 2004; Niznikiewicz et 
al., 2009). Taken together, these findings point towards a possible link between 
music-making and mechanisms underlying schizophrenia.      
 
To achieve a clearer understanding of the relationship between internal and external 
cues across an entire self-to-other continuum and so deepen our knowledge of 
agency in health and psychosis (Moore & Fletcher, 2012), an objective and 
continuous measure of sense of control (self to other) that participant’s subjective 
attribution ratings can be measured against must be developed. In traditionally used 
feedback distortion paradigms, it is not obvious how much distortion (delay or 
spatial displacement) is required for stimuli to objectively belong to other or to be 
considered ambiguous. Farrer et al. (2003; 2004), for example, spatially distorted 
results of the participant’s movements in steps of 25 degrees for conditions 2 and 3, 
and used the results of another individual’s actions for the 4th condition, making it 
impossible to assert that differences between successive conditions were equal. 
Furthermore, previous studies have tended to keep the amount of distortion constant 
within trials (e.g., 25 degrees of spatial displacement), often by restricting trials to 
single events. Apart from the risk of confounds associated with adaptation effects 
(Honda et al., 2012; Cunningham et al., 2001), consistent distortion can exclude a 
ubiquitous source of ambiguity in attribution. In most dynamic contexts outside 
experimental settings, for instance during joint-action, information for both self and 
other is simultaneously available for perception. This means that successive stimuli 
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can point to varying extents in opposing directions, for example, with one stimulus 
pointing towards self while the next points towards other. Overall sense of agency is 
likely, in part, to be determined by weighing up stimuli over time, rather than 
processing discrete events separately, making it easy to conceive of agency as a 
matter of degree. Ambiguity may be said to increase as the proportion of action 
belonging to self and other becomes more equal, resulting in semi action-outcome 
discordance. The manner in which agency builds up over time has not been a focus 
in previous research and could help fill the conceptual gap between agency as it 
functions at a sensorimotor, perceptual level and at a higher-level, such as the overall 
control that a person feels over their lives (Gallagher, in press). 
 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the relationship between subjective 
and objective control, with a particular focus on causal ambiguity – the middle of the 
self-to-other continuum. Using probability, we parametrically manipulated the 
proportion of control that actions of self versus other had over an auditory tone 
associated with finger taps during a series of ten-second trials. Attribution error 
(misattribution) was defined as the difference between the proportion of control that 
participants felt they had (attribution rating) compared to the control that they 
actually had. As attribution is likely to be most challenging in ambiguous contexts, 
misattribution was expected to peak in the middle of the discordance continuum 
(semi-discordance: 50% self; 50% other). We examined misattribution in relation to 
individual differences thought to be associated with lower attribution abilities, 
hallucination proneness (LSHS-R), as well as higher abilities, musical experience. 
We expected misattribution to be particularly related to hallucination proneness in 
the middle of the self-to-other continuum, based on the hypothesis that perturbed 
attribution previously identified in patients with positive symptoms and schizotypal 
tendencies may be understood as an inability to deal with causal ambiguity. In 
contrast, individuals who spend a great deal of time in contexts that make self-other 
differentiation necessary but often challenging (e.g., intricate joint action) are likely 
to become better at differentiating acts of self from those of others. We, therefore, 
predicted that years of musical experience would be negatively associated with 
misattribution, again, particularly in ambiguous contexts. 
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2.3. Methods 
 
2.3.1. Participants 
The sample comprised 40 participants (11 females; 30 right-handed) with a mean age 
of 29 years (SD = 6.3; range, 20-42). They were recruited from staff and students at 
the University of Liverpool and, to insure sufficient variability in musical 
experience, a pool of Manchester-based musicians matched for age and education. 
All reported normal, or corrected-to-normal, vision and hearing, somatosensory 
perception and reported no history of mental illness or neurological abnormalities. 
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Liverpool and 
conducted in accordance with committee policies. 
 
2.3.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
Stimulus presentation and participant response collection were managed using Pure 
Data (a real-time graphical programming environment: http://puredata.info/) and a 
MacMini computer. The auditory stimuli were presented at 65 dB diotically through 
headphones (PX-660, Pro-Luxe) and consisted of an auditory tone (a cosine wave, 
262 HZ; 100 ms duration; 20 ms onset ramp; 5 ms offset ramp). This tone could 
either be generated by participant finger taps [self] (inherent delay of 15ms) or by the 
participants’ 50 previous inter-tap intervals played back in a random order [other]. 
There were 10 different conditions corresponding to the proportion of control that 
self versus other had over tones within trials. This proportion was manipulated in the 
following way: a random number between 0 and 90 was generated on every tap; each 
condition was associated with a threshold above which tones generated by self would 
be heard and below which tones generated by other would instead be heard. For 
example, with a threshold of 90 all tones belonged to self (condition 1: maximal 
action-outcome concordance) (Fig. 2.2 C1), while tone control belonged exclusively 
to other when the threshold was set to 0 (maximal discordance) (Fig. 2.2 C10). A 
threshold of 50 resulted control randomly shifting (following a tap) between self and 
other (condition 5: semi-discordance) (Fig. 2.2 C5) (see Table 2.1 for the threshold 
used in each condition). This method allowed the proportion of tones belonging to 
self and other to be manipulated systematically in 10 equal steps (conditions). Fig. 
2.2 shows temporal relationships between self-produced taps (Self), tone onsets 
(Tone) and other-produced taps (Other) for one arbitrarily chosen participant in 
 72 
conditions 1 (C1), 5 (C5) and 10 (C10). Note the synchrony between self and tone in 
C1, other and tone in C10, and the semi-synchrony between self and tone and 
between other and tone in C5 (see Table 2.1). 
 
2.3.3. Procedure  
The same quiet, dimly lit room was used for all experimental sessions. Participants 
were asked to use the index finger of their dominant hand to perform a series of 
irregular, Morse code-like taps whilst listening to a sequence of tones. A recorded 
example was provided to ensure that density of taps was similar across participants. 
Participants were explicitly told that tones could either result from their own actions/ 
taps, the recorded actions/taps of another individual, or varying mixtures of both. 
After each trial, consisting of 10 seconds of tapping, participants were asked to 
assess the proportion of control that they felt belonged to self versus to other along a 
continuum, using its entire range. This consisted of an empty rectangle (12x3cm) 
with the word “self” displayed on the left and “other” on the right. Following a 
mouse click, a vertical line would appear at the position of the click and participants 
could adjust their response before clicking on the “Submit” button that would trigger 
a three second countdown to the following trial. After a 3-minute practice session to 
ensure that the task was fully understood, each participant completed a total of 50 
trials made up of 5 repetitions of each of the 10 conditions. These were presented to 
participants in a pseudo-random order, with the constraint that consecutive trials 
were at least two conditions apart (e.g., C2 could not be followed by C1 or C3) and 
that each set of 10 conditions were completed before proceeding to the next set. 
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Fig. 2.1. Illustration of the experimental task.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Temporal relationships between self-produced taps (Self), tone onsets (Tone) and other-
produced taps (Other). Data shown are from one arbitrarily chosen participant in condition 1 (C1), 5 
(C5), and 10 (C10). Onsets have been smoothed to produce a wave-like shape and positioned to make 
temporal relationship apparent (i.e., ‘Self’ inverted and ‘Tone’ mirrored).  
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2.3.4. Individual difference data 
After the experimental task, participants completed the Launay-Slade Hallucination 
Scale (Revised) (LSHS-R) (Launay & Slade, 1981) – a frequently used reliable 
measure of predisposition to hallucinations in normal individuals (Aleman et al., 
1999; Bentall & Slade, 1985; Levitan et al., 1996). The scale comprises 12 items 
each scored on a five-point Likert scale. Items describe clinical hallucinatory 
experiences (e.g. ‘In the past, I have had the experience of hearing a person’s voice 
and then found that no one was there’) or sub-clinical, intrusive mental events (e.g. 
‘The sounds I hear in my daydreams are usually clear and distinct’). The scale has a 
range of 0 to 48 with higher scores indicating greater predisposition to hallucination-
like experiences.  
 
Participants were then interviewed by a music pedagogue to assess the extent of their 
music-making experience. The semi-structured interview lasted approximately 5 
minutes. The interviewer began by asking the participant: “How many years of 
music-making do you have?” This was followed by more in-depth questions relating 
to (1) formal training (2) informal experience and (3) the role that music has 
generally played in their lives. Responses were used to check for over- and under-
estimations in self-reported years of musical experience.  
 
 
2.4. Results 
 
2.4.1. Paradigm validation 
With data pooled over all participants, the mean number of actions per trial was 30 
(SD = 7.), the mean number of tones per trial was 32 (SD = 9), and mean attribution 
rating (scaled from 0-1) was .52 (SD = .33). To assess how the above measures 
varied across conditions, correlation tests were conducted for each participant 
separately. There was a small tendency for participants to perform less taps as 
conditions increased (reduced control over tones), mean r =  -0.28 (SD = 0.18). The 
number of tones per trial did not vary with condition, mean r = -0.11 (SD = 0.10), 
suggesting that apart from action-outcome discordance stimuli were similar across 
conditions.  
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To validate the probability-based manipulation, a measure of synchrony between the 
onsets of the participant taps and auditory tones was calculated. Onset time-series for 
both measures were first smoothed (butterworth low-pass filter: order = 1, band = 
0.01) (see Fig. 2.2 to see the resulting wave), then correlated with one another for 
each trial and for each participant. Mean correlation between synchrony and 
condition was r = -0.95 (SD = 0.033), indicating that the manipulation was 
successful and that conditions 1 to 10 provided a reliable and systematic measure of 
action-outcome discordance.  
 
With data pooled over all participants, mean attribution (scaled from 0, indicating 
100% self, to 1, indicating 100% other) increased with condition (discordance) while 
the standard deviation of attribution peaked near middle conditions 3, 4, and 5 and 
was lowest in condition 1 (Table 2.1). All participants were included in the analysis 
on the basis of their significant positive correlation values between attribution rating 
and condition, mean r = 0.76 (SD = 0.11). Using a t-test, these correlation values 
were found to be significantly greater (t = -4.63, df = 77.6, p< 0.001) than those 
obtained when using a mean split binary measure of discordance (mean r = 0.64). 
This suggests that individuals are able to better discriminate between self and other 
in a continuous as opposed to categorical manner.    
 
Misattribution was used as a measure of performance on the task and calculated as 
the difference between attribution rating and condition (rescaled from 0 to 1). 
Positive values (shown to peak in condition 4 in Table 2.1) indicate a bias towards 
other while negative values a bias towards self (seen from condition 7 onwards). 
Table 2.1 also shows that the standard deviation of misattribution peaked in 
conditions 4 and 5.  
 
Table 2.1. Summary statistics by condition (C1 to C10) with data pooled over all participants 
 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
Manipulation threshold 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 
Correlation between tap (self) and tone 
SD of tap-tone correlation 
1 
(0) 
0.87 
(0.07) 
0.75 
(0.12) 
0.65 
(0.11) 
0.57 
(0.08) 
0.46 
(0.09) 
0.38 
(0.11) 
0.26 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.1) 
Mean attribution 
SD of attribution 
0.02 
(0.09) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
0.35 
(0.25) 
0.48 
(0.25) 
0.54 
(0.25) 
0.64 
(0.24) 
0.66 
(0.24) 
0.73 
(0.22) 
0.80 
(0.21) 
0.84 
(0.2) 
Mean misattribution 
SD of misattribution 
0.2 
(0.8) 
0.05 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.24) 
0.14 
(0.25) 
0.09 
(0.25) 
0.08 
(0.23) 
0 
(0.24) 
-0.04 
(0.21) 
-0.09 
(0.2) 
-0.16 
(0.2) 
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Descriptive statistics for hallucination proneness (HP) and years of musical 
experience (ME) are shown in Table 2.2. Self-reported years of musical experience 
was used as the final ME score in every case, as responses prompted by the semi-
structured interviews confirmed that all participants had made sufficiently reliable 
estimations. HP and ME did not significantly correlate with one another r = -0.16 (t = 
-1.0105, df = 38, p-value = 0.3186), meaning that observed differences between the 
two measure in relation to the task was not simply a reflection of significant 
correlation between them. 
 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics of questionnaire and interview data   
 
 Mean  SD Min Max 
Hallucination proneness (LSHS-R) 23.2 5.4 14 34 
Musical Experience (in years) 12.4 8.2 3 26 
 
 
2.4.2. Overall misattribution  
Fig. 2.3 shows the misattribution profile for all 40 participants with data pooled over 
the 10 conditions. Between-individual variation may be seen in at least two distinct 
ways: (1) how centered scores are around 0 (dotted line indicating no error), reflected 
in the standard deviation of misattribution (e.g., compare participants 1 and 15); and 
(2) the direction of bias towards self (right heavy distribution) or other (left heavy 
distribution), reflected in mean misattribution (e.g., compare participants 4 and 23).  
 
A multiple regression revealed that the overall variability in attribution responses, as 
measured by the standard deviation of misattribution, increased with HP, b = 0.002, t 
= 2.17, p = 0.03, and decreased with ME, b = -0.002, t = -2.06, p = 0.046 (R2 = 0.22, 
F(2,37) = 1.2, p = 0.009). Examining bias towards self and other, a positive trend 
was observed between HP and mean misattribution, indicating a general bias towards 
other, but this failed to reach significance, b = 0.003, t = 1.527, p = 0.13, as did the 
negative relationship between mean misattribution and ME, b = -0.002, t = -1, p = 
0.32 (R2 = 0.1, F(2,37) = 1.2, p = 0.15). This was not surprising given that the 
relationship between misattribution and individual differences was expected to vary 
as a function of condition (action-outcome discordance). 
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Fig. 2.3. Participants’ distribution of misattribution (difference between attribution ratings and 
condition) with data pooled over all conditions.  
 
 
2.4.3. Misattribution as a function of condition  
As a preliminary investigation of the data, linear regressors were first used to 
describe each individual’s misattribution as a function of condition (discordance). A 
higher-level regression was then conducted to examine whether individual 
differences were related to resulting slopes (beta coefficients). As may be seen in 
Table 2.3, both HP and ME were significant predictors of slope, pointing in opposite 
directions. A t-test comparing r-squared (R2) values, revealed that misattribution was 
better characterised (t(77.53) = -4.7694, p < .0001) as a quadratic (mean R2 = .59) 
rather than a purely linear function (mean R2 = 0.42). Both linear and quadratic 
slopes were significant predictors of HP. Similarly, ME was predicted by linear and 
quadratic slopes which again pointed in the opposite direction. The fit of the 
quadratic model to the data (R2) was also positively related to HP and negatively 
related to ME, suggesting that misattribution as a function of condition was more 
quadratic in high HP and low ME. Fig. 2.4 shows that misattribution biased towards 
other (positive values) peaks around condition 4 while misattribution biased towards 
self (negative values) peaks at condition 10. For visualisation purpose only, the data 
has been split between high and low HP and high and low ME to show that this trend 
(described as positive or negative distance from 0 – an errorless attribution score) is 
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particularly pronounce in individuals with high HP (Fig. 2.4a) and low ME (Fig. 
2.4b).   
 
Table 2.3. Two-step regressions for 40 participants (M = misattribution; C = condition; C
2
 = quadratic 
term of condition; HP = hallucination proneness; ME = musical experience; β = slope; R
2
 = r-squared; 
~ = predicted by) Step 1 shows the regression fitted on each participant separately; step 2 shows the 
models fitted at group level (df = 2, 37 in all four models). 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Step 1 
Step 2 
M~C 
(Cβ~HP+ME) 
M~C+C
2
 
(HP~Cβ+C
2
β) 
M~C+C
2
 
(ME~Cβ+C
2
β) 
M~C+C
2
 
(R
2
~HP+ME) 
(Intercept) -0.02*** 4.25 13.34*** 0.19*** 
 (0.006) (2.35) (2.45) (0.04) 
HP -0.0008*   0.006* 
 (0.0003)   (0.002) 
ME 0.0007*   -0.005 
 (0.0003)   (0.002) 
Cβ  -158.21* 152.48*  
  (63.84) (66.39)  
C
2
β 
  -2215.88
** 1893.45*  
  (704.98) (733.23)  
R
2 0.25 0.27 0.16 0.24 
Adj. R
2 0.21 0.23 0.12 0.22 
Num. obs. 40 40 40 40 
***
p < 0.001, 
**
p < 0.01, 
*
p < 0.05 
Statistical models 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.4 (a,b). Misattribution as a function of condition for low and high HP (a) and low and high (b) 
ME. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
A multilevel approach was considered to be more appropriate for this data and for 
the action attribution phenomena being explored. This analysis, conducted using the 
lme4 library in R, not only allowed trials to be nested within participants, but also 
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enabled misattribution to be investigated as a quadratic function of discordance in 
relation to individual differences within the same model (Goldstein, 1995; Snijders & 
Bosker, 1999). In contrast to two-step regressions, participant slopes were weighted 
by their standard error, as multilevel models use information from the whole sample 
data when making estimates for any one participant. This makes estimates more 
reliable and inferences generalizable to the population (Richter, 2006; Goldstein, 
1995). All predictors were mean centered in accordance with previously used 
procedures (e.g., Rasbash et al., 2000) and both the intercept and slope were allowed 
to vary between participants. 
 
Confirming our previous results, the multilevel analyses showed that a linear and 
quadratic effect of condition significantly predicted misattribution (Table 2.4). 
Misattribution was found to increased with HP and decreased with ME when they 
were added as main effects. Including two-way interactions into the model revealed a 
negative relationship between condition and HP and a positive relationship between 
condition and ME. The R package visreg, version 2.0-4 (Breheny & Burchett, 2012) 
was used to visualise interaction effects by inputting the model’s predicted values. 
2.5 not only confirms that positive misattribution (a bias towards other; shown in 
dark red) peaked in more ambiguous conditions (between C3 and C4), but also that it 
was in these conditions that HP and ME best predicted misattribution (Fig 5 a and 
5b). HP predicted increased misattribution towards other while ME was associated 
with attenuated misattribution towards other. A negative interaction between HP and 
ME was also found to be significant. As Fig 5c shows, misattribution to be 
associated with high HP and low ME while low misattribution (an errorless score of 
0) were associated with low HP and high ME.   
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Table 2.4. Multi-level models predicting misattribution for 40 participants. The first section shows the 
slope (β) and bootstrapped 95% confidence interval (CI) for the fixed part of the model, including 
main effects and two-way interactions between condition (C), the quadratic term of condition (C
2
), 
hallucination proneness (HP), and musical experience (ME). The second section shows between-
subject variance in intercept, residual, and condition). The third shows the model fit (using Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC)) and the number of observations and groups (participants). 
 
 (Intercept) C C
2
 HP ME C:HP C:ME HP:ME 
β 0.0829* -0.0244* -0.0079* 0.0041* -0.0031* -0.0008* 0.0007* -0.0006* 
95 % CI [0.0583; 
0.1075] 
[-0.03; 
-0.0188] 
[-0.0092; 
-0.0067] 
[0.0014; 
0.0068] 
[-0.006; 
-0.0003] 
[-0.001; 
-0.0001] 
[0.0001; 
0.0013] 
[-0.0011; 
-0.0001] 
Variance: Subject.(Intercept) = 0.004;  Variance: Residual = 0.0406;  Variance: Subject.Condition: 0.0001 
BIC = -557 ;  Num. obs. = 2021; Num. groups = 40 
* 0 outside the confidence interval       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 (a,b,c). Predicting misattribution 
through interactions between discordance 
and hallucination proneness (a), 
discordance and musical experience (b) 
and hallucination proneness and musical 
experience (c). Darkest red indicates 
highest misattribution values while darkest 
blue indicates lowest values. Values below 
0 indicate a bias towards self while values 
above 0 indicate a bias towards other.      
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Fig. 2.6 (a,b). Variance within-individuals (level 1) as a function of condition (discordance) is shown 
in the top 2 lines of both (a) and (b) while the bottom two lines in both graphs represent between-
individual (level 2) variance. Full lines indicate low HP in (a) and low ME in (b), while dashed lines 
represent high HP in (a) and high ME in (b). 
 
 
To visualise the variability in our model, variance at both within- and between-
individual levels were plotted as a function of condition (discordance) using MlwiN 
version 2.10. Fig. 2.6 shows that, in addition to being biased towards other, 
participants’ misattribution tended to be more random (varied) in the middle of the 
self-to-other continuum (two top lines in Fig. 2.6a and 2.6b). This pattern was 
accentuated by high HP (depicted by the dashed line in Fig. 2.6a) and low ME 
(depicted by the full line in Fig. 2.6b), in line with the analysis predicting variance in 
misattribution (SD) over all conditions with individual differences. Misattribution 
variance between-individuals (lower lines in Fig. 2.6a and 2.6b) shows a general 
positive trend, with peaks in the middle and at the end of the continuum. 
 
 
2.5. Discussion 
 
This study investigated misattribution across a self-to-other continuum in healthy 
participants, examining individual differences thought to be associated with lower 
(HP) and higher action attribution abilities (ME). Participants engaged in a button-
press task resulting in auditory tones. Ten conditions – parametrically manipulating 
the probability that an action of self versus other would generate a tone – were used 
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to obtain a systematic measure of action-outcome discordance.  
 
In line with behavioural and imaging findings showing that action attribution to self 
and other is processed in a continuous manner (e.g., Farrer et al., 2003; Franck et al., 
2001; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Fukushima et al., 2013), results revealed that the 
continuous measure of discordance was a better predictor of participant’s attribution 
ratings than a binary measure. The quadratic finding showing that misattribution 
(Fig. 2.4 and 3.5) and its variability within individuals (Fig. 2.6) was greatest near 
the middle of the discordance continuum supports the view that ambiguity plays an 
important role in agency (Fukushima et al., 2013; Gallagher, in press). It suggests 
that individuals’ ability to attribute actions to self and other is markedly diminished 
in ambiguous contexts. Using a parametric fMRI design (Buchel et al., 1998), future 
research using the task developed here will explore how particular brain regions 
respond to this type of ambiguity. 
 
The general direction of misattribution in the middle of the discordance continuum 
was towards other rather than self for all participants. While this accords with the 
majority of phenomenological and clinical accounts in schizophrenia that describe 
the loss of control over self-generated thoughts or actions, some studies have also 
shown a bias towards self in healthy subjects (Repp & Knoblich, 2007) and people 
with schizophrenia (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001) that could reflect a 
cognitive coping mechanism for dealing with distressing ambiguous situations – an 
attempt to regain control over self (see Hauser et al., 2011). This explanation also fits 
with the idea that direction of bias is dynamic, changing in response to 
psychopathological development and possibly mediated by progressive degradation 
of glutamatergic pathways (Moore & Obhi, 2012). Our findings demonstrate that the 
direction of misattribution reverses from other to self by the end to the continuum for 
all participants (Fig. 2.4 and 2.5). It seems likely, therefore, that discrepancies in the 
literature may be due to task differences between studies in the calibration of the 
‘other’ condition and, more specifically, the amount of discordance associated with 
other in the different paradigms.  
 
Other task and stimulus characteristics are also likely to play a part in the direction 
that misattribution takes. For example, consistent with evidence for a self-serving 
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bias (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999), an aversive task or stimulus could be expected to 
promote a bias towards other while a rewarding task/stimulus may promote a bias 
towards self (e.g., An et al., 2010; Federoff & Harvey, 1976). Research shows that 
attention is also likely to be a determining factor. Individuals primed to attend to 
themselves are more likely to display a bias towards self (Duval et al., 1979), while a 
bias towards other individuals or groups is more likely when attention is drawn 
towards these entities (Lassiter et al., 2002; Taylor and Fiske, 1978). The fact that a 
bias towards other was observed in most participants (irrespective of HP and ME) 
using a neutral task involving low-level temporal cues suggests that, when faced with 
ambiguity, self is (by default) experienced as having less control over events in the 
world than it actually has. Future work could manipulate factors such as task or 
stimulus valence, attentional cues, participants’ subjective states (e.g., anxiety level), 
and the relation that self has with other (e.g., friend/foe; human/computer) to 
examine how such factors interact with the extent, direction and variance of 
misattribution.  
 
Our findings also suggest that HP is associated with increased misattribution towards 
other (when controlling for the effects of discordance), as well as greater overall 
variance in misattribution (SD of misattribution over all conditions), confirming 
previous findings that associate dysfunctional action monitoring with passivity 
phenomena and schizotypal personality traits (Daprati et al., 1997; Fourneret et al., 
2001; Knoblich et al., 2004; Asai et al., 2008). In contrast, reduced bias towards 
other and less misattribution variance was related to ME. This suggests that musical 
experience makes individuals more reliable at judging the proportion of control 
belonging to self and other, at least in the auditory domain. Supported by findings 
that musicians have more pronounced auditory and motor system coupling (Zatorre 
et al., 2007) and use sensorimotor cues effectively in action attribution (Knoblich & 
Repp, 2009), music-making may improve predictions of self-generated outcomes. 
However, action attribution style is also likely to be determined by the accuracy of 
predictions made for others’ actions and for the combined actions of both self and 
other (Pacherie, 2011), which is likely to develop through experience in intricate 
joint action. 
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Again, it was in ambiguous conditions that the observed effects of HP and ME on 
misattribution were most pronounced. HP correlated with increased misattribution 
towards other (Fig. 2.5a) as well as increased variability (Fig. 2.6a) in the middle of 
the self-to-other continuum. The latter fits with research associating psychotic 
symptoms of schizophrenia to the formation of indiscriminate (noisy) action-
outcome associations and predictions (Moore & Obhi, 2012). Findings that link 
delusions to a tendency to jump to conclusions in uncertain situations (Linney et al., 
1998; Van Dael et al., 2006) and an inability to tolerate ambiguity (Colbert & Peters, 
2002; Grube, 2002) support the fundamental role of ambiguity as a trigger for 
psychotic-like experiences. There is also, of course, robust and widespread evidence 
for poor performance on diverse information processing tasks in schizophrenia 
(Potkin et al., 2009) including salience processing (Kapur, 2003; Walter et al. 2010) 
and attention (Tyson et al., 2008) – skills that are likely to mediate the detection and 
resolution of conflicting information. Interestingly, these skills have also been related 
to impaired social functioning (Cohen et al., 2006:236). Building on work identifying 
theory of mind (ToM) difficulties in schizophrenia (Corcoran, 2000; Brune 2003), 
research has more recently focused more generally on social cognition (Biedermann 
et al., 2012; Mier et al. 2010; Walter et al., 2010) and between-individual interaction 
(Liepelt et al., 2012; Trognon, 1992; Wan et al., 2008.).  
 
Frith (1992) among others has argued that such cognitive deficits and the unusual 
beliefs that are a core feature of schizophrenic delusions are rooted in a lower-level 
self-monitoring impairment. Our findings put forward the argument that socio-
cognitive difficulties may be underpinned by misattribution during the processing of 
causal ambiguity within social contexts. Notably, only inductive information 
processing can help within characteristically ambiguous social situations because 
deductive processes rely on definitive information (Corcoran et al., 2006; Bennett & 
Corcoran, 2010). Ambiguity drives a hunt for disambiguating information (Gibson, 
1966:303) from the internal or external environment. These are the very reality-
testing reflexes that may be dysfunctional in individuals experiencing psychosis 
(e.g., Aggemaes, 1972; Moritz & Woodward, 2006). Future research could examine 
individual differences in information-seeking strategies within ambiguous contexts. 
 
Finally, the association found between ME and attenuated misattribution and 
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variance within-individuals was also most pronounced in ambiguous conditions. This 
finding resonates with those demonstrating that long-term music training is related to 
improvements in working memory (e.g., George & Cock, 2011) and other higher 
order cognitive skills that involve simultaneous processing of information and 
attentional control (e.g., Lee et al., 2007; Helmbold et al., 2005; Moreno & Besson, 
2006). Longitudinal studies have also shown that such improvements are more likely 
to result from musical training rather than from any innate musical predisposition 
(e.g., Lahav et al., 2007; Hyde et al., 2009; Moreno et al., 2009). Experience-induced 
improvements in executive function have also been observed outside the domain of 
music (Hussey et al., 2012; Manly & Murphy, 2012). For example, individuals with 
Tourette’s syndrome have shown enhanced cognitive control on executive function 
tests which may be explained by the constant effort exerted to suppress tics when in 
public (Mueller et al., 2006). This finding is consistent with an increased need to 
monitor and control movements and may indicate a subcortical locus for the 
triggering of tics. It also suggests that the constant need to suppress tics could have 
resulted in an enhancement of the executive processes involved in inhibitory control. 
Music therapy findings also show improvement in patients with positive symptoms 
(Silverman, 2003; Peng et al., 2010; Na & Yang, 2009). This research, alongside our 
finding of an interaction between HP and ME (Fig. 2.5c), supports the view that 
attribution abilities are malleable. It also leaves open the possibility that engagement 
in intricate joint-action from an early age is what enables individuals to learn to 
differentiate self from other in ambiguous contexts.  
 
Whether increasing attribution accuracy in ambiguous contexts is possible through 
experience in particular activities and whether this would alleviate distressing 
symptoms of psychosis are open questions. However, given the findings presented 
here, research directly comparing behavioural and neural differences between 
individuals with passivity-related phenomena and expert joint-actors such as 
musicians is justified.  
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2.6. Summary and conclusions  
 
Results from this study support previous findings that show action attribution to be 
continuous rather than categorical and stresses the central role that ambiguity plays 
in action attribution and agency. The study confirms the link between action 
attribution deficiencies, passivity-related phenomena and schizotypal traits. 
However, these are the first experimental findings to suggest that such deficiencies 
may be related to an impairment in processing causal ambiguity between self and 
other. Data showing ME to be associated with reduced misattribution within 
ambiguous contexts suggest that action attribution style may be malleable, and that 
extensive experience in joint-action could improve attribution abilities. Finally, the 
important clinical question of whether experience-based improvement in action 
attribution can lead to a reduction of passivity symptoms is a worthwhile avenue for 
future investigation. 
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Neural response to modulating the probability that actions of self or other result 
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[de Bézenac, C. E., Sluming, V., Gouws, A., & Corcoran, R. (2016). Neural response 
to modulating the probability that actions of self or other result in auditory tones: A 
parametric fMRI study into causal ambiguity. Biological Psychology, 119, 64-78.] 
 
 
Christophe E. de Bézenac (corresponding author) 
Psychological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Waterhouse Building, Block B, 2nd Floor, L69 3BX, 
United Kingdom 
cedb@liverpool.ac.uk  
 
Vanessa Sluming 
School of Health Sciences, Thompson Yates Building, The Quadrangle, Brownlow Hill, Liverpool, L69 
3GB, United Kingdom 
Vanessa.Sluming@liverpool.ac.uk 
http://www.liv.ac.uk/health-sciences/staff/vanessa-sluming/ 
 
Andre Gouws 
York Neuroimaging Centre (YNiC) 
The Biocentre , York Science Park, Heslington, York,YO10 5NY, United Kingdom 
andre.gouws@ynic.york.ac.uk 
https://www.ynic.york.ac.uk/about-us/people/andre  
 
Rhiannon Corcoran 
Psychological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Waterhouse Building, Block B, 2nd Floor, L69 3BX, 
United Kingdom 
Rhiannon.Corcoran@liverpool.ac.uk 
http://www.liv.ac.uk/psychology-health-and-society/staff/rhiannon-corcoran/ 
 
 
3.1. Abstract 
 
In normal circumstances we can easily distinguish between changes to the external 
world brought about by our own actions from those with external causes. However, 
in certain contexts our sense of ownership and agency over acts is not so clear. 
Neuroimaging studies have implicated a number of regions in the sense of agency, 
some of which have been shown to vary continuously with action-outcome 
discordance. However, little is known about dynamic, ambiguous contexts 
characterised by a lack of information for self-other differentiation, yet such 
ambiguous states are important in relation to symptoms and levels of consciousness 
that characterise certain mental health conditions. With a block-design fMRI 
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paradigm, we investigated neural responses to changes in the probability that a 
participant’s irregular finger taps over 12 sec would result in auditory tones as 
opposed to tones generated by ‘another’s finger taps’. The main findings were that 
misattribution increased in ambiguous conditions where the probability of a tone 
belonging to self and other was equal. Task-sensitive brain regions, previously 
identified in self-agency, motor cognition, and ambiguity processing, showed a 
quadratic response to our self-to-other manipulation, with particular sensitivity to 
self-control. Task performance (low error and bias) was related to attenuated 
response in ambiguous conditions while increased response in regions associated 
with the default mode network was associated with greater overall error and bias 
towards other. These findings suggest that causal ambiguity as it occurs over time is 
a prominent feature in sense of agency, one that may eventually contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of positive symptoms of psychosis. 
 
 
Keywords: Parametric design; fMRI; agency; causal ambiguity; self and other; 
prediction error 
 
 
Highlights 
 
• A parametric agency task manipulating the probability of self-other control 
• Misattribution increased in ambiguous conditions  
• Task-modulated regions showed a quadratic response most sensitive to self-
control 
• Task performance predicted attenuated response in ambiguous conditions 
• Overall error and bias towards other predicted increased response in DMN 
nodes  
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3.2. Introduction 
 
The ability to make accurate predictions about the underlying causes of sensory input 
is one of the primary tasks of the brain (Friston et al., 2010; Clark, A., 2013). In 
normal circumstances we automatically distinguish between changes to the external 
world brought about by our own actions from those with external causes. Agency – 
the sense of being the cause – is a multifaceted phenomenon, involving 
somatosensory signals, body schema, and also higher-order intentions, goals and 
desires (Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen, 2008). The comparator 
model proposes that sensory input that matches our prior intention or action (low 
prediction error) is experienced as self-generated, while a discrepancy (high 
prediction error) is more likely to be attributed to an external cause, such as another 
agent in the vicinity (Frith, 2005; Wegner, 2002; Von Holst, 1954). This prediction 
error mechanism, also observed at a sensorimotor level in non-humans (Bell, 2001; 
Poulet & Hedwig, 2002), is well supported by empirical work that manipulates the 
predictability of action consequences. For example, a number of paradigms use 
temporal delay or spatial displacement to distort the results of a participant’s action 
in visual, tactile, or auditory stimuli (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998a; Farrer et 
al., 2003; Lindner et al., 2005; Synofzik, Thier, & Lindner, 2006; Sato & Yasuda, 
2005). 
 
Neuroimaging research has implicated several brain regions in the attribution of 
actions to self and other and the associated sense of agency. These include areas 
known to be involved in sensorimotor processing and motor control such as the 
ventral premotor cortex (Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2007), the putamen (David et al., 
2007), the supplementary motor area (SMA) (Cunnington et al., 2006; Lau et al., 
2004) and cerebellum (Blakemore & Siriguet, 2003; Agnew & Wise, 2008). Multi-
modal regions involved in temporal aspects of cognition have also been implicated 
(Voeley & Kupke, 2007), including the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and inferior 
parietal lobe  (IPL) (Farrer et al., 2003; 2008; Agnew & Wise, 2008; Fink et al., 
1999), the dorso and ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; VLPFC) (Fink et al., 
1999; Schnell et al., 2007; David et al., 2007), the posterior segment of the superior 
temporal sulcus (pSTS) (Ramnani & Mial, 2004; Spengler et al, 2009), and the insula 
(Farrer et al., 2002; 2003) (for reviews see:  Sperduti et al., 2011; David et al., 2008). 
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While the exact function of these regions in agency processing remains unclear, with 
contradictory evidence in some cases, on the whole it is thought that action 
attribution to self and other is supported by partially distinct neural substrates 
(Sperduti et al., 2011). Increased activity in the PPC and IPL, for example, has 
tended to be linked to the attribution of action to external causes and to sensorimotor 
mismatch (Moore et al., 2010; Farrer et al., 2003; McGuire et al., 1996; Spence et al., 
1997; Ruby and Decety 2001; Farrer and Frith, 2002), while the putamen, insula, 
cerebellum, and SMA have been associated with attributing intentions and actions to 
self (Farrer & Frith, 2002; David et al., 2007; Haggard & Whitford, 2004; Lau et al., 
2004; Farrer et al., 2003; Leube et al., 2003).  
 
However, typically agentic decision-making does not involve information that 
clearly distinguishes self from other. Some studies have used experimental 
manipulations that allow intermediate conditions to be represented (Franck et al., 
2002; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Blakemore et al., 1998; Farrer et al., 2003). For 
example, in a PET study that manipulated the angular distortion of visual feedback, 
Farrer et al., (2003; 2004) found that the degree of a subject’s control over action 
outcomes modulated brain activity continuously, with the insula and cerebellum 
decreasing and the IPL and preSMA increasing with loss of control. That the sense 
or judgement of agency is a question of degree makes sense given that discrepancy 
between action and outcome (prediction error) can range from high to low with 
sensorimotor cues (e.g., timing between action and feedback) also varying in a 
continuous rather than a categorical manner. 
 
It is in ambiguous contexts where control over sensory outcomes belongs neither 
fully to self nor to other that agency is likely to be most challenged (de Bezenac et 
al., 2015). Take, for example, a situation where two or more individuals play a 
mutual game (e.g., Ouija board; Ansfield & Wegner, 1996). As the sensory input is 
co-produced and the mutually coordinated actions of self and other produce similar 
outcomes, it may be difficult for us to know whether an event is caused by self or by 
another participant (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Information for self-other 
differentiation is reduced making misattributions more likely: we may feel that 
others have control over events that in fact belong to self (bias towards other); or that 
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self has control over outcomes resulting from the action of others (a bias towards 
self). Though causal misattributions of this sort have been associated with 
phenomena such as delusions of control and auditory verbal hallucinations (Spence 
et al., 1997; Parnas & Handest, 2003; Jeannerod, 2009; Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005; 
Lindner et al., 2005; Frith, 2005; Woodruff, 2004), they are also characteristic 
features of complex social encounters, where the actions, intentions and resulting 
outcomes of participating individuals are matched, parallel and intricately 
comingled. However, despite its ubiquitous nature and potential relevance to 
disorders characterised by the blurring of self-other boundaries, still little is known 
about the role that ambiguity plays in causal attribution and how the brain responds 
to situations with reduced information for self-other differentiation.  
 
In a recent study, Fukushima et al., (2013) used a paradigm that adjusted delay 
between action and visual feedback to make agency maximally ambiguous for each 
individual. They found that attribution in such contexts was associated with activity 
in temporo-parietal areas (IPL, TPJ), medial frontal areas (SMA, ACC), the DLPFC, 
and frontal operculum/insula regions, while activity in posterior midline areas (PCC; 
precuneus) specifically correlated with self-attribution. Outside the domain of 
agency-focussed research, ambiguity has been studied as a key dimension of 
everyday experience that significantly influences decision-making and behaviour 
(Yoshida and Ishii, 2006). Imaging research on the topic has also implicated the 
DLPFC (Huettel et al., 2005), associated with conflict resolution (Mansouri et al., 
2009), the IPL (Britz et al., 2009; Volz et al., 2003), the ACC (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Stern et al., 2010; Critchley et al., 2001), an area thought to be involved in conflict 
detection (Carter et al., 2007) (for a review see, Krain et al., 2006), as well as the 
amygdala (Hsu et al., 2005; Zaretsky et al., 2010). That these regions (apart from the 
amygdala) have also been shown to be responsive to agency-related tasks supports 
the role of active ambiguity processing in agency.  
 
The ability to tolerate ambiguity has also been implicated in a range of 
psychopathological disorders including general anxiety disorder (Buhr & Dugas, 
2002), obsessive–compulsive disorder (Tolin, Woods, & Abramowitz, 2003), and 
schizophrenia (Broome et al., 2007). Understanding the relationship between 
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ambiguity and agency may therefore contribute to a more comprehensive 
conceptualisation of positive symptoms of psychosis. 
 
 
There are methodological challenges associated with examining how the brain 
responds to causal ambiguity. For example Fukushima et al.’s (2013) elegant study 
was limited by the fact that the paradigm did not allow neural response for 
ambiguous and non-ambiguous conditions to be compared. As the authors indicated, 
this could be achieved by parametrically varying the degree of ambiguity. In the 
continuous manipulation used by Farrer et al. (2003), differences between the 4 
successive conditions were not likely to be equal/systematic, as they included: (1) 
undistorted feedback (self); (2 and 3) varying degrees of feedback distortion (angular 
bias of 25 and 50 degrees, respectively); and (4) the outcome of the experimenter’s 
movement. Furthermore, a feedback distortion approach may be susceptible to 
adaptation confounds, with participant’s eventually recognizing themselves in non-
manipulated aspects of the stimuli (e.g., movement velocity) (Honda et al., 2012; 
Cunningham et al., 2001). It is also not obvious how much action-outcome 
discrepancy is required for a stimulus to be experienced as ambiguous or as 
belonging to other. Studies using such paradigms have therefore tended to rely on 
participant’s subjective attribution rating given as a categorical rather than 
continuous response (action of self: yes/no). Ideally, behavioural and brain response 
would be measured against an objective and systematic continuum ranging from 
control belonging fully to self, to control belonging fully to other, with ambiguity 
peaking in the middle. 
 
But what does the middle of a self-to-other continuum look, feel or sound like, and in 
what ways can information for self-other differentiation be reduced? According to 
Rimmon (1977), ambiguity emerges from a balanced system of conflicting cues. 
These cues can be balanced by pointing towards alternative interpretations (e.g., 
self/other) simultaneously or sequentially. By directly manipulating the degree of 
action-outcome discrepancy in distortion paradigms, keeping it constant within 
conditions, previous agency research has focused primarily on the former. In reality 
however, an event is processed in the context of other events that vary in action-
outcome discrepancy over time, pointing towards self one moment and other the 
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next. In dynamic social contexts outside experimental settings, the sense of agency is 
therefore likely to involve the weighing up and monitoring of successive stimuli, 
updating and averaging prediction error over a given period of time. In addition to 
previously mentioned agency-related brain regions, this may be expected to 
implicate networks associated with motor planning and adaptive learning that 
involve executive function and working memory (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Nieoullon, 
2002). A clearer understanding of how overall proportion of stimuli caused by self 
versus other is processed and experienced may help fill a gap that exists between 
research examining agency as it functions in different temporalities, ranging from 
sensorimotor processes operating primarily at smaller timescales, to the overall 
control that a person feels over their lives, which involves attribution averaged over 
larger timescales (Gallagher, 2013). From this perspective, causal ambiguity may be 
objectively defined: it emerges when the proportion of control over stimuli is equally 
distributed between self and other over a given period of time. This situation can 
arise when action-outcome discrepancy is neither high nor low and when it fluctuates 
between the two to an equal extent. In either setting, the information available for 
self-other differentiation is limited. 
 
The aim of this study was therefore to examine brain response to the proportion of 
control belonging to self in relation to other, with a particular focus on ambiguous 
situations where action outcomes do not exclusively belong to self or to other but to 
varying mixtures of both. To examine this, we used a tapping task developed in our 
lab (de Bezenac et al., 2015). In this task participants perform irregular self-paced 
taps for a duration of 12 seconds whilst listening to a sequence of tones. Rather than 
directly manipulating action-feedback discrepancy (as previous paradigms have 
done), we varied the probability that self-produced finger taps would result in 
auditory tones as opposed to taps belonging to ‘other’ (made up of randomised taps 
of self). This was done in 5 equal steps (conditions 1 to 5). Highest tap-tone 
synchrony occurred in condition 1 (C1) where probability was equal to 1 for self and 
0 for other, while maximal discordance occurred when probability was 0 for self and 
1 for other. Ambiguity peaked in the middle of the self-to-other continuum (C3) 
where tones were as likely to belong to self as to other (self=0.5; other=0.5), in 
random fluctuation. 
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Neural response to this self-to-other manipulation was tested in a parametric block 
design, taking advantage of its greater statistical power compared to event-related 
designs (Friston et al., 1999). Parametric designs have previously been used to 
investigate the specific roles that regions play in a given process (Cohen et al., 1997, 
Rees et al., 1997; Schlaug et al., 1996), avoiding some of the pitfalls associated with 
subtraction logic (Donders, 1969). After identifying regions showing significant 
response variation across conditions (in a whole brain group analysis), we used linear 
and non-linear regressors to characterise stimulus-response functions (Büchel et al., 
1998). The shape of the BOLD response has implications for the role played by 
identified regions in differentiating action outcomes belonging to self from those 
belonging to other. 
 
More specifically, regions previously identified as being associated with control 
belonging to self were expected to show an increased response as the likelihood of 
self-produced tones increased (a negative linear trend in relation to conditions 1-5). 
Regions previously identified as being sensitive to the actions of other were expected 
to increase as the proportion of tones belonging to other increased (a positive linear 
trend in relation to conditions 1 -5). A significant quadratic response was interpreted 
as sensitivity to causal ambiguity, indicating either a reduced or increased response 
near the middle (compared to the extremes) of the self-to-other continuum. 
Subjective attribution responses were also collected after each trial, allowing the 
function of identified regions to be further investigated using task performance 
measures. Given that (i) a paradigm allowing variation of self-other control within 
trials has not yet been used in an imaging study and (ii) the function of brain regions 
in agency is still unclear, we used conservative Z thresholds, whole-brain multiple 
comparison correction, and examined/presented stimulus-response functions in all 
significant regions rather than selecting them on the basis of a priori hypotheses. 
Thus, the aims of the study were 3-fold: (1) to identify brain regions responding to 
the proportion of self-other control over action outcomes, (2) to distinguish linear 
and nonlinear brain responses in these regions, and (3) to examine how response 
varied in relation to task performance.  
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3.3. Methods 
 
3.3.1. Participants 
Twenty-four healthy right-handed student volunteers (12 male, 12 female) took part 
in this study (age: M = 32.3, SD = 8.4). Participants had no previous history of mental 
illness or neurological abnormalities and reported the absence of difficulties in 
auditory, visual and somatosensory perception. The study was approved by the ethics 
committee of the University of Liverpool and conducted in accordance with committee 
policies. 
 
3.3.2. Experiment stimuli 
Audio-visual stimulus presentation and participant response collection were managed 
using Pure Data (Puckette, 1996: http://puredata.info/). In the scanner, participants 
completed the behavioural task using an MRI-compatible response box with 
instructions provided visually via a projector screen seen through inverting mirrors. 
Auditory stimuli were presented diotically through pneumatic tubes within the ear 
protector at a volume of 95 dB and consisted of a tone with the following 
parameters: cosine wave, 262 HZ; 100 ms duration; 20 ms onset ramp; 5 ms offset 
ramp. This tone could be triggered by one of the three keys of the response box 
positioned on the participant’s right thigh. All participants reported that the tone 
could be clearly heard during data acquisition, following finger taps without 
perceptible delay (inherent delay = 25ms).  
 
Tones could either result from the participant’s own actions (self) or from the actions 
of another individual (other). To ensure that stimuli were similar within participants 
and conditions, taps produced by other actually consisted of the participant’s own 50 
previous intertap intervals played back in a random order. The probability that a tap 
belonging to self would result in a tone (as opposed to one belonging to other) was 
manipulated in five equal steps, corresponding to the five experimental conditions 
(C) (C1 = probability of 1, C2 = .75, C3 = .5, C4 = .25, C5 = 0). Probability 
manipulation was achieved by generating a random number between 0 and 1 every 
time a self or other tap occurred. Each condition was associated with a threshold 
above which tones generated by self would be heard and below which tones 
generated by other would be heard. In condition 1, the threshold was set to 1, 
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meaning that all tones were self-generated (maximal tap-tone synchrony). In 
contrast, as condition 5 had a threshold of 0, all tones belonged to other (maximal 
tap-tone discordance). A threshold of .5 resulted in control being equally distributed, 
shifting between self and other (semi-discordance). Conditions 2 and 4 were 
allocated thresholds of .75 and .25, respectively. Fig. 3.1 provides an example of the 
result of the probability manipulation where temporal relationships between auditory 
tone onsets and self/other-generated taps are depicted as a series of peaks. Note that 
peaks in top lines (red), which represent a participant’s irregular taps (Self), are 
synchronised with tones heard in condition 1 (top line peaks meet middle line peaks), 
semi-synchronised in condition 3, and asynchronised in condition 5. 
 
Fig. 3.1. Temporal relationships between self-produced taps (red), tone heard (green), and taps of 
other (blue). Data shown are from one arbitrarily chosen participant from a pilot study in conditions 
equivalent to 1 (self fully in control), 3 (ambiguous control: the probability that self or other will 
produce a tone is equal), and 5 (other fully in control). Peaks in top lines (which represent the 
participant’s irregular taps), are synchronised with tones heard in condition 1 (peaks meet), semi-
synchronised in condition 3, and asynchronised in condition 5. 
 
3.3.3. Imaging parameters 
Scanning was performed at the Magnetic Resonance And Image Analysis Research 
Centre (MARIARC), University of Liverpool with a Siemens Trio 3.0 Tesla 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany), whole body MRI system, equipped with an eight-
channel phased array head coil. Foam padding and head restraints were used to 
minimise head movement during imaging. For fMRI scanning, echo-planar images 
were acquired using a T2* weighted gradient echo sequence with blood oxygen level 
dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 3000 ms; TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 90°, 49 slices, 
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distance factor = 10 mm, interleaved multi-slice mode, matrix = 64 x 64; FOV = 192 
mm; acquisition voxel size = 2.7 mm3). Each experimental scan consisted of 197 
contiguous EPI functional whole head volumes. Before preprocessing these 
functional data, the first eight volumes of each run were automatically removed to 
allow for magnetic stabilization. T1-weighted MR images were acquired sagitally for 
each participant with the following parameters: TE 5.57ms, TR 2040 ms, flip angle 
8º, FOV=256×256 mm2, 176 slices, voxel size 1×1×1 mm3. 
 
3.3.4. Experimental scan  
Participants were asked to perform series of irregular taps (“like Morse code”) using 
their right index finger whilst listening to a sequence of tones. A recorded example 
of tapping was provided and a practice session outside the scanner ensured that tap 
density was similar across participants and conditions. They were told that tones 
could either result from their own actions (self) or from the actions of another 
individual (referred to as ‘other’), and that the proportion tones belonging to self or 
other would vary between trials. Experimental blocks consisted of 12 seconds of 
tapping, indicated on the screen by the word “Play”. After each block, participants 
were given 5 seconds to report the proportion of control that they felt belonged to 
self or other along a continuum represented by a rectangular box within which a 
vertical bar appeared in a randomised initial position. Using the two remaining keys 
of the response box, participants were able to move that bar towards self (left) or 
other (right) to represent the locus of experienced control. The rating period was 
followed by a 6 second fixation cross (jittered by up to 2 seconds) to ensure that 
BOLD response returned to baseline levels, including a 3 digit countdown to the start 
of the following block (500 ms per digit). Each of the 5 conditions was repeated 10 
times and presented to participants in a pseudo-random order, with the constraint that 
consecutive conditions were not presented in consecutive blocks. The 50 blocks were 
divided into two 12-minute scans (25 blocks in each). A schematic representation of 
the experimental paradigm is provided in Fig. 3.2. Participants also underwent a 
T1/T2 structural, resting-state and DTI scan, meaning that scanning sessions were 
approximately 50 minutes long.  
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Fig. 3.2. Schematic representation of the experimental paradigm. 
 
 
3.3.5. fMRI data analysis  
Image analyses were performed using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 
6.00, part of FSL (FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). For each 
participant the following pre-statistic processing was applied: motion correction 
using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, 2002); slice-timing correction using Fourier-space 
time-series phase-shifting; spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 
5mm; grand-mean intensity normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single 
multiplicative factor; highpass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares 
straight line fitting, with sigma=45.0s). ICA-based exploratory data analysis was 
carried out using MELODIC (Beckmann, 2004), in order to investigate the possible 
presence of unexpected artefacts or activation. Following pre-statistics processing, a 
time series statistical analysis was carried out using FILM (FMRIB's Improved 
Linear Model) with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich et al., 2001).  
 
The general linear model (GLM) design matrix for the two experimental scans had 
one explanatory variable per condition that was "on" during corresponding blocks 
 111 
and "off" elsewhere. Parameter estimates (PE) were calculated for each explanatory 
variable using a double-gamma hemodynamic function in FEAT. Each condition was 
modeled as stimulus functions, contrasted with the baseline (rest) and all other 
conditions. Z (Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were thresholded at p=0.05 
(uncorrected) (Smith et al. 2004; Woolrich et al. 2004). Registration of EPI images to 
high resolution T1 images and then subsequently to the Montreal Neurological 
Institute standard brain (MNI152) was carried out using FLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 
2002; Jenkinson & Smith, 2001). A within-subject fixed effects analysis was then 
conducted to obtain the average BOLD response for each condition across the two 
experimental scans. Z (Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were again thresholded at 
p=0.05 (uncorrected). 
 
The results of the fixed effects analysis was then entered into a higher-level repeated 
measures analysis using mixed (random) effects implemented in FLAME (FMRIB's 
Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) stage 1 (Beckmann, 2003; Woolrich, 2004). The 
design matrix included estimates for each condition and for all 24 participants (120 
inputs in total). Given that previous studies have not specifically examined the 
proportion of control belonging to self versus other and to avoid potential biases of 
small volume correction, a conservative whole-brain analysis was carried out. 
Statistical images were thresholded using Gaussian random field theory with clusters 
determined by Z > 3.78 and a corrected cluster size significance threshold of p = 0.05 
(Worsley, 2001). A group-level F-test statistical image, derived from contrasts 
representing linear combinations of the five conditions, was generated to identify 
brain regions displaying any significant differences between conditions. To identify 
regions positively and negatively related to performance on the task, participants’ 
mean and SD of misattribution were also included as contrasts (centred around 0). 
 
As the goal was to characterise the direction and shape of the differences between 
conditions (positive/negative/linear/quadratic), a series of anatomical masks were 
created. These were defined as active voxels (Z>3.78 in the F-test statistical image) 
within hemisphere-specific regions determined by probabilistic structural atlases. 
Harvard-Oxford sub-cortical and cortical probabilistic atlases (FSLview 3.2.0, FSL 
software 5.0.4) were used for all brain regions apart from the cerebellum, which was 
defined by the MNI probabilistic structural atlas. Only voxels estimated at greater 
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than 50% probability of being in that brain structure were included in the mask. The 
number of voxels in each brain region was counted, and the voxel with the highest Z 
value located for each structure (Table 3.3). All masks were then transformed to 
participants’ native space and percent signal change evoked by each of the 5 
conditions was extracted from voxels within each mask (binarised) using FSL’s 
Featquery tool (fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fsl4.0/feat5/featquery.html).  
 
To investigate the activation pattern in each region, a linear regression and a second-
order polynomial were fitted to the responses at group level. A linear regression and 
a second-order polynomial were also fitted to each individual participant’s responses 
and paired t-tests were used to test differences between the R-squared of the two 
fitted equations in each region. A multilevel regression (with conditions nested 
within individuals), which allowed intercepts to vary across participants, was also 
performed for each region to examine the effects of task performance on responses 
across conditions. Finally, we introduced mean-centered individual differences in 
task performance into the model (contrasts) as a predictor of BOLD response across 
all condition. 
 
 
3.4. Results 
 
3.4.1. Behavioural data  
With data pooled over all participants and conditions the mean number of actions per 
block was 40.35 (SD=6.52), mean number of tones per block was 42.34 (SD=4.4), 
and mean attribution rating (scaled from 0 to 1) was 0.54 (SD=0.2).  
 
To validate the probability-based manipulation, a measure of tap tone synchrony was 
calculated as the correlation between tap and tone after the onsets of the two 
variables were smoothed (butterworth low-pass filter: order=1, band=0.01). Mean 
correlation (r) between tap-tone synchrony and condition was -0.97 (+- 0.01). 
Although there was a small tendency for participants to perform fewer taps as 
conditions increased (reduced control over tones), mean r = -0.27 (SD=0.17); this 
was shown to be non-significant for all but one participant (mean p=0.34, SD=0.26). 
The number of tones per block also did not vary significantly with condition, mean r 
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= 0.17 (SD=0.14) (mean p=0.4, SD=0.33). Table 3.1 shows tap-tone correlation, the 
number of taps and tones per block for each of the five conditions (with associated 
standard deviations). Taken together, this indicates that the manipulation aiming to 
systematically control the proportion of self-other control over tones had been 
successful and that conditions were well matched. 
 
Table 3.1. Summary statistics by condition (C1 - C5) with data pooled over all participants. 
 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
Manipulation threshold 1 0.75 0.50 0.25 0 
Tap tone correlation 1  
(0.00) 
0.72 
(0.08) 
0.52 
(0.07) 
0.28 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
Mean taps per block 42.80 
(5.80) 
40.78 
(6.63) 
40.15 
(6.22) 
39.06 
(6.26) 
38.93 
(7.32) 
Mean tones per block 42.80 
(5.80) 
43.43 
(4.46) 
44.65 
(4.40) 
43.16 
(4.61) 
39.07 
(4.88) 
Attribution 0.08 
(0.13) 
0.40 
(0.23) 
0.59 
(0.24) 
0.78 
(0.19) 
0.85 
(0.17) 
Misattribution 0.08 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.23) 
0.09 
(0.24) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
-0.15 
(0.17) 
 
Attribution ratings (provided on a 7-point scale) were analysed to check that the 
participants in the fMRI experiment rated the stimuli in line with what was intended. 
The attribution ratings of each participant were correlated with the five experimental 
conditions ranging from tones belonging to self to tones belonging to other. Given 
that all participants’ correlation values were > 0.46 (mean r = 0.77 +- 0.12) and 
significant (mean p<0.001), all participants were included in the imaging analysis.  
It was further determined that attribution was not related to the number of taps per 
block (r = -0.004) nor to the number of tones per block (r=0.05). Quadratic and linear 
regressions predicting attribution responses by condition (1 to 5) were fitted for each 
individual and a paired sample t-test confirmed that the R-squared values for the 
quadratic polynomial (M= 0.64, SD=0.15) were significantly higher (t(23)= -5.47, p< 
.0001) than those derived from the linear regression (M=0.6, SD=0.17). 
 
Misattribution, a measure of performance on the task, was calculated as the 
difference between attribution rating (scaled between 0 and 1) and condition 
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(rescaled from 0 to 1). Zero indicates a perfect score (i.e., no difference between 
perceived and actual control), with positive values indicating a bias towards other 
and negative values a bias towards self. Fig. 3.3 (a) shows the misattribution profile 
for all 24 participants with data pooled across conditions. Between-individual 
variation can be seen in at least two distinct ways: (1) how centered scores are 
around 0 (a perfect score) reflected in the standard deviation (SD) of misattribution; 
and (2) bias direction which can either point towards self (left-heavy distribution; 
negative score) or other (right-heavy distribution; positive score) reflected in mean 
(M) misattribution. Fig. 3.3 (b,c) shows how these two performance indicators – 
which we term error (SD misattribution) and bias (M misattribution) – varied across 
conditions, peaking near the middle of the self-to-other continuum (Table 3.2).   
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3. (a) Histogram showing the misattribution profile for all 24 participants with data pooled 
across conditions. (b) Error (SD of misattribution) across conditions; (c) Bias (self/other) (M 
misattribution) across conditions. The line in (b) and (c) represents the quadratic polynomial that best 
fitted the data and bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 115 
 
Table 3.2. Multilevel regression (conditions nested within participants) predicting error and bias with 
the quadratic polynomial of condition (proportion of tones belonging to self versus other).  
 
 
Error Bias 
(Intercept) 0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.03) (0.04) 
Condition 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Condition^2 -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
AIC -272.41 -213.40 
BIC -258.47 -199.47 
Log Likelihood 141.21 111.70 
Num. obs. 120 120 
Num. groups: subject 24 24 
Variance: subject.(Intercept) 0.00 0.00 
Variance: Residual 0.00 0.01 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
Statistical models 
 
3.4.2. Experimental  scan 
Fig. 3.4 shows the location of clusters within anatomically defined regions 
(thresholded at >50%) that showed significant differences between conditions in the 
whole-brain group analysis (Z>3.78, cluster corrected at p=0.05). The image results 
from an F-test and therefore represent all brain regions parametrically modulated by 
our task manipulation irrespective of response direction (positive, negative, 
quadratic) or participants’ subjective ratings. Radiological convention is used, with 
the right hemisphere represented on the left side.  
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Fig. 3.4. Location of clusters that showed significant difference between conditions (F-test, Z>3.78, 
cluster corrected at p=0.05). Regions were defined by the Harvard-Oxford Cortical and Subcortical 
Structural Atlases and the MNI probabilistic structural atlas (Cerbm) and thresholded at > 50% 
probability. Images follow the radiological convention, with the right hemisphere represented on the 
left side. The Statistical image is overlaid on the MNI-152 2mm brain with MNI coordinates given for 
cross hair locations. 
 
The name, abbreviation (Abbr), hemisphere (L/R), Brodmann area (BA), MNI 
coordinates and Z-statistic of peak voxels, and cluster size (mm3) are provided for 
each of the 19 regions in Table 3.3. In brief, these included a number of cortical 
regions (Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural Atlas) including, cingulate gyrus 
anterior division, cingulate gyrus posterior division, central opercular cortex, frontal 
orbital cortex, frontal pole, insular cortex, occipital pole, lateral occipital cortex 
inferior division, parietal operculum cortex, postcentral gyrus, precentral gyrus, 
supplementary motor cortex and temporal pole, as well as subcortical regions 
(Harvard-Oxford Subcortical Structural Atlas), including the accumbens, caudate, 
putamen, and thalamus. Areas of the cerebellum also showed significant response 
differences between conditions (MNI probabilistic structural atlas).  
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Table 3.3. MNI coordinates (x,y,z), peak voxels (Z) and size for clusters within anatomically defined 
regions (L= left; R=right) that showed significant difference between conditions (F-test, Z>3.78, 
cluster corrected at p=0.05). Regions are defined by the Harvard-Oxford Cortical and Subcortical 
Structural Atlases and the MNI probabilistic structural atlas (Cerbm) thresholded at > 50% 
probability. Region abbreviation (Abbr), hemisphere (L/R) and Brodmann areas (BA) associated with 
peak voxels are provided.   
 
Region Abbr L/R BA MNI coordinates (x, y, z) Z 
(max) 
Size 
(cm3) 
Accumbens Accbns R 25 10 12 -4 4.39 0.96 
  L 25 -12 8 -8 5.51 1.84 
Caudate Caud R - 16 -4 20 5.51 9.12 
  L - -14 -6 18 6.15 8.96 
Cerebellum Cerbm R - 32 58 -22 6.19 79.6 
  L 19 -24 -60 -22 5.77 36.72 
Cingulate Gyrus Anterior Division CGa R 24 6 24 26 6.11 34.4 
  L 24 -4 12 34 5.69 29.76 
Cingulate Gyrus Posterior Division CGp R 23 0 -32 26 4.61 3.12 
  L 23 -4 -18 44 5.88 6.56 
Central Opercular Cortex CO L 44 -38 4 8 5.61 4.8 
Frontal Orbital Cortex FOC R 38 24 12 -22 4.61 4.8 
  L 11 -24 32 -18 3.98 0.48 
Frontal Pole FP R 9 16 58 30 4.01 0.72 
  L 46 -36 46 30 4.23 1.76 
Insular Cortex INS R 48 40 6 2 4.62 3.6 
  L 48 -36 4 6 6.11 7.2 
Occipital Fusiform Gyrus OF R 18 20 -84 -14 5.62 3.92 
Lateral Occipital Cortex Inferior Division OLi R 19 40 -80 -12 4.39 1.2 
  L 19 -40 -78 -8 4.69 2.64 
Occipital Pole OP R 18 16 -92 -6 5.68 6.48 
  L 18 -30 -94 -2 3.88 0.24 
Parietal Operculum Cortex PO R 42 56 -26 18 4.07 0.16 
  L 48 -48 -32 20 4.81 4.24 
Postcentral Gyrus POG L 3 -48 -32 58 5.08 16.08 
Precentral Gyrus PRG R - 0 -16 52 3.83 0.8 
  L 6 -56 6 16 5.97 28.96 
Putamen Put R 48 30 -8 10 6.22 50.48 
  L 48 -30 -20 4 6.97 58.96 
Supplementary Motor Cortex SMC R 6 0 -6 64 6.08 9.92 
  L 6 -4 -4 70 6.17 24.48 
Thalamus Thal R - 14 -18 12 6.16 31.12 
  L - -12 -18 12 6.15 28.64 
Temporal Pole TP R - 58 10 -4 4.44 1.52 
  L - -56 8 -4 5.03 1.84 
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The response pattern across conditions is shown for each region in Fig. 3.5. 
Responses showing similar patterns in the right and left hemispheres were combined. 
Response in all regions shown to be significant at group level displayed greater 
sensitivity to self, decreasing as the proportion of tones belonging to other increase. 
Another consistent observable feature is the quadratic character of the response in 
brain regions.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.5. Response patterns (% signal change) across conditions. Responses showing similar patterns 
in the right and left hemispheres were combined; L= left; R = right. 
 
Results at group level showed bigger R-squared values for the quadratic polynomial 
than for the linear regression all brain regions. Quadratic and linear regressions were 
then fitted to the individual responses in each region and paired sample t-tests 
confirmed that the R-squared values for the quadratic polynomial were significantly 
higher than the R-squared for the linear regression in all the regions (Table 3.4). 
Although brain areas showing positive, negative, U-shaped and inverted U-shaped 
response patterns to our manipulation were observed at the individual level analysis, 
areas showing significant differences between conditions at the group level (mixed 
effects analysis), displayed a negative linear response with a positive quadratic 
component.  
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Table 3.4. R-squared values for the linear and quadratic polynomial regressions for each region with 
data pooled across participants (R=right; L=left; B= both). Results of paired t-tests comparing R-
squared values for the linear and quadratic polynomial regressions fitted for each participant within 
each region (n is the number of participants included in the t-test; ML and SDL is the mean and 
standard deviation of R-squared for the linear regression, MQ and SDQ is the mean and standard 
deviation for the quadratic polynomial regression; df = n-1).   
 
  R-squared (group)  t-test (individual) 
Regions  L Q  n ML SDL MQ SDQ t-value 95% CI 
Accbns L 0.61 0.69  19 0.41 0.25 0.66 0.26 -4.6*** 0.14, 0.37 
Caud B 0.89 0.99  24 0.46 0.24 0.63 0.2 -4.61*** 0.09, 0.25 
Cerbm B 0.86 0.94  24 0.53 0.28 0.66 0.26 -3.89** 0.06, 0.2 
CGa B 0.74 0.89  24 0.35 0.29 0.56 0.31 -4.36*** 0.11, 0.32 
CGp B 0.79 0.94  24 0.4 0.32 0.66 0.31 -4.85*** 0.15, 0.37 
CO L 0.63 0.86  24 0.38 0.27 0.62 0.28 -5.83*** 0.15, 0.32 
FOC R 0.86 0.99  24 0.47    0.31 0.68    0.25 -3.81**  0.1, 0.33 
FP L 0.67 0.95  21 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.27 -5.72*** 0.21, 0.46 
INS B 0.42 0.79  24 0.31 0.28 0.56 0.32 -6.07*** 0.17, 0.34 
OF R 0.95 0.95  20 0.36 0.29 0.55    0.29 -4.44*** 0.1, 0.28 
OLi  L 0.57 0.85  6 0.12 0.12 0.44 0.24 -2.57* 0, 0.65 
OP R 0.87 0.93  24 0.47 0.3   0.67    0.3   -4.13***  0.1, 0.29 
PO  L 0.95 0.96  24 0.43 0.31 0.57 0.31 -3.81** 0.06, 0.21 
POG L 0.58 0.82  24 0.31 0.25 0.56 0.26 -5.27*** 0.15, 0.35 
PRG  L 0.77 0.95  24 0.46 0.28 0.68 0.28 -4.8*** 0.12, 0.31 
Put B 0.87 0.98  24 0.56 0.25 0.75 0.24 -4.69*** 0.11, 0.28 
SMC B 0.79 0.97  24 0.39 0.29 0.65 0.27 -5.23*** 0.16, 0.36 
Thal B 0.91 0.99  24 0.46 0.29 0.58 0.27 -4.03** 0.06, 0.17 
TP B 0.88 0.95  23 0.38 0.27 0.58 0.26 -4.58*** 0.11, 0.29 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05       
 
Table 3.5 shows results of the multilevel regression for brain regions with significant 
main or interaction effects of error (SD misattribution) and/or significant main or 
interaction effects of bias (M misattribution). Using the R package visreg, version 
2.0–4 (Breheny & Burchett, 2012), visualisation of the relationship between 
condition (x) error (upper row), and bias (lower row) in predicting percent signal 
change (blue to red) may be seen in Fig. 3.6. Low error predicted reduced response 
in the caudate, cingulate gyrus anterior division, precentral gyrus, putamen and right 
thalamus, particularly in the middle of the self-to-other continuum (a more 
pronounced quadratic u-shape). In the caudate, cerebellum, precentral gyrus,, and 
putamen, a bias towards self was associated with a greater negative linear response 
while a bias towards other showed a positive linear trend. No bias in these regions 
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showed reduced activity in ambiguous conditions. Negative linear response was 
more pronounced in the cingulate gyrus anterior division and supplementary motor 
cortex as bias towards other increased.    
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6. Heat maps showing the relationship between condition (x) and error (SD misattribution) 
and/or bias (M misattribution) (y) in predicting responses (% signal change) (blue to red). Only 
regions with significant main and/or interaction effects are included in the figure. Responses showing 
similar patterns in the right and left hemispheres were combined. 
 
Table 3.5. Multilevel regression (conditions nested within individuals) using condition, standard 
deviation (SD) and mean (M) of misattribution to predict responses within brain regions showing 
significant differences between conditions (F-test).  
 
 
Caud Cerbm CGa L CGp PRG Put SMC Thal R 
(Intercept) -0.04 0.13** -0.40*** -0.41*** 0.20*** -0.03 0.48*** -0.08 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) 
Condition -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Condition^2 0.03* 0.03* 0.05* 0.06* 0.02* 0.04*** 0.05* 0.03* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Error 0.54* 0.44 0.64 0.79* 0.25* 0.47* 0.55 0.52* 
 
(0.27) (0.26) (0.37) (0.40) (0.12) (0.21) (0.37) (0.25) 
Bias -0.36* -0.24 -0.30 -0.48 -0.22* -0.27 -0.48 -0.26 
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(0.18) (0.17) (0.24) (0.26) (0.09) (0.14) (0.24) (0.17) 
Condition : Error -0.28* -0.04 0.11 -0.29 -0.03 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 
 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.21) (0.06) (0.10) (0.18) (0.13) 
Condition : Bias 0.18 0.27* 0.37* 0.39* 0.14* 0.32** 0.36* 0.18 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.19) (0.06) (0.10) (0.17) (0.12) 
AIC -73.97 -71.12 18.94 40.28 -218.31 -119.09 31.96 -80.77 
BIC -34.94 -32.10 57.96 79.31 -179.29 -80.07 70.98 -41.74 
Log Likelihood 50.98 49.56 4.53 -6.14 123.16 73.55 -1.98 54.38 
Num. obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Num. groups: subject 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Variance: subject.(Intercept) 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.03 
Variance: Residual 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
Participants with greater overall error (Fig. 3.6, row 1) and bias (Fig. 3.6, row 2) 
towards other showed increased response during the task in medial prefrontal and 
posterior cingulate/precuneus areas (see red clusters in Fig. 3.7, row 1). A spatial 
cross correlation with intrinsic connectivity networks (ICN) as defined by Laird et al. 
(2013) showed greatest overlap with the default mode network (DMN) (ICN13) for 
both error (r = .32) and bias towards other (r = .34) – a network associated with 
internally focussed thought, theory of mind and social cognition tasks (Laird et al., 
2013). In contrast, lower error most closely corresponded to a network involved in 
motor movements (ICN8: r = .34), and lower-level visual processing (ICN12: r = 
.31), while bias towards self showed greatest overlap with a network associated with 
auditory perception and discrimination (ICN16: r = .28). 
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Fig. 3.7. Location of regions showing increased (red) and decreased (blue) responses in relation to 
overall error (SD Misattrition) and bias (M Misattribution). The Statistical image is thresholded at 
Z>3.78 (cluster corrected at p=0.05) overlaid on the MNI-152 2mm brain with MNI coordinates given 
for cross hair locations. 
 
 
3.5. Discussion 
 
In this study we investigated response patterns to modulating the probability that 
control over action-outcomes belonged to self or other. The aim was to shed light on 
how we process causal ambiguity – situations where information for differentiating 
between events caused by self or other/s is reduced. Participants performed a series 
of irregular finger taps whilst listening to a sequence of auditory tones that could 
either be produced by self or ‘other’ (randomised self-taps). Probability for self-other 
control was manipulated in 5 equal steps, resulting in a continuum ranging from all 
tones belonging to self (condition 1) to all tones belonged to other (condition 5). In 
contrast to a previous study that relied on subjective ratings (Fukushima), peak 
ambiguity in our paradigm could be objectively defined as the middle of this self-to-
other continuum. Control in condition 3 was as likely to belong to self as to other, 
randomly fluctuating between the two over the 12 sec trial period. Following each 
trial, participants attributed control along a self-to-other continuum. Derived 
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performance measures were used to validate the task and shed additional light on the 
function of implicated regions. 
 
Confirming findings of a previous behavioural study conducted by de Bezenac et al. 
(2015), results showed that this method was able to systematically vary tap-tone 
correlation over the 5 conditions (r = -0.97). Participants were also able to accurately 
attribute control to self and other (mean r = 0.77), indicating that the manipulation 
successfully captures cues used to explicitly evaluate causal relationships. The 
finding that task error (the deviation from a perfect score) and bias (direction of 
error) towards other peaked near the middle of the self-to-other continuum, supports 
the idea that allowing control over sensory outcomes to fluctuate between self and 
other over time reduces information for self-other differentiation (Fig. 3.3b). It also 
suggests a tendency to over estimate the amount of control that others possess in 
ambiguous contexts, though bias shifts towards self when other is in full control (Fig. 
3.3c). As the task was neutral, a question for future research is how this pattern might 
be modulated by negatively and positively valenced stimuli. 
 
To determine how the brain responded to the manipulation, regions showing 
significant differences between conditions were anatomically defined for each 
participant and percent signal change extracted for each condition. Linear and 
quadratic predictors were used to characterize stimulus-response functions. The main 
findings from this analysis were: (i) response in task-modulated regions was 
continuous; (ii) response in all regions decreased as the proportion of control 
belonging to other increased but also showed a positive quadratic component (overall 
U-shape pattern); and (iii) lower error and bias was associated with reduced response 
in ambiguous conditions in a number of regions.  
 
Response in regions previously associated with self agency were also shown to be 
more sensitive to control belonging to self than to other in our manipulation, 
including the SMA (SMC), cerebellum, putamen, insula, ACC (CGa), and the 
DLPFC (FP) (Farrer & Frith, 2002; David et al., 2007; Haggard & Whitford, 2004; 
Lau et al., 2004; Farrer et al., 2003; Leube et al., 2003). Response in these regions 
varied continuously rather than categorically, consistent with the notion that agency 
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is often a question of degree in the brain, with relevant sensorimotor cues also 
varying in a continuous manner (Farrer et al., 2003; Gallagher, 2013).  
 
Previous findings have also identified brain regions more sensitive to other than to 
self. One of the most consistent findings in neuroimaging research on the topic of 
agency is increased response during external control in inferior and posterior parietal 
areas (IPL; angular gyrus; temporo-parietal junction; PPC) (Sperduti et al., 2011; 
Moore et al., 2010; Farrer et al., 2003; McGuire et al., 1996; Spence et al., 1997; 
Ruby and Decety 2001; Farrer and Frith, 2002). However, this pattern was not 
observed in the present study. Here, no brain areas that showed significant response 
variation across conditions in the group analysis showed augmented activity when 
control belonged more to other. We suspect that this discrepancy reflects key 
differences in the design of studies. In distortion paradigms, sensorimotor mismatch 
is held constant within conditions (Farrer et al., 2003). In contrast, using our 
probability manipulation, the temporal distance between action and outcome (tone) is 
not controlled directly and varies randomly within conditions. This approach 
highlights agency-related regions sensitive to the overall proportion of self-other 
control over a given period of time (12 sec), rather than those involved in detecting 
local sensorimotor discrepancies. That previously observed inferior parietal areas 
were not identified through our manipulation may suggest greater correspondence 
with the latter function. Though these regions were found when comparing agency to 
non-agency (agency > colour) in Fukushima et al.’s study (2013), activity did not 
differentiate between judgements of self and non-self, suggesting a greater 
involvement at lower stages of the attribution process. In relation to the overall 
absence at the level of group of response relating to other, it may be that between-
individual response variability increases in larger timescales as control belongs to 
other. Such an interpretation is supported by that fact that such stimulus-responses 
functions were observed at the individual level of analysis. Analyses of these 
patterns in relation to certain individual differences may be warranted.   
 
The quadratic component found to be significant in all task-modulated regions 
suggests that areas involved in determining the proportion of control that self versus 
other possesses over sensory stimuli are also sensitive to the amount of information 
available for differentiating self from other. Identified regions included the ACC and 
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DLPFC – areas previously implicated in ambiguity processing during both decision-
making (Huettel et al., 2005; Botvinick et al., 2001; Stern et al., 2010; Critchley et 
al., 2001) and agency (Fukushima et al., 2013). This suggests a role for these regions 
in processing ambiguity irrespective of domain (e.g., Neta et al., 2013). The pattern 
showing greatest response where attribution was most obvious, i.e. the extremes of 
the self-to-other continuum but particularly when self was in control, fits with the 
proposal that the DLPFC is involved in conflict resolution (Mansouri et al., 2009). 
The ambiguity implicit in most attribution tasks may partially explain the 
involvement of the DLPFC found in previous agency studies (Fink et al., 1999; 
Blakemore et al., 1998; Schnell et al., 2007; Farrer et al., 2008).  
 
What is less clear is why the same response pattern was observed in the ACC (as 
opposed to an inverted U-shaped pattern), given its putative involvement in conflict 
detection (Carter et al., 2007). However, there is uncertainty about response direction 
to ambiguity in this region. Some imaging studies have found reliable ACC 
activation when tasks require the ongoing adjustment of cognitive resource allocation 
(Botvinick et al., 1999; Paus, 2001), with others showing relative deactivation during 
tasks also requiring cognitive control, for example, when performing antisaccades 
(Polli et al., 2005). Another factor that may contribute to determining response 
direction in the ACC is whether tasks require disambiguation (e.g., Neta et al., 2013). 
As, in the present study, participants responded along a self-to-other continuum 
following each trial, there was arguably less need to disambiguate than in other 
agency paradigms where categorical self/other responses were solicited.  
 
Although decrease (relative deactivation) in BOLD signal is still poorly understood, 
it is thought to reflect neuronal inhibition (Frankenstein et al., 2003). There is 
evidence that inhibition plays a central role in executive functions including working 
memory (Rosen & Engle, 1998; Tomasi et al., 2006; Baddeley et al., 1998). It has 
also been linked to accurate performance in cognitive control tasks (Polli et al., 
2005) and complex skills, such as the suppression of possibilities related to a target 
concept in semantic processing (Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996; Mirman & Graziano, 
2013). Deficits in inhibitory function have been associated with psychopathologies, 
including schizophrenia and epilepsy (Clark, 1996). Consistent with these studies, 
reduced response in ambiguous conditions also correlated with low error and bias. 
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This may reflect a strategy of selectively suppressing internal or external stimuli in 
ambiguous conditions, such that definitive attribution judgments are suspended 
during the information-gathering period. Inhibition, defined as the ability to suppress 
dominant, automatic, or prepotent responses (Stroop, 1935), among other aspects of 
cognitive control, may play a key role in the neural architecture for responding to 
causal ambiguity as it occurs over time.  
 
Individuals who demonstrated stronger bias towards other throughout the task 
showed more activity in MPFC, precuneus, PCC and the ACC – areas that include 
key nodes of the DMN. Neuroimaging studies have also shown task-related 
deactivations in DMN regions accentuated by performance accuracy and task 
difficulty (Harrison et al., 2011; Gilbert et al., 2012; Polli et al., 2005). It has been 
suggested that this represents the reallocation of processing resources (McKiernan et 
al., 2003). It may be that individuals who make more attribution errors have a less 
developed ability to allocate or distribute resources to lower-level perceptual areas 
associated with low error and bias in our study. Broca’s region (BA 44, 45), a motor 
speech-production area involved in understanding, imitating and sequencing action 
(Nishitani et al., 2004), was also found to be sensitive to individual differences in 
task performance. Participants who made more errors had greater response in left 
hemisphere areas, primarily associated with language-related functions (Bookheimer, 
2002), while less error and bias predicted greater response in the right hemisphere, 
implicated in the voluntary inhibition of imitative (Brass et al., 2005), perceptual 
sequencing tasks (Schubotz & von Cramon, 2004), and in viewing ambiguous facial 
expressions (Nakamura et al., 1999).  
 
A number of subcortical regions less featured in previous agency studies were shown 
to be sensitive to our probability manipulation, including the putamen, caudate, 
nucleus accumbens, and thalamus. These regions, connected to widely distributed 
areas of the cortex and the PFC in particular (Choi et al., 2012), are involved in the 
regulation of dopamine, which is fundamental to a diverse range of cognitive and 
attentional processes including attention-mediated allocation of cognitive resources 
(see review by Nieoullon, 2002), many of which are relevant to agency. These 
include motivation associated with motor control and seeking behaviour, the 
planning of voluntary action, the on-line monitoring of its environmental context, 
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temporal estimation, and anticipatory adaptive learning involving executive 
functions and working memory (Arias-Carrión & Pöppel, 2007; Groenewegen, 2003; 
Nieoullon, 2002). These functions are likely to be implicated in monitoring causal 
relationships particularly as they occur over time during action performance. Altered 
dopamine neurotransmission has also been implicated in a number of disorders 
involving distortions in time perception and timed performance (Allman & Meck, 
2012), including schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease, ADHD and autism (Swerdlow 
& Koob, 1987; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1993; Bernheimer et al., 1973; Berger and 
Posner, 2000; Goldberg et al., 1987). That brain regions involved in time-perception 
were identified in the present study makes sense given that self-other difference was 
defined temporally in our task. 
 
The subcortical regions identified in this study have also been shown to be 
responsive to varied and even contradictory stimulus types, including reward, 
aversion, and unpredictability (Volman et al., 2013), leading to their proposed 
involvement in situated salience  (Luna at al., 2004; Berridge & Robinson, 1998; 
Schultz et al. 1997). Other regions found in our study, the ACC and insula in 
particular, are also core nodes of the salience network – a system thought to 
contribute to affective and social cognition by enabling the selection of the most 
relevant internal and external stimuli (Seeley et al., 2007; Menon & Uddin, 2010). In 
a previous parametric fMRI study, a U-shaped response found in the amygdala in 
relation to face trustworthiness was interpreted as reflecting the region’s role in 
processing behaviourally salient events as opposed to fear that would predict a 
positive linear response (Said et al., 2009). However, a later study found that same 
pattern in response to face trustworthiness and gender, not only in the amygdala, but 
also in all other face-selective regions investigated (Mattavelli et al., 2012). This 
finding taken with those of the current study suggests that this type of U-shaped 
salience response may be wide spread in the brain, with stimuli processed in terms of 
their distinction from an ambiguous average. In a neutral task at least, situations that 
clearly point to self or other may inform subsequent behaviour more directly than 
those that are causally ambiguous.   
 
Despite the significantly better fit afforded by including a quadratic polynomial to 
the model, response was greater when control belonged to self than to other. This 
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may be explained by the relative similarity between self- and other-generated tones 
that only varied in their temporal relationship to the participant’s taps. In everyday 
experience stimuli belonging to other is generally more starkly defined. It is possible 
that more pronounced difference between stimuli generated by self and those 
generated by other would result in an actual U-shape. This could be examined in 
future research by manipulating a greater number of naturally occurring cues that 
contribute to self-other differentiation, including for example auditory differences in 
location, timbre and intensity, or cues from multiple sensory modalities. 
Interestingly, the region found to have the most pronounced quadratic component in 
the present study was the insula, which may explain why the initial finding 
associating insula activity with sense of self control was not systematically replicated 
(David et al., 2008).  
 
Another avenue for further investigation into the role of ambiguity in agency 
processing is to compare neural response to ambiguity in self-other differentiation 
with ambiguity as it occurs in ‘other-other’ differentiation (i.e., a passive self 
distinguishing one person from another). Given the absence of internally-derived 
sensorimotor information in the case of the latter (e.g., proprioception), ambiguity is 
likely to be even more prominent, though arguably less salient/relevant to self. 
Hallucinations have been associated with a reduced ability to use such internal 
signals to make accurate predictions about the effects self-produced thoughts and 
actions (Frith, 2005), therefore, identifying neural correlates specifically associated 
with ambiguity in self-other differentiation through direct contrast with other-other 
differentiation may eventually also contribute to clinical understanding.  
 
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 
In summary, our results provide evidence suggesting that causal ambiguity is a 
prominent feature in self-other attribution and the experience of agency, more 
generally. We used a novel approach that allowed ambiguity, as it occurs over time, 
to be objectively defined and parametrically manipulated. Brain regions previously 
identified in agency, motor cognition, salience, and ambiguity processing showed 
greatest sensitivity to self-control and an attenuated response in conditions where 
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information for self-other differentiation was reduced. This response pattern was 
associated with task performance in a number of task-related regions, with low error 
and bias predicting reduced response. Individuals who made more errors and biased 
responses over the entire task also showed increased activity in regions associated 
with the DMN. Overall these findings suggest that causal relationships are processed 
in terms of their distinctiveness from uncertain contexts. A greater understanding of 
ambiguity-processing in agency may shed additional light on positive symptoms 
associated with psychosis. Future studies, for example, could explore how response 
across a self-to-other continuum is modulated by individual differences associated 
with agency deficits in both neutral and valenced contexts and compare neural 
response to ambiguity in self-other and other-other differentiation. 
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4.1. Abstract 
 
The ability to distinguish the effects of own from others’ actions is a prerequisite for 
effective interpersonal functioning. Difficulties in self-other differentiation have 
been linked to positive symptoms of schizophrenia such as hallucinations, with 
causally ambiguous situations where actions of both self and other produce similar 
results proving a universal challenge. Evidence has shown that individuals who 
spend time in ambiguous contexts, such as music-making, may become better at self-
other discrimination. This study explores brain-behaviour relationships associated 
with self-other processing, in differentially ambiguous contexts. Using a block-
design fMRI paradigm, we manipulated the probability that a participant’s finger 
taps would result in auditory tones as opposed to tones generated by ‘another’s finger 
taps’ with ambiguity at its highest when the probability of self- and other-produced 
tones was equal. Positive schizotypy and the inability to tolerate ambiguity predicted 
increased activation in multiple brain networks (i.e., DMN, visual, auditory and 
sensorimotor) and regions (i.e., cingulate and temporal) while processing ambiguous 
stimuli. In contrast, reduced response in the same areas was associated with 
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increasing musical experience and improving task performance. Our findings suggest 
the possibility that practice-induced improvement in self-other differentiation under 
conditions of maximal uncertainty may prove an alternative treatment for troubling 
hallucinations. 
 
 
Keywords: fMRI; Agency; causal ambiguity; self-other processing; schizotypy; 
healthy brain; functional networks; musical experience; ambiguity-processing 
 
 
Highlights 
 
• Individual differences predicted response in causally ambiguous conditions   
• Overall response to ambiguity increased with positive schizotypy 
• Ambiguity-related response decreased with task performance and musical 
experience 
 
 
4.2. Introduction  
 
4.2.1. Self-other differentiation 
The ability to accurately distinguish acts of the  ‘self’ from those of  ‘others’ is a 
prerequisite for meaningful social interaction. Both internally and externally derived 
information is typically present to help self-other differentiation. For example, 
outcomes belonging to self tend to closely match preceding intentions and actions 
(Wolpert et al. 1995; Frith, 2005; Wegner, 2003). Agency – the sense of being the 
cause – is therefore thought to be a multifaceted phenomenon, involving 
somatosensory signals, body schema, and also higher-order intentions and goals 
(Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen, 2008).  
 
A growing body of research has examined the neural correlates of agency, by 
comparing response to the unaltered visual feedback of a participant’s action with 
feedback that has been distorted using delay (Leube et al. 2003) or spatial 
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displacement (Farrer et al. 2003; David et al. 2007). These studies have implicated 
several distributed brain regions, with action attribution to self and other supported 
by partially distinct neural substrates (for reviews see Sperduti et al., 2011, David et 
al., 2008). For example, activation in the putamen, insula, cerebellum, and parieto-
occipital sulcus has been linked to self-agency (congruent vs. distorted feedback), 
though findings vary across studies (Farrer & Frith, 2002; David et al., 2007; 
Haggard & Whitford, 2004; Lau et al., 2004; Farrer et al., 2003; Leube et al., 2003). 
There is more consistent evidence that the right inferior parietal lobe  (IPL), the 
supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-SMA, precuneus, and medial prefrontal cortex 
are sensitive to the processing of distorted (assumed not-self) stimuli (Moore et al., 
2010; Farrer et al., 2003; McGuire, Silbersweig, & Frith, 1996; Spence et al., 1997; 
Ruby and Decety, 2001; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Pfeifer, Lieberman, & Dapretto, 
2007).  
 
4.2.2. Challenges in self-other differentiation 
Differentiating self from other is complex, not always straightforward. Mental states, 
intentions, biases, beliefs, and expectations influence how an individual attributes 
action outcomes to self and other (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Farrer et al., 2008; Sato, 
2009; Synofzik, Thier, & Lindner, 2006; Wegner, 2003). Moreover, difficulties 
distinguishing between self-produced versus externally-caused thoughts and actions 
is thought to constitute one of the core cognitive features of schizophrenia reflected 
in positive symptoms like delusions of control and auditory verbal hallucinations and 
reflected in positive schizotypy  (Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005; Frith, 2005; Jeannerod, 
2009; Spence et al., 1997; Woodruff, 2004; Lindner et al., 2005; Parnas & Handest, 
2003; Johns et al., 2001; Hauser et al., 2011; de Bezenac et al., 2015; Sugimori, Asai, 
and Tanno, 2011). Furthermore, neuroimaging has identified increased temporal and 
inferior parietal activation associated with perceived externally generated action in 
patients with positive symptoms (Spence et al., 1997; Jardri et al., 2011; Farrer et al., 
2004). Hallucinations have been associated with neural dysfunction in multiple 
cortical and subcortical regions, including over-activation in cingulate and auditory 
temporal areas (reviewed by Allen et al. 2008) with several functional networks 
more recently implicated. Examples include reduced task-related suppression of the 
default mode network (DMN) (Williamson and Allman, 2012) and abnormalities in 
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language-related, temporal, subcortical and salience networks (Welsh et al., 2010; 
Wolf et al., 2011; Liemburg et al., 2012; White et al., 2010). 
 
While the focus of much of the clinically-oriented agency literature has been on 
mechanisms internal to the perceiver (see review by Moore & Fletcher, 2012), 
misattribution can also be driven by external, situational factors (Wegner, 2002; 
2003). Notably, social contexts are often characterised by challenges in attributing 
intentions, actions, and their outcomes to ourselves and other agents (Frith, 2007). 
This is because events in such contexts tend to be co-produced, neither fully 
belonging to self or to other but resulting from the mutually regulated actions of both  
(Badino et al., 2014; Wing et al., 2014; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; 
Konvalinka et al., 2010). Take for instance the experience of singing in a choir and 
not knowing which part of the overall sound belongs to self as opposed to other choir 
members performing similar or complementary actions. The more integrated or 
similar self-produced outcomes are to those belonging to other(s) (e.g., in time, 
location, form and intensity), the less information there is on which to base self-other 
differentiation. In these contexts we may experience stimuli generated by self as 
belonging to other (other bias), or claim ownership of the results of others’ actions 
(self bias). 
 
Still, little is known about the role that lack of discriminating information (i.e., 
ambiguity) plays in self-other processing and how the brain responds to situations 
with reduced information to guide differentiation (Gallagher, 2013). This may be 
partly due to methodological challenges associated with adequately addressing this 
research question. Fukushima et al., (2013) used the feedback distortion approach, 
adjusting delay between action and visual feedback to make agency maximally 
ambiguous for each individual. They found that ambiguity in attribution was related 
to activity in temporo-parietal regions (IPL, TPJ), medial frontal areas (SMA, ACC), 
the DLPFC, and frontal operculum/insula regions, though the set-up employed did 
not allow ambiguity-related response to be compared to response related to non-
ambiguous conditions. In a recent behavioural study, we developed a tapping task 
that systematically manipulated the probability that self- or other-produced taps 
would result in auditory tones (de Bezenac et al., 2015), with the ‘other’ made up of 
the randomised tap timings of self. In contrast to previously used feedback distortion 
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paradigms, this approach allowed control over stimuli to be systematically 
manipulated along a self-to-other continuum meaning that causal ambiguity could be 
objectivity defined as the middle of the continuum where likelihood of tones 
belonging to self and other was equal. Findings from a subsequent fMRI study (de 
Bezenac, Sluming & Corcoran, under review) showed decreased response in the 
middle of the self-to-other continuum in a network of cortical and subcortical regions 
associated with self-agency. However, increased ambiguity-related response was not 
clear within the group results. The authors speculated that this was likely due to 
individual differences in factors associated with this self-other discrimination ability, 
suggesting the need for a nuanced analysis taking into account the most likely 
relevant variables 
 
4.2.3. Refining differentiation abilities 
The experience of ‘not knowing who has done what’ promoted by behavioural 
synchrony can be highly enjoyable and an intrinsically motivating aspect of joint 
activities such as music, dance, sport, and even everyday conversation (Coey et al., 
2012; Richardson et al., 2007; Himberg et al., 2015). However, such activities also 
explicitly require participants to monitor contributions of self in relation to those of 
others: failure to do so can result in unintentional, less effective and non-adaptive 
outcomes. It is possible that enjoyable but challenging joint-activities that require 
self-other differentiation may provide optimal conditions for refining this skill. This 
could explain some of the significant functional changes in motor, auditory and 
speech processing regions previously shown to be associated with musical training 
(reviewed in François et al., 2015). For example, Chen et al. (2012) observed 
practice-induced activation reductions in motor-related areas, which may reflect 
developed functional efficiency (Jäncke et al., 2000). This idea allows certain 
predictions to be made: individuals who spend more time engaged in such 
ambiguous contexts should be better than average at distinguishing self- from other-
acts. Such a finding would have clinical implications, suggesting that the ability to 
accurately differentiate self and other, widely agreed to be causally related to 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia, is malleable and honed through practice.  
 
De Bezenac et al. (2015) explored this idea using the probability manipulation 
described above Results showed that variance between individuals increased in 
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ambiguous conditions. Furthermore it was in these conditions that misattribution 
towards other decreased with years of music-making experience and increased with 
hallucination proneness. 
 
4.2.4. Ambiguity-processing 
Outside of agency-focussed research, ambiguity has been studied as a key dimension 
of everyday experience that significantly influences behaviour and decision-making 
(Yoshida & Ishii, 2006). Imaging research has implicated the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) (Botvinick et al., 2001; Stern et al., 2010; Critchley et al., 2001; Krain 
et al., 2006), an area thought to be involved in conflict detection (Carter et al., 2007), 
the DLPFC (Huettel et al., 2005), a region associated with conflict resolution and 
context processing (Mansouri et al., 2009), the IPL (Britz et al., 2009; Volz et al., 
2003), as well as the amygdala (Hsu et al., 2005; Zaretsky et al., 2010). The latter 
may be related to the anxiety that can be induced by uncertainties in the 
environment. The inability to tolerate ambiguity (treating situations lacking 
information as threatening rather than promising) – a concept linked to cognitive 
flexibility and typically measured by a self-report questionnaire (Budner, 1962; 
Furnham and Ribchester, 1995) – has been implicated in a range of 
psychopathological disorders including general anxiety disorder (Buhr & Dugas, 
2002; Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001), obsessive–compulsive disorder (Tolin, 
Woods, & Abramowitz, 2003), and psychosis-proneness (Broome et al., 2007; 
Colbert & Peters, 2002). It has also been related to prejudicial attitudes (Frenkel-
Brunswik, 1949), and inversely correlated to mindfulness (Sauer et al., 2012), and 
critical thinking (Facione, Facione, & Sanchez, 1994). Ambiguous stimuli (bistable 
perception) have also been used to examine ambiguity-processing. Individual 
variation in patterns of spontaneous perceptual switching between two or more 
available percepts has been related to a number of factors, including working 
memory (Allen et al., 2011), mindfulness (Sauer et al., 2012), mood state (Hupé & 
Rubin, 2003), and genetic traits related to dopamine and serotonin systems (Miller et 
al. 2010; Shannon et al. 2011; Kondo et al., 2011). Though findings have not been 
consistent  (Keil et al., 1998), a reduced number of perceptual switches and the 
inability to control which percept is attended to has been linked to clinical conditions 
including schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (McBain et al., 2011; Miller et al., 
2003).  
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4.2.5. Experimental approach  
The aim of this exploratory fMRI study is to shed light on self-other processing in 
the brain by investigating the relationship between contextual factors relating to the 
locus of control and individual traits likely to be implicated in this process. 
Following previous work in our lab (de Bezenac et al., 2015; de Bezenac et al., 
2016), a cohort of healthy volunteers completed a tapping task in the scanner which 
parametrically manipulated the probability that actions of self or ‘other’ would result 
in auditory tones in 5 conditions ranging from tone control belonging fully to self to 
belonging fully to other. Ambiguity peaked where the probability for self and other 
control was equal in the middle of the continuum. We examined task-related neural 
response using individual-difference variables as predictors. Given its 
phenomenological and behavioural overlap with clinical symptoms of schizophrenia 
(Ettinger et al., 2015), we used a multi-dimensional measure of schizotypy 
(shortened O-LIFE: Mason, Linney, & Claridge, 2005). Other predictors used in the 
analysis included task performance, music-making experience (based on the 
hypothesis that this is related to efficient self-other processing), and indicators of 
ambiguity processing style, namely the tolerance of ambiguity scale (Budner, 1962) 
and an auditory stream task (Kondo et al., 2011). There is an increasing number of 
neuroimaging studies treating response variability between individuals as 
meaningfully associated with cognitive and behavioural factors that constrain real 
world function, rather than as noise (Bassett et al., 2009, van den Heuvel et al., 
2009). Delineating these brain-behaviour relationships during a self-other attribution 
task, we believe, can shed light on the processes involved in self-other differentiation 
and help to formulate testable hypotheses concerning the aetiology of agency-related 
symptoms of schizophrenia. 
 
Two different approaches were taken to the analysis of the imaging data. We first 
conducted a standard whole-brain univariate analysis examining response in brain 
regions associated with control belonging to self (negative linear response in relation 
to conditions 1-5), other (positive linear response) and ambiguity between self and 
other (positive/negative quadratic response) and how response was predicted by 
individual differences. We then examined how network time-courses, derived from a 
group Independent Component Analysis (ICA), were modulated by the task and their 
functional connectivity with the rest of the brain (dual regression), in relation to 
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individual differences. In recent years there has been a shift in the neuroimagining 
literature towards considering networks as opposed to isolated regions as the unit of 
analysis in elucidating neural processes (Friston, 2011; Meehan & Bressler, 2012). A 
data-driven ICA approach has a number of advantages over more conventional 
univariate and seed-based correlation techniques, including the identification of 
response patterns in partially overlapping regions and reducing sensitivity to artifacts 
(Laird et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2009; Bressler and Menon, 2010). Network-based 
methods have also been effective in highlighting neural differences between 
schizophrenia patients and matched controls (reviewed in Williamson and Allman, 
2012). Despite this, few studies have examined agency using network-based 
approaches (David, Newen & Vogeley, 2008). It is also not yet clear whether the 
spatially distributed regions implicated in agency function together, covarying as one 
or more intrinsic networks. We report the results of both analytic approaches here to 
allow findings to be considered in relation to patterns of activations reported in 
previous research on agency, whilst providing a novel network-level account of 
agency-related brain function that can be considered alongside network-based 
clinical evidence. 
 
Detailed hypotheses were not advanced due to the exploratory nature of the study. 
However, based on previous evidence showing between-participant variation in 
misattribution to increase with ambiguity (de Bezenac et al., 2015), we broadly 
hypothesised that individual differences would predict response to ambiguous 
conditions. Given previous over-activation findings associated with hallucinations, 
we expected positive schizotypy and an inability to tolerate ambiguity to correlate 
with increased network recruitment, as well as in regions previously associated with 
both agency and ambiguity-processing. Conversely, task performance, musical 
experience and the bistable auditory stream task were expected to reflect more 
efficient self-other processing and, thus, to predict neural response in the opposite 
direction.  
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4.3. Methods 
 
4.3.1. Participants 
Twenty-four healthy right-handed student volunteers (12 male, 12 female) took part 
in this study (age: M = 32.3, SD = 8.4). Participants reported normal hearing, vision, 
and somatosensory perception and no known history of mental illness or neurological 
abnormalities. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of 
Liverpool and conducted in accordance with its policies. 
 
4.3.2. Experimental stimuli 
Stimulus presentation and participant response collection were managed using Pure 
Data (Puckette, 1996: http://puredata.info/). In the scanner, the experimental task was 
completed using an MRI-compatible response box. Instructions were provided 
visually via a projector screen seen through inverting mirrors. Auditory stimuli were 
presented diotically through pneumatic tubes within the ear protector at a volume of 
95 dB and consisted of a tone (cosine wave, 262 HZ; 100 ms duration; 20 ms onset 
ramp; 5 ms offset ramp). This tone was triggered by one of the three response box 
buttons positioned on the participant’s right thigh. In a pre-scan test, all participants 
reported that the tone could be clearly heard without perceptible delay during data 
acquisition (inherent system delay = 25ms).  
 
During the task, tones could either result from the participant’s own actions (self) or 
from the actions of another individual (other). To ensure consistency across 
conditions, taps produced by ‘other’ consisted of the participant’s own 50 previous 
inter-tap intervals played back in a random order. The probability that a tap 
belonging to self or other would result in a tone was manipulated in five equal steps, 
corresponding to the five experimental conditions. Probability manipulation was 
achieved by generating a random number between 0 and 1 every time a self or other 
tap occurred. Each of the 5 conditions (C1-5) was associated with a threshold below 
which tones generated by self would be heard and above which tones generated by 
other would be heard: C1 = 1; C2 = .75; C3 = .5; C4 = .25; C5 = 0. These thresholds 
meant that in C1 all tones were self-generated (maximal tap-tone synchrony), while 
in C5 all tones were generated by other (maximal tap-tone asynchrony). In C3 (the 
middle of the self to other continuum) tone control was equally distributed, shifting 
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between self and other (semi-synchrony). Fig. 5.1 provides an example of the result 
of our manipulation where temporal relationships between tone onsets, self- and 
other-taps are depicted.  
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Temporal relationships between self-produced taps (red), tone heard (green), and taps of 
other (blue). Data shown are from one arbitrarily chosen participant from a pilot study in conditions 
equivalent to 1 (self fully in control), 3 (ambiguous control: the probability that self or other will 
produce a tone is equal), and 5 (other fully in control). Peaks in top lines (which represent the 
participant’s irregular taps), are synchronised with tones heard in condition 1 (peaks meet), semi-
synchronised in condition 3, and asynchronised in condition 5. 
 
4.3.3. Imaging parameters 
Scanning was performed at the Magnetic Resonance And Image Analysis Research 
Centre (MARIARC), University of Liverpool with a Siemens Trio 3.0 Tesla 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany), whole body MRI system, equipped with an eight-
channel phased array head coil. Foam padding and head restraints were used to 
minimise head movement during data-acquisition. For fMRI scanning, echo-planar 
images were acquired using a T2* weighted gradient echo sequence with blood 
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 3000 ms; TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 
90°, 49 slices, distance factor = 10 mm, interleaved multi-slice mode, matrix = 64 x 
64; FOV = 192 mm; acquisition voxel size = 2.7 mm3). Each experimental scan 
consisted of 197 contiguous EPI functional whole head volumes. The first eight 
volumes of each run were automatically removed to allow for magnetic stabilization. 
T1-weighted MR images were acquired sagitally for each participant with the 
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following parameters: TE 5.57ms, TR 2040 ms, flip angle 8º, FOV=256×256 mm2, 
176 slices, voxel size 1 mm3. 
 
4.3.4. Experimental scan  
Participants were asked to perform series of irregular taps (“like Morse code”) using 
their right index finger whilst listening to a sequence of tones. A recorded example 
of tapping was provided and a practice session outside the scanner ensured that tap 
density was similar across participants and conditions. Participants were told that 
tones could either result from their own actions (self) or from the actions of another 
individual (referred to as ‘other’), and that the proportion tones belonging to self or 
other would vary between trials. Experimental blocks consisted of 12 seconds of 
tapping, indicated on the screen by the word “Play”. After each block, participants 
were given 5 seconds to report the proportion of control that they felt belonged to 
self or other along a continuum represented by a rectangular box within which a 
vertical bar appeared in a randomised initial position. Using the two remaining keys 
of the response box, participants were able to move that bar towards self (left) or 
other (right) to represent the locus of experienced control. The rating period was 
followed by a 6 second fixation cross (jittered by up to 2 seconds) to ensure that 
BOLD response returned to baseline levels, including a 3 digit countdown to the start 
of the following block (500 ms per digit). Each of the 5 conditions was repeated 10 
times and presented to participants in a pseudo-random order, with the constraint that 
consecutive conditions were not presented in consecutive blocks. The 50 blocks were 
divided into two 12-minute scans (25 blocks in each). A schematic representation of 
the experimental paradigm is provided in Fig. 4.2. Participants also underwent a 
T1/T2 structural, resting-state and DTI scan, meaning that scanning sessions were 
approximately 50 minutes long.  
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Fig. 4.2. Schematic representation of the experimental paradigm. 
 
 
4.3.5. Behavioural and self-report measures  
Following the scanning session, participants completed behavioural tasks 
(programmed in Pure Data) and electronic versions of self-report questionnaires in a 
quiet room using a MacMini computer.  
 
The experimental task was completed outside the scanner. The probability 
manipulation was identical to the scanner task, although there were 10, instead of 5, 
conditions from self to other. In this version of the task, previously described in 
detail in de Bezenac et al. (2015), participants used a mouse to indicate the 
proportion of control belonging to self and other along a continuum and responses 
were not speeded. These differences allowed greater precision in the assessment of 
agency performance (Perf) without scanner-related constraints and distractions. Perf 
was calculated as the correlation between participants’ attribution ratings (subjective 
locus of control) ranging from self to other and tap-tone asynchrony (objective locus 
of control). The latter was computed as the correlation between Butterworth filtered 
time-series of tap and tone onsets (see waves in Fig. 4.1). A high correlation thus 
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indicated the locus of control subjectively experienced by the participant matched the 
actual control that they had in relation to other. The task lasted approximately15 
minutes.  
 
During the auditory streaming (AS) task, stimuli were presented at 65 dB diotically 
through headphones (PX-660, Pro-Luxe). In accordance with the standard protocol 
describe by Kondo et al (2011), stimuli consisted of 225 repetitions of a triplet tone 
that comprised high (H) and low (L) tones with silent intervals. The duration of each 
tone was 40 ms, which included rising and falling cosine ramps of 10 ms. The 
stimulus onset asynchrony between the L tones was 200 ms, whereas that between 
the H tones was 400 ms. The interval between H and L tones was 6 semitones: H = 
1213 Hz and L = 823 Hz. Participants were instructed to close their eyes and listen to 
the sound sequence passively. They were told to press a key with their dominant 
hand every time a perceptual shift occurred.  Shifts could occur between hearing the 
stimuli as a single coherent stream (with a galloping rhythm) or as one of two 
segregated streams (with isochronous rhythms in the high and the low). The stimuli 
were presented to participants for 30 seconds to ensure that all participants 
experienced these perceived differences prior to testing.  
 
Participants were asked to report the number of years (if any) that they have been 
involved in formal or informal music-making activities. This value was divided by 
age to provide a measure of musical experience (ME) 
 
They then completed the Tolerance of Ambiguity (ToA) scale (Budner, 1962) – a 
widely used 16-item questionnaire designed to assess the degree of dis/comfort that 
an individual has in situations that lack information or that are complex or uncertain. 
The self-reported tolerance of ambiguity is measured using a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) with higher scores indicating greater intolerance of 
ambiguity.  
 
Finally, schizotypal personality was assessed using the shortened version of the 
Oxford–Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE) (Mason, Linney, 
& Claridge, 2005). The inventory is a 43-item self-report questionnaire (dichotomous 
yes/no responses), comprising four analogue subscales of psychotic experiences: 
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Unusual Experiences (UE) (positive symptoms; perceptual aberrations and magical 
thinking); Cognitive Disorganisation (CD) (cognitive symptoms; poor attention, 
thought disorder; poor decision making, and social anxiety); Introvertive Anhedonia 
(IA) (negative symptoms; avoidance of intimacy and lack of pleasure from social and 
physical stimuli); and Impulsive Nonconformity (IN) (impulsive and antisocial 
symptoms; eccentric behaviours suggesting a lack of self-control). Higher scores 
indicate higher levels of schizotypy. Although all factors were examined, the factors 
related to positive schizotypy (i.e., UE primarily but also and CD) were hypothesised 
to be of particular interest.  
 
4.3.6. fMRI data analysis  
Image analyses were performed using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 
6.00, part of FSL (FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). For each 
participant the following pre-statistic processing was applied: motion correction 
using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, 2002); slice-timing correction using Fourier-space 
time-series phase-shifting; spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 
5mm; grand-mean intensity normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single 
multiplicative factor; highpass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares 
straight line fitting, with sigma=45.0s). ICA-based exploratory data analysis was 
carried out using MELODIC (Beckmann, 2004), in order to investigate the possible 
presence of unexpected artefacts or activation. Following pre-statistics processing, a 
statistical analysis of time-courses was carried out using FILM (FMRIB's Improved 
Linear Model) with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich et al., 2001).  
 
4.3.7. Individual and group-level GLM   
For both runs, a task regressor was included for each of the 5 conditions. Each 
predictor covered the duration of 12 s composed of 5 trials (25 per run in total). 
Response periods and a variable representing the number of taps in each block were 
included as confounds, along with temporal derivative terms derived from each 
predictor. Contrasts were set to model condition-specific response as well as mean 
activation across all conditions: task (T) > baseline (B). Following an F test 
confirming significant continuous task-related response in all participants, 4 contrasts 
were used to further characterise positive and negative linear and quadratic response 
to our parametric manipulation with regressors: self (S) > other (O) [2 1 0 -1 -2]; O > 
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S [-2 -1 0 1 2]; middle (M) > extremes (E) [-2 1 2 1 -2]; and E > M [2 -1 -2 -1 2]. 
Fixed-effects analyses were then conducted using FEAT to estimate the average 
effects of all contrasts across runs within-participants. 
 
Group-level mixed-effects analyses (treating subjects as random effects) were carried 
out using FLAME (FMRIB's Local Analysis of Mixed Effects) to estimate the 
average effects of interest (individual-level contrasts) for the group, with individual 
differences (IDs) added as covariates. Given the exploratory nature of the study, 
separate models were setup for each ID apart from O-LIFE where all subfactors were 
included as predictors in the same model, given previous evidence of factor overlap 
(Mason, Linney, & Claridge, 2005). Group Z (Gaussianised T/F) statistic images 
resulting from whole-brain voxel-wise comparisons were thresholded using clusters 
determined by Z>2.3 and a corrected cluster significance threshold of P=0.05 
(Worsley, 2001). 
 
4.3.8. Network analysis  
Functional networks with significant variance contributions to the dataset were 
identified by temporally concatenating the data from the 48 runs (2 per participant) 
into a 4D file that could be entered into a group ICA (Beckmann, 2004) as 
implemented in MELODIC (Version 3.13), part of FSL (FMRIB's Software Library, 
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Data were decomposed into 20 spatially and temporally 
distinct components in order to represent robust large-scale networks (Beckmann et 
al. 2005; Greicius et al. 2007; Smith et al., 2009).  
 
The 20 normalised component maps were visually inspected (in both spatial and 
frequency domains) and spatially cross-correlated with 10 intrinsic network 
templates to distinguish brain networks from artifactual components and identify 
canonical networks corresponding to components (Smith et al., 2009). The 
components that showed a moderate to good (r > 0.30) correlation with the templates 
were carried forward for further analysis. 
 
To examine task-related temporal fluctuations in network activity following Clewett 
et al. (2014), the run-specific temporal responses time-course of each non-artifactual 
component were fit to each run’s respective GLM design matrix. Following this 
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temporal regression, a component-specific t-statistic was calculated for each contrast 
by averaging the contrast of parameter estimates for the two runs and dividing this 
value by associated standard deviations, averaged across both runs. Consistency of 
these values across participants was examined for each component using a one-
sample t-tests for mean (T>B; B>T), linear (S>O; O>S) and non-linear (M>E; E>M) 
contrasts (see Fig. X). To shed light on mean, linear and quadratic component 
modulation during the task, (Pearson, two-tailed) t-statistic values were correlated 
with individual difference measures (see Fig. X). Welch two sample t-tests on 
absolute resulting correlation values were conducted to test whether ICs included in 
the study were better predictors of mean, linear or quadratic contrasts.   
 
Finally, we used a dual regression implemented in FSL to examine how individual 
differences predicted connectivity between network components and other parts of 
the brain (Beckmann et al., 2009). The procedure involved the following steps: group 
components were regressed against participants’ preprocessed data to produce run-
specific time-courses which were in turn used as predictors to generate 
corresponding spatial maps. These maps were averaged across runs to produce 
participant-specific components which could then be entered into a whole-brain, 
non-parametric regression, using FSL’s randomise tool with previously described 
group-level GLMs (with individual difference covariates) as predictors. Five 
thousand permutations were carried out for each model and significant clusters 
corrected for multiple comparisons using threshold-free cluster enhancement, 
reported at P<0.05, corrected (Smith and Nichols, 2009).  
 
 
4.4. Results  
 
4.4.1 Behavioural findings  
Data from the agency task completed in the scanner were analysed to ensure that 
participants completed the task as expected. The mean number of actions per block 
was 40.35 (SD=6.52), mean number of tones per block was 42.34 (SD=4.4), and 
mean attribution rating (scaled from 0 to 1) was 0.54 (SD=0.2). Mean tap-tone 
synchrony (calculated as the correlation between Butterworth filtered tap and tone 
timings) was -0.97 (+- 0.01). There was a tendency for participants to perform fewer 
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taps as the proportion of tones belonging to other increased, mean r = -0.27 
(SD=0.17); this tendency, however, was non-significant for all but one participant 
(mean p=0.34, SD=0.26). The number of tones per block also did not vary 
significantly with condition, mean r = 0.17 (SD=0.14) (mean p=0.4, SD=0.33). Table 
4.1 shows tap-tone correlation, the number of taps and tones per block for each of the 
five conditions (with associated standard deviations). Taken together, this indicates 
that the probability manipulation resulted in well-matched conditions that 
systematically varied in the proportion of self-other control over tones. 
 
Table 4.1. Summary statistics by condition (C1 - C5) with data pooled over all participants. Standard 
deviation in presented within parentheses 
 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
Manipulation threshold 1 0.75 0.50 0.25 0 
Tap tone correlation 1 (0.00) 0.72 (0.08) 0.52 (0.07) 0.28 (0.08) 0.02 (0.05) 
Mean taps per block 42.80 (5.80) 40.78 (6.63) 40.15 (6.22) 39.06 (6.26) 38.93 (7.32) 
Mean tones per block 42.80 (5.80) 43.43 (4.46) 44.65 (4.40) 43.16 (4.61) 39.07 (4.88) 
Attribution 0.08 (0.13) 0.40 (0.23) 0.59 (0.24) 0.78 (0.19) 0.85 (0.17) 
Misattribution 0.08 (0.13) 0.15 (0.23) 0.09 (0.24) 0.03 (0.19) -0.15 (0.17) 
 
Correlation between tap-tone asynchrony (calculated as synchrony but inverted for 
clarity) and attribution rating deriving from the post-scan agency task was used as 
the measure of between individual variation in agency performance (Perf), mean r =  
.76, SD = .12. Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and relationships 
among individual difference measures are shown in Table 4.2. In brief, O-LIFE sub-
factors UE and CD were significantly correlated, indicating overlap, while IA and IN 
were negatively related. Though a general negative association was seen between 
Perf and OL factors, two-tailed significance was not reached in our sample. A non-
significant positive trend was also observed between ToA and positive schizotypy 
(UE and CD), while the trend was negative in relation to Perf, ME and AS. ME was 
positively related to Perf and negatively associated with UE. The inverse correlation 
found between ToA and AS and their opposing trend in relation to Perf, UE and ME 
indicates that the ability to cope with ambiguity is associated with low ToA and high 
AS.     
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation matrix for individual difference measures  
 
Variable 
 
Descriptive stats  Pearson correlation matrix     
Mean sd UE CD IA IN Perf ToA ME 
Unusual experience (UE) 4.71 2.29         
Cognitive Disorganisation 
(CD) 
3.71 1.55  0.71 ***       
Introvertive Anhedonia (IA) 5.21 1.41  -0.03 -0.15      
Impulsive Nonconformity 
(IN) 
4.79 1.1  0.11 0.17 -0.42 *     
Performance (Perf) 0.76 0.12  -0.24 -0.26 -0.1 -0.32    
Tolerance of Ambiguity 
(ToA) 
51.83 9.58  0.32 0.27 0.14 -0.07 -0.28   
Musical Experience (ME) 0.27 0.24  -0.39 * -0.3 0.21 -0.18 0.44 * -0.25  
Auditory Stream (AS) 7.75 5.62  -0.16 0.04 -0.01 -0.18 0.2 -0.45 * 0.31 
n=24; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-
tailed) 
        
 
 
4.4.2. ICA results 
Nine out of 20 components showed a moderate to good (r > 0.30) correlation with 
network templates (Smith et al., 2009): they represented visual (VN:IC2, r = .67), 
default mode (DMN: IC3, r = .48; IC7, r = .3; IC15, r = .41), auditory (AN:IC4, r = 
.67), right-lateralised frontoparietal (rFPN:IC14, r = .7), left-lateralised frontoparietal 
(IC8, r = .65), cerebellar (IC16, r = .37), and sensorimotor (SMN: IC12, r = .62) 
components (see Fig. x). Based on previous findings one of the networks of interest 
was the salience (or executive control) network with nodes centred around the 
anterior insula and ACC; however no single component could be said to represent 
this network. Lowering the map threshold from Z=4 to 2.3 revealed that in our data 
this network was incorporated into both visual- and auditory-related components 
(IC2 and IC4 respectively). Given the absence of previous agency research using a 
network approach, all 9 components were tested. The 11 remaining components were 
deemed artifactual due to predominant activation in white matter, ventricles, or 
vasculature, head movements, or signal drop out. 
 
4.4.2. Average task effects 
Examining between-individual consistency of t-values derived from regressing IC 
time-courses onto respective run-specific GLMs using a one-sample t tests showed 
increased response during the task to be associated with IC4 (AN) and IC12 (SMN), 
while DMN-related ICs 3, 15 and 7 were strongly associated with baseline response. 
All ICs showed increased response for self compared to other (negative linear), 
though ICs 3,5 and 16 did not reach significance. U-shaped (extremes (E) > middle 
(M)) quadratic response was associated with IC4 (AN), which included temporal, 
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insular and subcortical regions. These findings are presented in Fig. 4.3 alongside 
statistical maps (B) derived from mixed-effects group analysis for corresponding 
contrasts (A), allowing method comparisons to be made. Confirming a previous 
study (de Bezenac et al., under review), no ICs/networks or regions showed 
significant positive linear (other (O) > self (S)) or inverted U-shape quadratic (E>M) 
response in relation to the task. We used individual differences to explore between-
individual variation in task-related neural response. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Regions (mixed effects analysis results) (B) and group independent components (networks) 
(C) showing between-individual consistency (t-values) (lower C) in mean (task (T) > baseline (B); B 
> T), linear (self (S) > other (O); O > S) and quadratic (middle (M)>extremes (E); E > M) response to 
task manipulations (conditions 1 to 5) (A). The x axis is presented as a dendrogram, hierarchically 
clustered to facilitate interpretation.  n=24; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed). 
 
 
4.4.3. Individual differences related to brain regions  
Significant results for the GLMs with individual differences included as covariates 
may be seen in Table 4.3 for mean (task (T) < baseline (B); B>T), linear (S>O; O<S) 
and quadratic (M>E; E>M) contrasts. Only O-LIFE measures associated with 
positive schizotypy (i.e., UE and CD) modulated task-related response when 
controlling for other O-LIFE factors; no contrasts showed significant clusters with 
IA and IN as predictors. During baseline compared to task periods (B>T), CD 
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predicted increased temporal and frontal gyrus response while frontal pole response 
increased with Perf. In conditions where other had more control than self (O>S), 
occipital areas were more active as UE increased and middle frontal gyrus response 
for other increased with Perf.  
 
Table 4.3. Brain regions with task-related response modulated by individual differences (ID). Mean 
(task (T) > baseline (B); B > T), linear (self (S) > other (O); O>S) and quadratic (middle (M) > 
extremes (E); E > M) response to conditions 1-5 was examined in relation to O-LIFE factors 
including unusual experience (UE) and cognitive disorganisation (CD), as well as task performance 
(Perf), tolerance of ambiguity (ToA), musical experience (ME) and auditory stream task (AS). 
Regions were defined by the Harvard-Oxford Cortical and Subcortical Structural Atlases and the 
Cerebellar Atlas in MNI152 space after normalization with FLIRT. P-values and n-voxels refer to the 
cluster. Hemisphere (H), brodmann area (BA), and MNI coordinates are provided for the most 
significant voxel within the cluster. 
 
Contrast ID   Region (Structures to which each cluster belongs to in %) H BA 
n 
voxels 
Z 
(max) p-value MNI coordinates 
      
  
      x y z 
Mean                     
B > T 
 
CD 
 
-- Middle Temporal Gyrus (30%), Posterior Inferior Temporal Gyrus 
(22%), Posterior Superior Temporal Gyrus (10%) 
R 
 
20 
 
547 
 
4.69 
 
0.00395 
 
52 
 
-28 
 
-20 
 
  
-- Middle Frontal Gyrus (31%), Frontal Pole (18%) R 45 519 3.61 0.0056 40 30 28 
B > T Perf -- Frontal Pole (13%), Frontal Orbital Cortex (5%) L 10 731 3.69 0.000434 -20 58 2 
Linear                     
O > S UE -- Occipital Pole (21%), Superior Lateral Occipital Cortex (19%) L 19 429 3.6 0.0134 -22 -84 22 
O > S Perf -- Middle Frontal Gyrus (36%), Superior Frontal Gyrus (9%) R 45 776 3.78 0.000212 42 30 46 
Quadrat
ic                     
M > E 
 
UE 
 
-- Postcentral Gyrus (18%), Central Opercular Cortex (13%), 
Precentral Gyrus (11%), Superior Temporal Gyrus (7%), Heschl's 
Gyrus (3%) 
R 
 
48 
 
1147 
 
3.85 
 
1.13E-06 
 
62 
 
-6 
 
16 
 
  
-- Supplementary Motor Cortex (31%), Anterior Cingulate Gyrus 
(12%), Superior Frontal Gyrus (7%) 
L 
 
24 
 
427 
 
3.63 
 
0.00842 
 
-10 
 
16 
 
32 
 
M > E CD -- Cerebellum: Right Crus II (43%), Right Crus I (38%)  R n/a 386 3.67 0.0157 40 -76 -42 
  
-- Cerebellum: Left Crus II (52%) L n/a 413 3.53 0.0104 -6 -88 -36 
E > M 
 
Perf 
 
-- Anterior Cingulate Gyrus (22%), Precentral Gyrus (12%),  
Posterior Cingulate Gyrus (11%), Supplementary Motor Cortex (9%) 
n/a 
 
23 
 
821 
 
3.77 
 
8.13E-05 
 
0 
 
-10 
 
44 
 
M > E 
 
ToA 
 
-- Precuneous Cortex (18%), Posterior Cingulate Gyrus (17%), 
Anterior Cingulate Gyrus (11%),  Supplementary Motor Cortex 
(11%)  
L 
 
n/a 
 
575 
 
3.8 
 
0.0015 
 
-4 
 
-40 
 
48 
 
  
-- Lateral Occipital Cortex (51%), Middle Temporal Gyrus (13%), 
Angular Gyrus (4%) 
L 
 
37 
 
931 
 
3.61 
 
2.10E-05 
 
-58 
 
-66 
 
14 
 
  
-- Superior Parietal Lobule (32%), Postcentral Gyrus (22%) R 5 416 3.39 0.0132 22 -54 64 
E > M 
 
ME 
 
-- Supramarginal Gyrus (32%), Postcentral Gyrus (12%),  Parietal 
Operculum Cortex (10%), Planum Temporale (4%), Heschl's Gyrus 
(2%) 
R 
 
40 
 
385 
 
3.5 
 
0.0217 
 
68 
 
-36 
 
34 
 
  
-- Central Opercular Cortex (17%), Insular Cortex (15%), Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus, pars opercularis (8%), Frontal Operculum Cortex 
(8%)  
L 
 
48 
 
393 
 
3.4 
 
0.0193 
 
-50 
 
6 
 
-4 
 
M > E AS -- Frontal Pole (63%) R 46 408 3.58 0.0157 40 50 12 
E > M 
 
AS 
 
-- Frontal Pole (33%), Paracingulate Gyrus (22%), Superior Frontal 
Gyrus (5%) 
L 
 
10 
 
951 
 
4 
 
1.88E-05 
 
-20 
 
60 
 
22 
 
    
-- Middle Frontal Gyrus (24%), Frontal Pole (23%), Superior Frontal 
Gyrus (10%) 
L 
 
9 
 
554 
 
3.76 
 
0.00212 
 
-26 
 
42 
 
34 
 
 
On the whole, individual differences included in the study (related to schizotypy, 
agency and ambiguity-processing) were better predictors of quadratic response to 
task manipulation (M>E; E>M), as indicated by the number of clusters reaching 
significance (see Table 4.3). These are presented in Fig. 4.4. Increased response in 
the middle of the self-to-other continuum (M>E) was predicted by UE in the 
precentral and postcentral gyri, superior temporal, supplementary motor and anterior 
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cingulate regions, and by CD in the cerebellum. This inverted U-shape pattern was 
also associated with ToA in cortical midline structures including the precuneus, the 
posterior and anterior cingulate gyrus as well as in the superior parietal lobule and 
lateral occipital cortex.  
 
In contrast, increase response at the extremes of the self-to-other continuum (E>M) 
was predicted by Perf in the anterior cingulate gyrus, and by ME in the right 
supramarginal gyrus extending to Heschl’s gyrus, as well as in a cluster between the 
central opercular and insular cortex. AS pointed in both directions, predicting 
increased right frontal pole response in the middle of the continuum and left frontal 
pole and paracingulate response at the continuum extremes compared to the middle 
(E>M).    
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Fig. 4.4. Individual differences (ID) in brain response to quadratic contrasts (causal ambiguity: 
middle (M) > extremes (E); E>M), Z>2.3, cluster corrected at p=0.05. Scatterplots show participants’ 
mean % signal change of voxels in significant clusters against each ID, with grey bands representing 
standard error. Statistical images were thresholded, are overlaid on the MNI-152 2mm brain with 
MNI coordinates (x,y,z) given for cross hair locations (peak voxels) and follow radiological 
convention, with the right hemisphere represented on the left side.  
 
 
4.4.4. Individual differences related to group independent components 
For mean task contrasts (T>B; B>T), significant positive correlation (increased 
response for task compared to baseline: T>B) was observed between IC2 (VN) and 
IA, r(23) = 0.48, p = 0.01. Negative correlation (B>T) was observed between IC3 
(DMN) and AS, r(23) = -0.42, p = 0.04, and between IC14 (rFPN) and OL IN, 
r(23)= -0.48, p < 0.01. For linear contrasts (S>O; O>S), positive correlation 
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(increased response for other compared to self: O>S) was observed between IC14 
(rFPN) and UE, r(23) = 0.44, p = 0.03, between IC2 (VN) and UE, r(23) = 0.5, p < 
0.01, between IC2 (VN) and IN, r(23) = 0.47, p = 0.02, and between IC14 and ToA, 
r(23) = 0.42, p = 0.04.  
 
As in the previous analysis, individual difference measures were better predictors of 
quadratic (mean absolute r = 0.25; sd r = 0.3) than mean (mean absolute r = 0.15, sd 
r = 0.18), t = 3.7(121), p = 0.0003, or linear (mean absolute r = 0.18, sd r = 0.19), t = 
2.67(124), p = 0.008, component modulation. Results for the quadratic contrasts 
(M>E; E>M) are presented in Fig. 4.5. Components (x axis) and individual 
differences (y axis) have been hierarchically clustered to facilitate interpretation and 
p-values (represented by asterisks) are presented uncorrected for between-component 
comparisons, following previous procedures (Nomi & Uddin et al., 2015; Uddin et 
al., 2013). UE, CD and ToA predicted an increased response in the middle of the 
self-to-other continuum (M>E) in posterior nodes of the DMN (IC15) and VN (IC2) 
(which along with AN included salience network). UE also correlated positively with 
AN (IC4) and SMN (IC12) and ToA predicted increased response in the main DMN 
(IC3). In contrast, response in these networks/ICs was reduced in the middle of the 
continuum when predicted by Perf, ME and AS. More specifically, Perf predicted 
less SMN (IC12) response, while ME predicted was negatively related to VN (IC2), 
AN (IC4) and SMN (IC12). AS predicted decreased ambiguity-related response in 
DMNs and increased response in lFPN (IC8). 
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Fig. 4.5. Correlations between individual differences (y axis) and functional network connectivity 
estimates (x axis) associated with quadratic contrasts (middle (M) > extremes (E); E>M). X and y 
axes are presented as a dendrogram, hierarchically clustered to facilitate interpretation. n=24; * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed). 
 
 
Results of the dual regression analysis which tested whether individual differences 
predicted connectivity between ICs and other brain regions (within grey matter 
voxels), showed that UE predicted increased functional coupling between IC14 
(rFPN) and a small cluster (36 voxels: MNI coordinate of max: x=22, y=-54, z=64) 
in the right middle temporal gyrus, posterior division (rMTG) (P < 0.05, corrected) 
(Fig. 4.6). No other individual difference measures showed significant IC 
connectivity clusters after correcting for between-voxel comparisons. 
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Fig. 4.6. Unusual experiences (O-LIFE) predicting increased functional connectivity between the right 
fronto-parietal network (light green) and right middle temporal gyrus, posterior division (red to 
yellow). Threshold-free cluster enhancement was used for multiple comparisons (grey matter voxels) 
correction. Voxels shown pasted a corrected threshold of P < 0.05. Images follow the radiological 
convention, with the right hemisphere represented on the left side. The Statistical image is overlaid on 
the MNI-152 2mm brain with MNI coordinates given for the cross hair location. 
 
 
4.5. Discussion 
 
This study explored brain behaviour-relationships associated with self-other 
processing. We did this by manipulating the probability that actions of self or other 
would generate tones, examining how individual differences previously associated 
with this process predicted neural response when tone control was manipulated 
across the self/other dimension. We were particularly interested in conditions of 
increased causal ambiguity, where self- and other-generated tones were equally 
likely. It is in these challenging conditions, which resemble complex social 
encounters in this respect, that we expected response variation to be explained by 
selected individual differences. 
 
4.5.1. Behavioural results 
Relationships between these variables broadly pointed in predicted directions, with 
overall task performance reducing with schizotypy and ToA and increasing with 
musical experience and AS. Though task performance was positively correlated with 
ME, in line with our previous findings, its negative correlation with UE did not reach 
significance. In this previous study (de Bezenac et al., 2015) it was in the middle of 
the self-to-other continuum that hallucination proneness (and ME) predicted 
increased misattribution in line with the proposed role of ambiguity in agency. That a 
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measure of overall task performance (across the entire self-other continuum) was 
used in this study may explain the weakened effect of positive schizotypy. 
 
Though some findings from the whole-brain univariate analysis and ICA related to 
linear response where control belonged more to self or to other, individual difference 
measures included in the study more effectively explained neural variation related to 
causal ambiguity, as indicated by the number significant findings (see Table 4.3) and 
increased correlation values associated with quadratic contrasts in the ICA results. 
This suggests that challenging situations with less information for self-other 
differentiation accentuates the effects of individual difference traits, maximising the 
need for perceptual inference (Schmack et al., 2015; de Bezenac et al., 2015; 
Gallagher, 2013; Fukushima et al., 2013). Increased ambiguity-related neural 
variation between individuals may also explain the absence of increased response to 
ambiguity (inverted U-shape) in our overall group results reported in de Bezenac et 
al. (under review) (see Fig. 4.3). 
 
4.5.2. Univariate analysis results 
As anticipated, when schizotypy factors were included as additional explanatory 
variables, it was positive (UE) but not negative (IA) schizotypy that predicted task-
related response. This accords with models associating unusual experiences 
including hallucinations and delusions with agency deficits (Frith, 2005; Jeannerod, 
2009). UE specifically predicted increased response in the middle of the continuum 
in a right inferior frontal and temporal region (including the post- and precentral 
gyrus, STG, and Heschl’s gyrus), previously implicated in auditory stimulation and 
the cognitive control of spoken language (Geranmayeh et al., 2014). Hallucinatory 
experiences have previously been linked to activation of this region in the absence of 
external auditory stimuli (Lawrie et al., 2002; Woodruff et al., 1995; Shergill et al., 
2000; Dierks et al., 1999). Response also increased in SMA (extending to ACC) – a 
key region of the motor system previously associated with the sense of agency 
(Tsakiris, Longo & Haggard, 2010; Farrer et al., 2003; Nahab et al., 2011) and, more 
specifically, ambiguity in agency (Fukushima et al., 2013), as well as with auditory 
verbal hallucination (Raij & Riekki, 2012; Zhou et al., 2007). Interestingly, there are 
also reports that lesion-induced disruptions in this region give rise to experiences of 
alien control (Mellor, 1970:18; Goldberg, Mayer, & Toglia, 1981:684-685).  
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With other O-LIFE factors controlled for, CD predicted increased cerebellar 
response during causal ambiguity. In addition to basic motor control, the cerebellum 
is increasingly thought to play a central role in multiple higher-level cognitive 
functions (Timmann & Daum, 2007) implicated in schizophrenia-related disorders 
(Picard et al., 2008; Konarski et al., 2005). In addition to its involvement in 
externally attributed agency (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 1999), the cerebellum has 
been linked to error-related cognitive control (Ide and Chiang-shan, 2011), prediction 
of movement outcomes (Fuentes and Bastian, 2007), working memory (Akshoomoff, 
and Courchesne, 1992), cognitive flexibility (De Bartolo et al., 2009; Kim, Ugurbil, 
and Strick, 1994) and social cognition (Van Overwalle et al., 2014) – domains likely 
to require processing of situations where causal ambiguity features. 
 
Task performance (Perf) predicted reduced ambiguity-related response in the 
posterior and anterior cingulate gyrus, in contrast to ToA which correlated with 
increased response in precuneus and cingulate regions. Our findings suggest that 
these midline structures may be key to how ambiguity, as it occurs in self-other 
differentiation, is processed. This is supported by previous findings implicating the 
cingulate gyrus (particularly the anterior division) in ambiguity related to both 
agency (Fukushima et al., 2013) and decision-making (Botvinick et al., 2001; Stern 
et al., 2010; Critchley et al., 2001). Consistent with our results, Krain et al., (2008) 
found that intolerance of uncertainty (a measure similar to ToA) predicted increased 
response in cingulate regions during a decision-making task, while high tolerance 
and less anxiety deactivated the same regions in response to uncertainty. Other 
domains relevant to ambiguity and agency associated with this region include 
monitoring stimuli for errors (Carter et al., 2007; Bush, Luu, and Posner, 2000), 
verbal working memory (Metzak et al., 2011), attention to willed actions (Paus, 
2001), external action attribution (Farrer and Frith, 2002), and socially-driven 
interactions (reviewed in Lavin et al., 2013). As key nodes of the DMN, increased 
activation in posterior midline structures has been linked to mind wandering and self-
referential processing, while relative deactivation has been linked to demanding tasks 
involving externally-focussed attention (being “on task”) including working memory 
and meditation (Brewer et al., 2013; Sperduti et al., 2012). Therefore, these regions 
are considered to be directly involved in regulating the focus of attention (Leech and 
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Sharp, 2014). Neuroimaging investigations also suggest that midline structures have 
a significant part to play in pathogenesis of schizophrenia (reviewed in Adams & 
David, 2007). Though Adams and David’s review (2007) shows evidence for both 
hypo- and hyper-activation, increased ACC activation has been observed during 
auditory hallucinations (Shergill et al., 2000). The response patterns we found in 
relation to individual difference variables in all medial regions supports a hyper-
activation model of positive symptoms in relation to causal ambiguity. 
 
ME predicted reduced ambiguity-related response in a left temporal region that 
included the insula, as well as in the right IPL (supramarginal gyrus more 
specifically). Prior evidence indicates that the latter is activated during multiple 
forms of social cognition (reviewed in Decety & Lamm, 2007; Wible, 2012), 
including theory of mind (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003) and agency particularly related 
action attribution to external causes (David et al., 2007; Blakemore et al., 2002; 
Farrer et al., 2003). Neuroimaging studies of positive symptoms of schizophrenia 
show over-activation in this region during agency tasks, providing a neural 
explanation of the associated tendency of attributing self-produced actions/thoughts 
to external causes (Farrer et al., 2004; Spence et al., 1997; reviewed in Wible, Preus, 
Hashimoto, 2009). Interestingly, reduced response predicted by ME found in this 
region partially overlapped with the postcentral region that increased with UE.  
 
4.5.3. Network analysis results 
Our task-related ICA findings allowed us to go beyond pinpointing single brain 
regions involved in agency and related behaviour. We found that positive schizotypy 
(UE in particular but also CD) predicted increased ambiguity-related recruitment of 
the DMN. This is consistent with prior findings indicating that schizophrenic patients 
have difficulties in deactivating DMN regions during tasks (Williamson and Allman, 
2012; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009). Other studies specifically connect severity of 
hallucinations and delusions to altered functional connectivity of the DMN 
(Camchong et al., 2011; Rotarska-Jagiela et al., 2010). This, it has been argued, may 
reflect a loss of contact with relevant external stimuli and a difficulty in reallocating 
neural resources in challenging conditions (Smallwood et al., 2008; McKiernan et 
al., 2003). That the main DMN component was found to correlate with both ToA and 
AS (in opposite directions) in this study, suggests that ambiguity processing during 
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agentic considerations might involve DMN regulation. There is prior evidence that 
task-related deactivation of the DMN is accentuated by task difficulty and 
performance accuracy (Harrison et al., 2011; Gilbert et al., 2012; Polli et al., 2005). 
In relation to the latter, however, the negative trend predicted by task performance 
did not reach significance.  
 
In addition to DMN recruitment, UE predicted increased ambiguity-related 
engagement in visual, auditory and sensorimotor networks. Brain regions associated 
with these networks have also previously been implicated in schizophrenia (Butler, 
Silverstein, Dakin, 2008; Rapin et al., 2010; Lawrie et al., 2002; Woodruff et al., 
1995; van den Heuvel et al, 2010; Shergill et al., 2000). This may reflect motor-
related ‘over-perceptualization’ that can lead to hallucinations (Allen et al., 2008). In 
contrast, ME again predicted reduced response in the visual, auditory and 
sensorimotor networks, generally pointing in the same direction as task performance 
and AS, and in the opposite direction to UE and ToA. The ME-related neural 
response patterns found in both analyses are consistent with previous behavioural 
results showing ME to be related to reduced misattribution particularly in ambiguous 
conditions (de Bezenac et al., 2015). They are also in line with findings showing 
music-training-induced neuroplasticity in multiple sensorimotor, auditory and 
language-related pathways (François et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2012). Together, our 
behavioural and imaging findings imply that practice in challenging ambiguous 
settings involving the intricate coordination of one’s own actions with those of others 
may improve self-other processing abilities, which are thought to be impaired in 
schizophrenia (Frith, 2005; Jeannerod, 2009). This is supported by prior work 
relating long-term music training to improvements in working memory (George & 
Coch, 2011) and attentional control (Helmbold, Rammsayer, & Altenmuller, 2005; 
Lee, Lu, & Ko, 2007; Moreno & Besson, 2006). Indeed, precedents for practice-
induced changes have been observed in a number of domains relating to executive 
function (Hussey & Novick, 2012; Manly & Murphy, 2012). Clearly more direct 
testing with relevant clinical populations is required to support this contention. 
Future work could explore whether experience in (musical and non-musical) 
ambiguous settings results in improvement of attribution accuracy and its 
implications for symptom severity.  
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4.5.4. Dual regression results 
Though FPN recruitment was not directly modulated by UE, our dual regression 
results showed that UE predicted increased functional integration between the rFPN 
and a cluster in the right MTG during the task. This region has been previously 
implicated in positive symptoms of schizophrenia in a number of studies. In their 
examination of auditory hallucination, for example, Woodruff et al., (1997) found 
that schizophrenia patients showed increased response to external speech in the right 
MTG, which correlated with hallucination severity. Structural asymmetries have also 
been noted, with hallucination severity predicting reduced left hemisphere volumes 
in both the MTG and STG with right MTG being significantly larger than the left 
(Onitsuka et al., 2014; Hu et al., 2013; Kuroki et al., 2006; Tang et al., 2012). Our 
functional connectivity findings add to this picture by suggesting that these group 
differences may be more specifically related to altered interaction between the MTG 
and other regions associated with the right frontoparietal attention network. 
 
4.5.5. Increased and decreased response  
Examining overall trends from findings derived from the whole-brain univariate 
analysis and task-related ICA, a generalised increase in ambiguity-related response 
correlated with UE, CD and ToA in multiple regions and networks, in contrast to the 
decrease in response predicted by task performance and ME. (AS pointed in both 
directions, reducing in left frontal regions of the DMN and increasing in a right 
frontal region and rFPN.) Elevated-activation has previously been related to 
cognitive load and inhibitory control deficits in schizophrenia (Brandt et al., 2014; 
2015; Clark, 1996), prolonged mental fatigue (Ishii et al., 2013), anxiety in the 
absence of relevant information (Rigoli et al., 2013) and during social processing 
(Hall et al., 2008; Mukherjee et al., 2013), and poor performance in working memory 
tasks (Engström, Landtblom, and Karlsson, 2013). For example, Driesen et al. (2013) 
found that schizophrenia-like symptoms induced through ketamine were associated 
with increased global functional connectivity during resting-state fMRI. 
 
In contrast, neuronal inhibition (Frankenstein et al., 2003), thought to play a central 
role in working memory among other cognitive functions (Rosen & Engle, 1998; 
Tomasi et al., 2006), has been associated with accurate task performance (Polli et al., 
2005; Engström, Landtblom, & Karlsson, 2013) and processing skills associated with 
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ambiguity in language, such as the suppression of possibilities related to a target 
concept in semantic reasoning (Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996; Mirman & Graziano, 
2013). Decreases in neural response after practice reported in a wide range of 
cognitive tasks has been linked to automatisation (Van Raalten et al., 2008) and the 
capacity to perform a number of working memory tasks simultaneously (Ramsey et 
al., 2004). Overall response reductions may reflect a strategy of selectively 
suppressing internal and external stimuli in causally ambiguous contexts or increased 
practice-induced efficiency and automatisation (Van Raalten et al., 2008; Jäncke et 
al., 2000). This could be tested using a design that allows response fluctuations to be 
investigated at smaller time-scales.  
 
4.5.6. Conclusions 
In conclusion, findings from this exploratory fMRI study suggest that a greater 
understanding of how individuals respond to causally ambiguous contexts can shed 
light on mechanisms of self-other processing and on phenomena such as 
hallucinations previously associated with agency deficits. Though our study explored 
brain-behaviour relationships in a non-clinical sample, findings relating positive 
schizotypy and an inability to tolerate ambiguity to increased neural response during 
causally ambiguous conditions in a number of regions and networks allows specific 
predictions to be made in future research comparing clinical and non-clinical groups. 
Furthermore, the functional patterns found in relation to task performance and ME, if 
confirmed, raise the possibility that the ability to differentiate self from other can be 
refined by engaging in intrinsically motivating activities that blur self-other 
boundaries through intricate joint behaviour. At a neural level, this may be reflected 
in decreased response linked to functional efficiency. A greater understanding of the 
process of differentiating self from other during development and the extent to which 
this ability can be honed through practice in later life could lead to new strategies for 
promoting resilience to symptoms of psychosis. 
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5.1. Abstract 
 
Individuals differ in their ability to distinguish the effects of own from others’ 
actions. For example, difficulties in self-other differentiation have been linked to 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia such as hallucinations, with causally ambiguous 
situations proving a universal challenge. Indeed, difficulties in this area have been 
shown to characterise non-clinical samples who self-report higher levels of positive 
schizotypy. The goal of the present study was to examine relationships between 
individual differences in resting-state functional connectivity and self-other 
attribution performance. Fifty-five healthy adults completed a resting-state fMRI 
scan and a task that systematically modulated the probability that finger taps of self 
versus other would generate auditory tones. Using group independent component 
analysis (ICA) and dual regression, we found that connectivity between prefrontal 
networks and other brain regions increased as overall performance decreased and 
misattribution biased towards other increased. These findings shed additional light 
on the neural mechanisms of agency, emphasising that connectivity with prefrontal 
networks play an important role in self-other differentiation. 
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Highlights 
 
• Agency performance modulated resting-state activity 
• A medial prefrontal network extended into other regions with lower agency 
abilities 
• Between-network connectivity increased with bias and lower performance 
 
 
5.2. Introduction 
 
Our waking day is filled with encounters that involve coordinating our own thoughts 
and behaviours with those belonging to other individuals. A prerequisite for doing 
this is the ability to distinguish acts of the ‘self’ from those of  ‘others’ by forming 
accurate predictions about action-outcomes (Wolpert et al. 1995; Frith, 2005; 
Wegner, 2003). Even in the absence of others, we think about, and attempt to work 
out who is responsible for events that have or will take place. The sense of agency, 
the feeling that ‘I am in control of my thoughts, actions and their consequences’ 
(Gallagher, 2000) is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that can be influenced 
by sensorimotor processes as well as by individuals’ mental and emotional states; 
their intentions, expectations and biases (Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen, 2008; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; Farrer et al., 2008; Sato, 2009; Synofzik, Thier, & Lindner, 
2006; Wegner, 2003).  
 
Evidence suggests that individuals differ in their ability to objectively distinguish 
between events caused by self from those caused by other individuals. Difficulties 
associated with this fundamental skill are thought to be a core cognitive feature of 
schizophrenia, reflected in positive symptoms like delusions of control and auditory 
verbal hallucinations (Waters et al., 2012; Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005; Frith, 2005; 
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Jeannerod, 2009; Spence et al., 1997). Performance discrepancies have also been 
shown in non-clinical samples (Sugimori, Asai, & Tanno, 2011; de Bezenac et al., 
2015). For example, de Bezenac et al. (2015) found that accuracy in assessing the 
proportion of self-other control over auditory events decreased with hallucination 
proneness and, as anticipated, increased with music-making experience. This pattern 
of results was accentuated by task difficulty, i.e., in conditions where tones were as 
likely to belong to self as to other. Agency performance is therefore also determined 
by how an individual’s previous experiences and expectations and cognitive biases 
interact with external factors (Wegner, 2002; 2003), such as the amount of prior 
information available to facilitate this decision-making. 
 
Previous neuroimaging studies into sense of agency have examined brain activity as 
participants performed attribution tasks in the scanner. For example, studies have 
compared response to unaltered visual feedback of action with feedback that has 
been distorted using delay (e.g., Leube et al. 2003) or spatial displacement (e.g., 
Farrer et al. 2003; David et al. 2007). These paradigms have implicated a number of 
disparate regions involved in sensorimotor control and multimodal integration (for 
reviews see Sperduti et al., 2011, David et al., 2008). Some regions, such as the 
insula, display particular sensitivity to clearly self-produced outcomes  (Farrer et al., 
2003). However, most other implicated regions have been primarily associated with 
action-outcome discordance typical of externally generated stimuli, though some 
have also shown sensitivity to self-agency (Renes et al., 2015). These include the 
inferior parietal lobe (Farrer et al., 2003; Chaminade & Decety, 2002), extrastriate 
body area (EBA) (David et al., 2007), medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Pfeifer, Lieberman, & Dapretto, 2007; Schnell et al., 2007), and cerebellum 
(Blakemore et al., 1999; 2002).  
 
Patients experiencing the positive symptoms of schizophrenia have shown over-
activation of the inferior parietal lobe (primarily associated with external causes) 
when performing attribution tasks (Spence et al., 1997; Jardri et al., 2011; Farrer et 
al., 2004). However, it is not yet clear how neural differences between individuals 
directly relate to agency performance. Increasing evidence suggests that inter-
individual variation seen in the broad patterns of activation is meaningfully 
associated with cognitive and behavioural factors that constrain real world function 
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(Bassett et al., 2009, van den Heuvel et al., 2009). 
 
FMRI studies have examined individual differences in neural response, not only 
during experimental tasks, but also during so called ‘resting-state’ – in the absence of 
an explicit task. Resting-state networks (RSN) have been shown largely to 
correspond to regions that are co-activated during the performance of specific tasks 
and can provide complementary information about brain function, avoiding 
confounds related to completing a task (Smith et al., 2009). Emerging findings 
suggest that the temporal and spatial organisation of such networks have behavioural 
and clinical relevance (for reviews see Greicius, 2008; Zhang and Raichle, 2010) and 
remain relatively stable across time within individuals (Shehzad et al., 2009; Guo et 
al., 2012). RSN patterns in neurologically typical individuals have been associated 
with a number of cognitive functions relevant to agency, including working memory 
(Gordon et al., 2014; Hampson et al., 2006), attentional control (Kelly et al., 2008), 
fluid reasoning (Cole et al., 2012) and theory of mind (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). 
 
Network-based methods exploring co-activating areas have also been effective in 
highlighting neural differences between people with schizophrenia and matched 
controls (reviewed in Williamson and Allman, 2012; Karbasforoushan & Woodward, 
2012). For example, severity of hallucinations and delusions were shown to correlate 
with aberrant functional connectivity in the default-mode network (DMN) (Rotarska-
Jagiela et al., 2010), a set of brain regions associated with self-referential processing 
(Greicius et al., 2003; Christoff et al., 2011) and aspects of social cognition (Mars et 
al., 2012) including source attribution (reviewed in Northoff et al., 2006). The 
relationship between networks has also been shown to be clinically significant. For 
example, the anti-correlation typically observed between the DMN (the medial 
prefrontal area in particular) and the central executive network (CEN) (Wiebking et 
al., 2014), has been implicated in processes of self-other discrimination and shown to 
be attenuated in individuals at risk for psychosis (Spaniel et al., 2015; Wotruba et al., 
2013). It has been argued that such neural differences may explain observed 
misattributions of internally or externally generated stimuli and that resting-state 
variation may play an important role in determining the sense of agency (Robinson, 
Wagner & Northoff, 2015).  
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Despite a shift towards considering networks as opposed to isolated regions as the 
unit of analysis in elucidating neural processes (Friston, 2011; Meehan & Bressler, 
2012), network accounts of agency are scarce (David et al., 2007; David, Newen & 
Vogeley, 2008; Robinson, Wagner & Northoff, 2015). This line of research, 
however, has the potential to shed additional light on the functional relationships 
between brain regions previously implicated in self-other differentiation and the 
processes leading to agency difficulties and symptoms thought to be related to this 
facility. The current study aims to shed additional light on self-other processing by 
examining the relationship between performance on an agency task and functional 
connectivity in resting state fMRI. More specifically, we assessed the ability of 55 
participants to identify the proportion of auditory tones resulting from finger taps 
belonging to self as opposed to ‘other’ (composed of randomised taps of self; see de 
Bezenac et al., 2015), as well as the extent to which misattribution towards other 
increased in the most challenging ambiguous conditions. These measures were used 
to predict functional differences both within- and between-networks using a data-
driven approach involving group independent component analysis (ICA) and dual 
regression (Beckmann & Smith, 2005; Beckmann et al., 2009; Filippini et al., 2009).  
 
Given the limited scope of prior research on functional connectivity and agency, the 
current study had a number of objectives: to (1) determine whether patterns of 
functional connectivity are associated with individual differences in overall task 
performance and in ambiguity-related misattribution; (2) examine whether such 
differences are associated with RSNs composed of regions previously implicated in 
agency tasks; and (3) investigate how individual differences in agency performance 
might predict alterations in either the connectivity of RSNs with other brain regions 
or other large-scale RSNs. Our hypothesis was that between-individual variation in 
functional connectivity during rest would be associated with agency performance 
measures and, more specifically, in the light of previous clinical evidence, that DMN 
nodes would be implicated. However, based on the lack of prior research in this area, 
our investigation was more exploratory with regard to how exactly such individual 
differences would be expressed. 
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5.3. Methods 
 
5.3.1. Participants 
The study sample initially consisted of 57 right-handed participants with a mean age 
of 25 years (SD = 8; range, 19–50). Participants were recruited from the student and 
staff population at the University of Liverpool. All participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, normal hearing and somatosensory perception. No 
participants reported histories of mental or neurological illness. Two participants 
were excluded prior to statistical analysis due to incidental neurological 
abnormalities, leaving a final sample of 55 participants (28 females). All participants 
gave written informed consent as part of a protocol approved by the ethics committee 
of the University of Liverpool. 
 
5.3.2. Imaging protocol 
Participants completed a resting-state scan: they were asked to relax with their eyes 
closed for a duration of six minutes. Scans were obtained using a Trio 3.0 Tesla 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany), whole body MRI system, equipped with an eight-
channel phased array head coil. Foam padding and head restraints were used to 
minimise head movement during imaging. Each scan consisted of 197 contiguous 
EPI functional volumes (TR = 2000 ms; TE = 25 ms; flip angle = 90°, 32 slices, 
matrix = 64 x 64; FOV = 192 mm; acquisition voxel size = 3.5 mm3). Before 
preprocessing these functional data, the first eight volumes of each run were 
automatically removed to allow for magnetic stabilization, leaving 180 usable 
volumes. To facilitate co-registration and normalization of these functional data, we 
also acquired a high-resolution T1-weighted magnetization prepared gradient echo 
sequence from each participant that lasted 12 minutes (TE 5.57ms, TR 2040 ms, flip 
angle 8º, FOV=256×256 mm2, 176 slices, voxel size 1×1×1 mm3).  
 
5.3.3. Behavioural task  
Following the scanning session, participants completed a computerised agency task 
previously described in de Bezenac et al., (2015). Briefly, participants were asked to 
perform series of irregular taps (“like Morse code”) using their right index finger 
whilst listening to a sequence of tones on headphones. Tones either resulted from the 
participant’s actions (self) or from the actions of ‘other’, which consisted of the 
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previous 50 inter-tap intervals performed by the participant played back in a random 
order. The probability that self- or ‘other’-generated taps would produce tones was 
manipulated in 10 equal steps corresponding to 10 conditions, allowing a continuum 
ranging from tone control belonging fully to self (C1) to control belong fully to other 
(C10). In the middle of the continuum (C5, C6), the probability of self- and other-
generated tones was equal, making self-other attribution more ambiguous. After a 3-
minute practice session, each participant completed a total of 50 trials made up of 5 
repetitions of each of the 10 conditions presented in a pseudorandom order 
(consecutive conditions were not presented consecutively). After each trial, 
consisting of 10 seconds of tapping, participants were asked to assess the proportion 
of control that they felt belonged to self versus to other along a continuum, using a 
computer mouse. The task took approximately 15 minutes to complete and was 
preceded by a 3-min practice session allowing 50 participant tap intervals to be 
recorded and used in non-self taps following randomisation. A schematic 
representation of the experimental paradigm is provided in Fig. 5.1 (left).  
 
5.3.4. Behavioural variables 
Overall performance (OP) was calculated as the correlation between participants’ 
attribution ratings (subjective locus of control) ranging from self to other and tap-
tone asynchrony (objective locus of control). The latter was computed as the 
correlation between Butterworth filtered time-series of tap and tone onsets. A high 
correlation thus indicated that the subjective locus of control experienced by the 
participant matched the actual or objective locus of control instantiated in the task. 
 
Misattribution (attribution error) was calculated as the difference between attribution 
rating (ranged between 0 and 1) and tap-tone asynchrony (also ranged between 0 and 
1). Given that misattribution has been shown to peak in the middle of the self-to-
other continuum (C5-C6) (de Bezenac et al., 2015), we represented ambiguity-
related misattribution (AM) as the slope (b1) of a regression line predicting 
misattribution by pooling conditions 1 and 10, 2 and 9, 3 and 8, 4 and 7, and 5 and 6. 
Positive values represent misattribution biased towards ‘other’ in ambiguous 
conditions (the middle as opposed to the extremes of the self-to-other continuum) 
with negative values indicating ambiguity-related misattribution biased towards self. 
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5.3.5. Image preprocessing 
FMRI data processing was carried out using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) 
Version 6.00, part of FSL (FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). 
Preprocessing steps included motion correction (Jenkinson et al., 2002), non-brain 
removal (Smith, 2002), spatial smoothing (FWHM 5mm), grand-mean intensity 
normalisation, highpass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight 
line fitting, with sigma=55.0s). Registration to high-resolution structural and 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 152 stereotactic space (2 mm) images was 
carried out using default settings in FLIRT and a linear transformation with 12 
degrees of freedom (Jenkinson & Smith, 2001, Jenkinson et al., 2002). 
 
5.3.5. Within-network connectivity: dual regression ICA 
The overall group preprocessed data consisting of 55 participants were temporally 
concatenated and entered into an ICA using MELODIC (Version 3.13) 
(http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/MELODIC) in FSL. Data were decomposed into 
20 spatially and temporally distinct components in order to represent robust large-
scale networks (Beckmann et al. 2005; Greicius et al. 2007; Smith et al., 2009). 
Visual inspection (Kelly et al., 2010) of these group-level ICs was used to identify 
those best representing previously identified networks (Laird et al., 2011; Smith et 
al., 2009), while components that did not match these networks were considered 
noise or artifacts such as movement, white matter, or ventricles. Spatial cross-
correlation were also conducted to confirm IC-network associations.   
 
Non-artifactual ICs were then compared to participant-specific timecourses and 
spatial maps using dual regression  
(http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/DualRegression). This involved: (1) regressing 
the group-spatial-maps into each participant's functional dataset to give a set of time-
series; (2) regressing these time-series into the same dataset to get a participant-
specific set of spatial maps; and (3) comparing the spatial maps across participants to 
look for positive and negative differences predicted by the behavioural variables 
(after accounting for mean group connectivity). Non-parametric permutation testing 
was carried out as part of the latter (step 3) using the randomise tool in FSL (5000 
permutations) and resulting statistical maps were thresholded using threshold-free 
cluster enhancement with an alpha level of .05 (corrected). Following studies using 
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similar procedures (Uddin, Supekar, & Menon, 2013; Nomi & Uddin, 2015), 
correction for multiple component testing was not applied. 
 
5.3.6. Between-network connectivity: FSL Nets 
Between-network differences in functional connectivity were examined using the 
FSL Nets package implemented in Matlab 
(http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/FSLNets). This analysis involved correlating 
participant-specific time-series from the dual regression (step 1) for each IC pair 
(Smith et al., 2010). Behavioural variables were then used to predict full and partial 
correlation values using randomise (5000 permutations). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1. Behavioural task depiction (left) and processing pipeline for resting-state fMRI data (right). 
 
 
5.4. Results 
 
5.4.1. Behavioural data 
The data was found to be suitable for the proposed analyses, without floor or ceiling 
effects and with scores varying sufficiently across the group of participants. The 55 
participants had a mean OP (r) score of 0.77 (SD = 0.1, range = 0.51 to 0.94) and a 
mean AM (b1) score of 0.33 (SD = 0.2, range= -0.08 to 0.73). Confirming previous 
results (de Bezenac et al., 2015), the positive AB score in all but one participant 
indicates a general bias towards other in the middle of the self-to-other continuum. 
Given the possible effect of age on temporal discrimination implicated in agency and 
resting state networks connectivity (Ferreira & Busatto, 2013), we tested the 
relationship between age and our variables of interest (OP; AM). OP did not 
correlate with age (r(53) = 0.04, p=0.73) and neither did AM (r(53)=0.06, p=0.64).   
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5.4.2. Group ICA 
Of the 20 ICs extracted from the group of 55 participants, 10 were determined to be 
artifactual, representing cerebral spinal fluid, ventricles, head motion, signal drop-out 
and white matter response. The 10 remaining ICs seen on Fig. 5.2 were entered into 
the dual regression analysis and corresponded to default mode (IC1, r = .75; IC4, r = 
.36), right frontoparietal (IC2, r = .59), visual (IC3, r = .66), sensorimotor (IC5, r = 
.59), auditory (IC6, r = .6), dorsal attention (IC7, r = .45), left frontoparietal (IC8, r = 
.65), executive control (IC9, r = .67), and frontal (IC10, r = .52) networks. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2. Independent components (IC1-10) included in the analysis. Statistical images are shown in 
radiological convention with the right hemisphere displayed in the left. 
 
 
5.4.3. Within-network connectivity 
As seen in Fig. 5.3 and Table 5.1, lower OP (the correlation between subjective and 
objective action attribution) was associated with increased connectivity of IC10, a 
medial frontal network spatially (IC10, r = .29) and temporally (see Fig. 5.4) linked 
to the DMN, with a number of brain regions, including the paracingulate and anterior 
cingulate regions (peak voxel = MNI coordinate 4 44 -6, FWE corrected: p = 0.026), 
lateral occipital gyrus (peak voxel = MNI coordinate 50 -64 -2, FWE corrected: p = 
0.028), and cerebellum (right VI). Though correction has not been applied in similar 
studies, as an indication of the strength of the effect, the peak voxel in the statistical 
image reached a corrected p-value of 0.18 when false discovery rate (FDR) 
correction for multiple (10) network comparisons was applied. Ambiguity-related 
misattribution was also associated with increased connectivity between IC10 and the 
cerebellum (left Crus II; peak voxel = MNI coordinate -30 -72 -40, FWE corrected: p 
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= 0.018) and reduced right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (homologue of Broca’s area 
in the right hemisphere) connectivity with IC8, a left lateralised fronto-parietal 
network (peak voxel = MNI coordinate 52 28 -4, FWE corrected: p = 0.03, FDR 
correction for multiple (10) network comparisons, p=0.16). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.3. Within-network connectivity. Task performance predicting brain regions with functional 
connectivity to IC10 (medial frontal network) (top panel); Ambiguity error predicting brain regions 
with functional connectivity to IC10 (medial frontal network) (middle panel) and IC8 (left fronto-
parietal network). Corrected for multiple comparisons (grey matter voxels) using threshold-free 
cluster enhancement, shown at P < 0.05, corrected. The right side of images represents the left side of 
the brain. Scatterplots show the relationship between the behavioural variable (x-axis) and the degree 
of integration between the network and all significant voxels in the statistical image (y-axis). 
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Table 5.1. Within-network dual regression results. MNI coordinates for peak voxels are provided for 
each cluster with associated p-values corrected using threshold-free cluster enhancement. Values after 
each brain regions represents the associated cluster percentage. N = number of voxels; 
IC = independent component; BA = Brodmann area.  
 
Network Structures to which each cluster belongs to Side BA N P-value MNI coordinates 
       X y z 
IC10: reduced overall performance 
 Lateral Occipital Cortex, inferior division (12), 
Occipital Fusiform Gyrus (10) 
R 37 705 0.028 50 -64 -2 
 Paracingulate Gyrus (28), Cingulate Gyrus, 
anterior division (23), Subcallosal Cortex (24) 
R 10 252 0.026 4 44 -6 
 Lateral Occipital Cortex, inferior division (25), 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus, temporooccipital part 
(15) 
L 37 89 0.036 -46 -60 0 
 Right Crus II (69), Right Crus I (19) R n/a 47 0.036 24 -86 -36 
 Lingual Gyrus (34) R 18 10 0.043 14 -84 -12 
 Frontal Orbital Cortex (55) L 38 9 0.044 -42 22 -18 
 Right VI (89) R n/a 8 0.048 28 -58 -30 
 Right VI (81), Right V (19) R n/a 4 0.049 16 -60 -22 
 Frontal Orbital Cortex (68) L 38 3 0.048 -36 22 -8 
 Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex (34) L 19 3 0.047 -20 -58 -14 
IC10: increased ambiguity-related misattribution  
 Left Crus II (44), Left VIIb (21) L n/a 257 0.018 -30 -72 -40 
 Left Crus I (52), Left Crus II (33) L n/a 27 0.04 -10 -78 -32 
IC8: reduced ambiguity-related misatribution 
 Inferior Frontal Gyrus (40), pars triangularis, 
Frontal Orbital Cortex (17) 
R 38 11 0.032 52 28 -4 
 
 
 
5.4.4. Between-network connectivity 
Fig. 5.4 shows the correlation values of IC pairs. Squares below the diagonal line 
represent full correlation network comparisons, which allow for the influence of 
other ICs, while the partial correlations displayed above the diagonal line represent 
more direct measures of the relationship between IC pairs.  
 
Using performance as predictor, the between-network comparison showed one 
significant difference for partial correlation values between IC9, corresponding to a 
frontal executive control network, and IC3, a visual network (Fig. 5.4, labeled OP; 
FWE corrected: p = .019). Higher OP during the agency task predicted significantly 
smaller correlation values between these two networks. No other differences 
emerged for full or partial correlation with performance as the predictor (FWE 
corrected: p > .14). Increased misattribution towards other in ambiguous conditions 
in the middle of the self-to-other continuum predicted increased full correlation 
between IC9 (the same frontal executive control network) and IC7, a dorsal attention 
network (Fig. 5.4, labeled AM, FWE corrected: p = .035). No other differences 
emerged for between-network comparisons (FWE corrected: p > .9). 
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IC9 implicated in both performance measures included subcortical regions and 
spatially correlated with the salience network (r = 0.3). Across participants, partial 
correlation comparisons showed that response fluctuation in this frontal network 
(IC9) correlated with IC6 (a temporal network) (r = 0.84) and IC4 (a DMN) (r = 
0.63) and was negatively related to IC8 (a left-lateralised frontoparietal network) (r = 
-0.42). IC7, a dorsal attention network, was anti-correlated with IC4 (a DMN) (r = -
0.79) and correlated with IC2 (a right-lateralised frontoparietal network) (r = 0.9) 
(see Fig. 5.4). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.4. Between-network connectivity (IC1-10). The right side of the images represents the left side 
of the brain. Full correlations across the cohort are shown below the diagonal line of the correlation 
matrix (left) with partial correlations shown above it. IC groupings on top of the matrix represent 
hierarchical clustering of IC timeseries. OP (overall performance) represents a significant decrease in 
partial correlations between IC3 (visual network) and IC9 (executive control network) (FWE 
corrected: p = .019). AM (ambiguity-related misattribution) represents a significant increase in full 
correlations between IC7 (visual/attention network) and IC9 (executive control network) (FWE 
corrected: p = .035). Corresponding scatterplots are shown on the right.  
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5.5. Discussion 
 
Using resting state fMRI and an agency task, we investigated whether functional 
connectivity within and between networks during rest varies in relation to individual 
differences in agency task performance. Our findings indicate that lower overall 
performance and increased ambiguity-related misattribution was associated with 
increased connectivity between a medial prefrontal network (the anterior DMN) and 
other brain regions, including the anterior and paracingulate cortex, lateral-occipital 
gyrus, and the cerebellum. Ambiguity-related misattribution predicted reduced 
connectivity of a left lateralised frontoparietal network with the inferior frontal gyrus 
(Broca’s area homologue in the right hemisphere). Connectivity (correlation) 
between a second more lateral prefrontal network and a visual and attention-related 
network was also related to lower performance.  
 
5.5.1. Within-network functional connectivity and overall performance 
The association between agency performance in our task and variation in a medial 
prefrontal network is consistent with studies that implicate this region in agency 
through its putative role in performance monitoring (reviewed in Van Noordt & 
Segalowitz, 2012). The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) has specifically been 
implicated in organising behaviour in the temporal domain (Fuster, 1997, 2001; 
reviewed in Vogeley & Kupke, 2007). This temporal association makes sense in the 
context of the task used here because participants’ attribution judgments were based 
upon the temporal discrepancy between their actions and auditory outcome. Imaging 
studies also suggest that the MPFC is a key substrate for social cognition (Gallagher 
et al., 2000; Goel, 1995), integrating self-other information across time (reviewed in 
Van Overwalle, 2009). With reciprocal connections to brain areas associated with 
memory (hippocampus), emotion processing (amygdala) and higher-order 
information processing (DLPFC), this region is thought to be play a regulatory role in 
goal-directed behaviour (reviewed in Wood, & Grafman, 2003). 
 
As an anterior node of the DMN (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna & Schacter, 2008), the 
MPFC is thought to play an important role in maintaining the sense of self, showing 
particular sensitivity to self-referential processing, while posterior nodes (i.e., PCC; 
IPL) respond to stimuli relating to others (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Molnar-
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Szakacs & Uddin, 2013). For example, the MPFC has previously been associated 
with the retrieval of autobiographical memory (Svoboda et al., 2006), remembering 
self- versus externally-generated words (Vinogradov et al., 2008), self-referential 
episodes (Zysset et al., 2002) and self-knowledge (reviewed in Van Overwalle, 
2009). It may be that agency performance is more determined by how regions 
associated with self are related to the rest of the brain than by regions associated with 
processing of other. 
 
The DMN and its anterior node in particular has also received considerable interest 
in the study of neuropsychiatric conditions associated with agency dysfunction. For 
example, combined structural and functional imaging conducted by Pomarol-Clotet 
et al. (2010) revealed overlapping regions of abnormality in the MPFC in people 
with chronic schizophrenia compared to matched controls. Similarly, reduced task-
related deactivation of the MPFC (Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009; Pomarol-Clotet et 
al., 2008) and over-activation of this region during rest (Unschuld et al., 2014) has 
been associated with cognitive deficits related to schizophrenia. This pattern of 
findings is consistent with the direction of our results given the established link 
between positive schizotypy and reduced agency performance (Frith, 2005; 
Jeannerod, 2009).  
 
In particular, this network expanded into neighbouring anterior cingulate regions 
previously associated with agency-relevant functions such as conflict monitoring, 
attention, decision-making, and emotional regulation (reviewed in Devinsky, Morrell 
& Vogt, 1995; Paus et al., 1998; Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004). One model of 
the ACC proposes that it interacts with other prefrontal regions, combining executive 
processes with representations of emotional states to enable appropriate behavioural 
responses to events relevant to self (Paus, 2001). Interestingly, anterior cingulate 
regions are also amongst those that have been consistently implicated in 
hallucination-related phenomena (reviewed in Allen et al., 2008; Fornito et al., 
2009). Notable examples include relationships found between psychosis proneness 
and over-activation in the ACC during self-reflection (Modinos et al., 2011), and 
between the morphology of the paracingulate sulcus and hallucinatory experiences 
(Garrison et al., 2015).   
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In our findings prefrontal connectivity with a lateral occipital, inferior temporal 
region and the cerebellum also increased in association with lower overall 
performance. The former includes the “extrastriate body area” (EBA) – a region 
often implicated in agency tasks with particular sensitivity to externally-generated 
stimuli (David et al., 2007; 2008; reviewed in Jeannerod, 2004), in addition to its 
association with embodiment (Arzy et al., 2005). This region is also just posterior to 
the inferior parietal lobe also shown to be sensitive to action-outcome discrepancy 
that characterises externally-caused events and found to be overactive during agency 
tasks in patients with positive symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g., Farrer et al., 2004; 
Spence et al., 1997).  
 
Similarly, regions of the cerebellum have been associated with other-agency and 
action feedback discrepancy (Blakemore et al., 2001). Though still little is known 
about the fronto-cerebellar pathway, it has been suggested that it may facilitate 
functions that are implicated in agency processing such as the transfer of 
sensorimotor information and motor prediction and learning (Watson et al., 2015; 
Kalmbach et al., 2009). Compared with healthy controls, first-episode schizophrenia 
patients show increased resting state connectivity between DMN and the cerebellum 
(right Crus II) (Guo et al., 2015).  
 
More generally, it makes sense that connectivity between regions associated with self 
(MPFC) and those associated with other increased with lower performance. This 
suggests that self-other differentiation depends on regions associated with self and 
other being functionally distinct from one another. This rationale is in line with 
findings of overlap between the self and non-self cortical maps in individual with 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia (Jardri et al., 2011).   
 
5.5.2. Within-network functional connectivity and ambiguity-related misattribution 
Confirming previous behavioural findings (de Bezenac et al., 2015), ambiguity-
related misattribution was biased towards other, suggesting a tendency to experience 
self-generated events as belonging to other in ambiguous situations where the 
likelihood of self and other-generated tones was equal. The extent of this bias also 
implicated the medial frontal network, specifically predicting increased connectivity 
with the cerebellum (Left Crus II). More specific examination of functional  fronto-
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cerebellar pathways may therefore contribute to a clearer understanding of the role 
that the cerebellum plays in agency and in social cognition more generally (Van 
Overwalle et al., 2014). 
 
The only regions that showed increased network connectivity in relation to better 
performance and, more specifically, reduced ambiguity-related misattribution 
towards other was an area in the IFG that corresponded to the right homologue to 
Broca’s area. Activity in this region has been shown to be responsive to self-specific 
stimuli (Uddin et al., 2005; Kaplan et al., 2008; Qin & Northoff, 2011) and has been 
implicated in the experience of auditory verbal hallucinations (Sommer et al., 2008). 
In our findings, reduced ambiguity-related bias was associated with increased 
connectivity between this region and the left lateralised frontoparietal network that 
includes Broca’s area. Using dynamic causal modelling, Ćurčić-Blake et al. (2013) 
found reduction in connectivity between Broca’s area and its right homologue in 
patients with hallucinations. Furthermore, reduced connectivity between the latter 
and the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), part of the left frontoparietal network has 
also been associated with hallucinations (Vercammen et al., 2010). It may be that 
cross-hemisphere co-activation of these regions reduces the likelihood of 
experiencing self-generated action and thoughts as originating from an external 
source. This could be tested experimentally by using neuro-stimulation techniques to 
modulate functional relationships between aforementioned regions during an agency 
task or with patients experiencing hallucinations (Moseley, Fernyhough, & Ellison, 
2013). 
 
5.5.3. Between-network functional connectivity 
Examining connectivity between networks, both agency performance measures were 
associated with the more lateral, executive control prefrontal network (Smith et al., 
2009; for reviews see Botvinick et al. 2004; Dosenbach et al. 2007). This network 
spatially overlapped with the salience network and included subcortical regions and 
response fluctuations correlated with a temporal and default mode network. That 
agency performance modulated a frontal network commonly engaged by tasks 
requiring executive control is not surprising given the high-level functions likely to 
be involved in self-other processing. Such prefrontal regions are thought to regulate 
the flow of ongoing processing via dopaminergic neurotransmitters, particularly 
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affecting systems responsible for perception, action selection, and emotional 
evaluation (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
 
Our findings show that correlation between this frontal network and a visual network 
increased as overall agency performance decreased. While it is not immediately 
apparent why a visual network was implicated in agency performance, it suggests 
that autonomy between prefrontal and perceptual brain areas during resting state has 
important implications for accurate agentic decision-making.  
 
Ambiguity-related misattribution increased with correlation between the same frontal 
network and a dorsal attention network with fluctuations highly correlated with a 
right-lateralised frontoparietal network and anticorrelated with a DMN across 
participants. While further hypothesis-driven research is required, our pattern of 
results suggests that individuals who have a tendency to experience their actions as 
belonging to others in the absence of clear information for self-other differentiation 
may be hyper-attentive/vigilant during rest, a trait previously observed in people with 
schizophrenia (Mar, Smith & Sarter 1996). Given the previous link between 
ambiguity processing and hallucination proneness (de Bezenac et al., 2015), this 
finding indirectly supports evidence implicating the deregulation of task-positive and 
task-negative networks in schizophrenia (Wotruba et al., 2013; Nygård et al., 2012). 
However, ambiguity-related misattribution was only a significant predictor in the 
full-correlation comparison, suggesting that the effect may be modulated by another 
network. Hypotheses-driven mediation models could be used in future work to 
uncover indirect relationships.     
 
5.5.4. General  
With the exception of the finding relating agency performance to left frontoparietal 
connectivity with the right IFG, connectivity within and between networks was 
related to lower performance (including increased ambiguity-related misattribution). 
This is in line with studies that associate neural inhibition, particularly of the DMN, 
to task difficulty and performance accuracy (Harrison et al., 2011; Gilbert et al., 
2012; Polli et al., 2005; Engström, Landtblom, & Karlsson, 2013), as well as those 
showing general over-activation and connectivity to be associated with schizophrenia 
(Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009; Peeters et al., 2015; Shim et al, 2010; Yang et al., 
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2014). For example, Driesen et al. (2013) found that schizophrenia-like symptoms 
induced through ketamine were associated with increased global functional 
connectivity between networks that are normally functionally independent during 
resting-state fMRI. This hyperconnectivity seems to specifically implicate prefrontal 
areas (Vollenweider et al., 1997; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009; Anticevic et al., 
2015). Our findings, showing that two prefrontal networks were modulated by 
agency performance suggests a specific role for the prefrontal cortex and its 
functional connections with other parts of the brain in self-other processing. An over-
connected prefrontal lobe could mediate distorted boundaries between self and others 
and lead to lower attribution performance. Given the correlation between fluctuation 
in the medial frontal network and the DMN, our findings partially support 
theoretically-driven predictions implicating the DMN in self-other differentiation 
(Robinson, Wagner & Northoff, 2015).  
 
Finally, that cerebellar, frontal and parietal structures known to be involved in 
temporal processing (Coull, Davranche, Nazarian, & Vidal, 2013) were implicated in 
agency performance suggests that timing is an important cue for self-other 
differentiation and that there may be significant overlap between temporal 
discrimination and agency performance. This is in line with findings associating 
reduced performance on both timing and agency tasks to increased psychopathology 
(Papageorgiou et al., 2013; Carroll et al., 2008; Spence et al., 1997; Frith, 2005). 
Disentangling, and assessing the overlap between inter-individual variation in 
temporal/spatial discrimination and agency performance in relation to neural 
response in future work could further our understanding of agency-processing. 
 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
Using a data-driven approach, we present initial evidence for the relevance of the 
anterior brain’s resting state activity in agency processing. Increased connectivity of 
the prefrontal cortex with other parts of the brain related to a diminished ability to 
distinguish self from other-generated events. More specifically, lower performance 
predicted increased connectivity between medial prefrontal regions associated with 
self-referential processing and regions shown to be sensitive to externally-generated 
stimuli. On the basis of these findings we contend that a greater understanding of 
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agency-related patterns of functional connectivity during rest has potential to 
contribute to theories of self-other representation in the brain and, importantly, to 
enhance our understanding of conditions, like psychosis, where such representations 
are challenged. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
General discussion and conclusions 
 
 
6.1. Purpose and rationale of the study 
 
This doctoral research examined behavioural and neural underpinnings of self-other 
differentiation with a particular focus on response to ambiguous situations where 
information for distinguishing between events caused by self and other is reduced. 
The study began by defining the concept of ambiguity, putting forward the idea that 
it plays a key role in the developing sense of self and in learning to differentiate self 
from other, both as a physical entity and agent with influence on surroundings. The 
proposal was that experience in contexts that require self-other differentiation yet 
which makes such differentiation challenging may provide optimal conditions for 
developing reality-testing skills necessary for self-other processing. With attunement 
in early caregiver-infant interactions framed as one such context, the argument 
positioned vulnerability to psychosis within a developmental framework. However, it 
was also noted that attribution abilities negatively related to associated phenomena in 
previous research (Frith, 2005; Bentall et al., 2007; Jeannerod, 2009), may be 
malleable and improve through experience/practice. Using joint action and, more 
specifically, music-making as a case in point, it was argued that behaviours that put 
the sense of self into question – often by introducing a high degree of coherence 
between autonomous agents – may be understood as having the functional role of 
maintaining a coherent sense of self throughout life by refining reality-testing 
reflexes relating to self-other boundaries. As such, the first chapter concluded by 
proposing that increased insight into the role of ambiguity may enhance our 
understanding of mechanisms underlying ‘self-disorders’ such as schizophrenia and 
may eventually extend the range of social and arts-based therapeutic possibilities. 
Despite the scope of such proposals and their wide-ranging implications for mental 
health, initial predictions were put forward for testing in the context of the 
experimental investigations presented in Chapters 2-5.  
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Below is a summary of these experimental findings with a brief discussion about 
how these relate to the above theoretical ideas, general limitations and directions for 
further investigation. More specific associations between the findings of each study 
and previous behavioural and neuroimaging work are included in the discussion 
sections of experimental study write-ups (i.e., sections 2.5, 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5). 
 
 
6.2. Summary of experimental findings 
 
The aim of the first experimental study (Chapter 2) was to develop a novel task that 
would allow the amount of control that self has compared to other over action-
outcomes to be systematically manipulated. In so doing it addressed methodological 
challenges identified in previous agency paradigms (see section 2.2). This was 
achieved by modulating the probability that auditory tones would result from finger 
taps belonging either to self or to other. In contrast to previous examinations of 
agency that distorted self-generated feedback and used error to subjectively 
determine the point of greatest uncertainty for each individual, the approach used 
here allowed ambiguity to be objectively defined as conditions where the likelihood 
for self- and other-generated outcomes was equal.  
 
Misattribution, calculated as the difference between subjective locus of control and 
the actual proportion of control that a participant possessed, was examined along the 
self-to-other continuum in a multilevel analysis using hallucination proneness and 
musical experience as second-level predictors. In contrast to hallucination proneness 
(which has previously been linked with increased misattribution), musical experience 
was predicted to be associated with reduced attribution errors: the underlying 
supposition was that engaging in behaviours requiring self-other differentiation, on 
the one hand, yet which also render this task challenging, on the other, can make 
individuals better at monitoring self in relation to sensory outcome belonging to 
other/s. Furthermore, given that musical skill is not ‘innate’ but learnt through 
experience (or thousands of hours of practice), examining musical experience in 
relation to attribution abilities was used to provide preliminary insight into the 
malleability of this competence.  
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Findings from 40 participants revealed that misattribution peaked in the middle of 
self-to-other continuum where ambiguity was greatest. Misattribution tended to be 
biased towards other in ambiguous conditions for all participants in the sense that 
individuals were more likely to experience tones as having been externally rather 
than self- generated. As hypothesised, this pattern of results was related to higher 
hallucination-proneness and contrasted to the pattern of reduced ambiguity-related 
misattribution associated with musical experience. These finding not only provided 
initial support for the idea that causal ambiguity plays a key role in self-other 
processing, but also that action attribution abilities are malleable and may improve 
with experience in contexts that blur the boundaries between self and other. 
 
The aim of the second experimental study (Chapter 3) was to conduct an initial 
examination into neural response to ambiguity in the attribution task outlined above 
using a parametric fMRI block-design paradigm. The implementation of linear and 
non-linear stimulus-response functions allowed differentiation between neural 
activity related to control belonging to self (negative linear), other (positive linear) 
and ambiguity-related response (positive/negative quadratic). Confirming findings 
from the previous study (Chapter 2), ambiguity-related misattribution was observed. 
Testing stimulus-response functions in task-sensitive brain regions, revealed a 
general negative trend of BOLD response in relation to the self-to-other 
manipulation, indicating sensitivity to control belonging to self. However, all 
anatomically defined regions also displayed significant non-linearity with decreased 
response in ambiguous conditions compared to the extremes of the self-to-other 
continuum (see Table 3.5). This provided new insights into agency-related 
ambiguity-processing in the brain, suggesting that causal relationships are processed 
in terms of their distinctiveness from uncertain contexts.  
 
Task performance accentuated this U-shaped quadratic pattern in the precentral gyrus 
and a number of subcortical regions, including the putamen, caudate, and amygdala. 
Another important finding from this study was that individuals who made more 
errors (misattribution biased towards other) across the entire task showed increased 
response in regions associated with the DMN. This provides initial evidence of how 
individual differences can modulate neural response during self-other processing. As 
argued in sections 3.5 and 4.5.2, the observed response direction fits with evidence 
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associating expert performance with the deactivation of DMN regions (Harrison et 
al., 2011; Gilbert et al., 2012; Polli et al., 2005; Brewer et al., 2013; Sperduti et al., 
2012), as well as clinical findings associating altered neural function of these regions 
to positive symptoms of schizophrenia (reviewed in Adams & David, 2007). 
 
Given individual-difference findings related to ambiguity in the behavioural study 
(Chapter 2) and the performance-related response modulation observed in the fMRI 
investigation (Chapter 3), a more in-depth examination into how such differences 
modulate neural response during the attribution task was conducted in Chapter 4. 
Again reflecting the previous behavioural and imaging results, it was only in 
ambiguous conditions that neural response was found to vary between individuals. 
Increased response in a number of brain regions and networks was associated with 
positive, but not negative, schizotypy (measured using O-LIFE sub-factors) and an 
inability to tolerate ambiguity. These included the ACC and in a number of 
networks, including the DMN, visual, auditory and sensorimotor and regions (i.e., 
cingulate and temporal), previously implicated in hallucination, agency and 
ambiguity-processing. In contrast, reduced response in the same areas was associated 
with increased musical experience and improved task performance. In addition to the 
data-driven task-based ICA, a whole brain univariate analysis showed increased 
activation while processing the most ambiguous stimuli in cingulate and temporal 
regions previously associated with both hallucination (reviewed by Allen et al. 2008) 
and ambiguity-processing (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001) (for more detail see sections: 
4.2.2., 4.2.4., and 4.5). 
 
The purpose of the fourth empirical study (Chapter 5) was to examine the effects of 
attribution performance, including performance specifically related to ambiguity, on 
resting-state functional connectivity. Using ICA, dual regression and network 
analyses, the study investigated brain-behaviour relationships both within and 
between large-scale networks. In line with region-specific response decreases 
observed in studies 2 and 3 associated with individual differences such as task 
performance and schizotypy, a medial prefrontal network (the anterior node of the 
DMN) showed increased connectivity with the anterior cingulate, temporo-occipital 
and cerebellar regions in individuals with lower overall performance on the 
attribution task (completed outside the scanner). Increased frontoparietal 
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connectivity with the right inferior frontal gyrus was the only pattern associated with 
better task performance. That overall and agency performance was found to predict 
spontaneous fluctuations of neural response even when participants were not 
explicitly engaged in an agency task, suggests that the ability to distinguish self from 
other may be linked to neural function and an important distinguishing feature 
between individuals. More specifically, it implicates the relationship between the 
prefrontal cortex and the rest of the brain in this process.  
 
 
6.3. Implications of the study and future directions  
 
6.3.1. Implications of empirical findings  
Findings presented in this thesis provide initial support for the conceptual framework 
outlined in Chapter 1 regarding the putative role that ambiguity plays in self-other 
processing and in the experience of self-other action attribution. Behavioural and 
physiological indicators from all four empirical studies suggest that it is in contexts 
that lack information about whether the outcome of behaviour belongs to self or 
other that individuals show the greatest performance and neural disparities. While 
large inter-individual variability in agency performances is often observed (e.g., 
Farrer et al., 2004), few studies directly investigate the source of this variability. 
Thus, the present work constitutes an important step forward in filling this gap. 
Results not only confirm the previously established link between positive schizotypy 
and misattribution (e.g., Jeannerod, 2009; Frith, 2005; Bentall et al., 2007), but also 
provide credence to the idea that psychosis-related deficiencies may be more 
specifically associated with difficulties or lack of experience in dealing with contexts 
characterised by reduced agency information (de Bezenac et al., 2015). This idea 
requires further testing in research involving clinical samples. Empirical studies also 
point towards attribution abilities as being malleable, improving though experience 
in ambiguous contexts – a proposition that may have clinical implications.  
 
The imaging results presented here shed additional light on the neural mechanisms of 
agency and allow further, more specific predictions to be formulated for future 
studies investigating ambiguity in self-other action attribution. For example, in 
accordance with research linking deactivation with functional efficiency (Mckiernan 
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et al., 2003; Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2008), reduced ambiguity-related response was 
consistently associated with higher performance in the three fMRI investigations. In 
accordance with previous work on self-other processing (discussed in sections 3.5, 
4.5, and 5.5) findings implicated medial prefrontal regions (anterior DMN) and its 
relationship with the rest of the brain in the ability to accurately attribute actions to 
self and to other, allowing the direction of response within and between specific 
brain regions to be specifically tested in future investigations. The behavioural or 
experiential effect of dampening response or connectivity in regions positively 
associated with schizotypy and reduced task performance (e.g., using non-invasive 
brain stimulation such as rTMS or tDCS), for example, could also be investigated to 
determine the contribution of implicated brain regions to self-other processing. The 
network approach taken in Chapters 4 and 5 also builds on previous agency work, 
given the lack of network-based neural accounts of agency and the increasing 
evidence that large-scale networks functional integration measures can constitute a 
more accurate fingerprint of cognitive phenomena than other approaches (e.g., 
Bressler & Menon, 2010). 
 
6.3.2. Theoretical implications 
Drawing from perceptual and developmental psychology and from previous agency 
research (e.g., Gibson 1979; Bregman, 1994; Stern 1985; Fonagy et al., 2004; Farrer 
et al., 2004; David et al., 2008), the conceptual framework laid out in Chapter 1 has 
the potential to contribute to existing models of agency by placing dynamic features 
of experience at the centre. For example, the comparator model focuses on the 
relationship between sensorimotor predictions and action outcomes (Wolpert & 
Miall, 1996; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). By describing how such internal 
and external signals can vary in multiple ways including intensity, timing, and form 
– informed by the work of Daniel Stern (1985) – the framework provides a 
vocabulary that can lead to a more developed model of this relationship.  
 
Furthermore, Chapter 1 makes reference to internally derived signals other than 
sensorimotor prediction. For instance, affective sensations can also be more or less 
coherent with signals resulting from action-outcomes and are likely to play an 
important role in determining feelings of agency. This enables less investigated 
parameters particularly relevant to agency-related disorders to be considered within 
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the same theoretical frame and inform the development of new experimental 
paradigms. For example, the neutral agency task developed as part of this study 
could be adapted to include an emotional dimension in future research. More 
specifically, the effects of positively and negatively valenced stimuli could be 
examined in situations of reduced information for self-other differentiation. 
Indicators of modulating internal arousal, such as heart rate variability, electro-
dermal activity and body temperature, could also be compared to external stimuli 
(auditory, visual, or tactile) to examine the effects of coherence between internal and 
external signals on perceived agency. 
 
In contrast to considering agency as occurring within discrete moments that either 
belong to self or to other, the proposed framework emphasises that coherence of 
sensory signals from inside and outside the body varies continuously over time and 
at different timescales (e.g., sensorimotor processing or the general control that a 
person feels over their life - Gallagher, 2013). In accordance with recent conceptual 
shifts in cognitive science (Gallagher, 2013; Engel, Friston, & Kragic, 2016; Marsh 
et al., 2009; Stern, 2000), a more situated stance that implicitly examines experience 
as unfolding in time has the potential to bring together aspects of agency that have 
traditionally been addressed in non-overlapping research domains (e.g., sensorimotor 
agency and attribution theory). The task used in the experimental studies is a step in 
this direction given that, in contrast to previous agency paradigms, control can more 
naturalistically shift between belonging to self and other within trials. Attribution is 
continuous and can be ambiguous because it is based on weighing up stimuli 
belonging to both self and other picked up over a period of time (10-12 seconds in 
the case of this task). 
 
While mental health difficulties associated with the perception of self are viewed 
within a developmental framework and the importance of early caregiver-infant 
interaction is recognised, the model also leaves open the possibility for continued 
life-long development by proposing that the sense of self and the ability to 
distinguish self from other is malleable. A route through which such development 
may take place is specified. The functional description of ambiguity, as increased 
signal coherence between but not within entities, points towards practical ways of 
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measuring and manipulating the degree of ambiguity that exists in both controlled 
and more naturalistic settings.  
 
More generally, the ideas laid out in Chapter 1 are consistent with neuro- and 
cognitive-developmental accounts of psychosis proneness as well as with long-
standing non-medical therapies. Parallels are drawn between socio-affective 
interactions in early infancy that play an important role in the developing sense of 
self and the experience of coordinating behaviour with others through music-making. 
The two experiences have a number of commonalities, not least that both can be 
intuitively grasped without the need for verbal thinking or communication and 
involve the “flow of forms in time” (Stern, 2000). This comparison allows cultural 
and artistic practices to be understood as having a functional role in maintaining 
mental wellness. In accordance with approaches that reject the bio-medicalisation of 
mental illness (e.g., Bentall, 2004; Deacon, 2013; Watters, 2011), this reinforces the 
idea that psychological disorders can only be fully addressed in relation to the social, 
political and cultural contexts that sustain or maintain them. Rather than being 
predetermined by an individual’s particular genetic/neurological makeup or by the 
behaviour of family members including caregivers, mental illness is more 
fundamentally seen as causally related to processes of power that allow contexts and 
practices that have evolved to promote mental wellness to be eroded (Dewey, 1934; 
Reed, 1996; Blacking, 1974). However, an evidence-based awareness of the 
psychological outcomes that emerge from the interplay that exists between 
individuals and their surroundings is a necessary step towards genuine solutions to 
psychological difficulty. This project aims to contribute to such an endeavour by 
providing a framework for thinking about and testing aspects of this interplay 
involving individual differences associated with the perception of boundaries 
between self and other. As such, it speaks to concepts that consider individual 
differences in the quality of interpersonal relationships such as attachment theory 
(Bowlby, 2005), providing possible explanations for how such differences emerge 
and the degree to which experience-driven development is possible throughout life.  
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6.3.3. Applied directions with clinical implications 
The potential of being able to effectively manipulate/maximise ambiguity is not 
limited to the validation of theoretical ideas, but extends to developing practical 
ways of improving self-other monitoring capabilities. With the definition of 
ambiguity outlined in Chapter 1 in mind, a useful starting point is to observe and 
analyse behaviours across multiple domains that go against invariants, i.e., that 
increase coherence between and incoherence within entities across sensory 
modalities, to identify the most effective ambiguity-promoting methods.  
 
Given that behaviours including music-making, dance and certain sports require 
years of intensive training often from early childhood, an important step will be to 
design environments capable of amplifying ambiguity for participants without the 
trained motor and coordination skills. For example, this could be achieved through 
computer-mediated interaction between individuals and, more specifically, virtual or 
augmented reality settings that manipulate the correlation between sensory feedback 
belonging to self and other in ways that promote ambiguity (i.e., introducing 
incoherence within and coherence between self- and other-generated feedback). Such 
environments could also be dynamic: optimised for specific participants by using 
performance and physiological measures collected and analysed in real-time to adjust 
the degree of challenge that participants experience. A flexible, participant-sensitive 
setup of this sort would also protect against intervention-related distress in relevant 
user groups. 
 
Though the effect of improving self-other monitoring abilities on the experience of 
unsolicited and distressing misattributions associated with psychosis is still an open 
question, a setup that accelerates and makes such an improvement accessible has the 
potential to function as a sensorimotoric therapeutic intervention. As noted in 
Chapter 1, few treatments target lower order configurations of self that involve more 
primitive sensations of one’s body as a coherent entity or agent related to other 
individuals. This possibility is supported by evidence for the therapeutic benefits of 
behaviour described here as ambiguous such as music-making (e.g., Silverman, 
2003; Peng et al., 2010; Na & Yang, 2009; Kantrowitz et al., 2013). However, the 
identification of ambiguity as an underlying feature that drives such benefits makes it 
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possible to design environments that amplify the possibility of positive clinical 
change.  
 
 
6.4. General limitations  
 
A potential limitation of the experimental research is that the study explored brain-
behaviour relationships in a non-clinical sample. However, it is widely 
acknowledged that dimensional measures of schizotypy are a useful first step to 
examining underlying mechanisms of psychosis, with the advantage of avoiding 
confounding effects associated with medication or long-term chronic illness (Raine, 
2006). Examining self-other ambiguity-processing by comparing clinical and non-
clinical populations informed by the behavioural and neural hypotheses generated by 
this study would be the logical next step in further testing the clinically-related 
propositions put forward in Chapter 1. 
 
Given the scope of the proposed framework, many aspects of which had not been 
explored in previous imaging studies as well as the novelty of the behavioural task 
employed, the testing of narrowly defined hypotheses relating to neural function was 
premature in the context of studies included here. While this necessarily limits the 
definitive conclusions that can be drawn from the study, it also allows for a flexible 
and iterative approach towards the subject matter – one that progressively leads to 
more circumscribed hypotheses excluding other interpretations. The imaging 
analysis approach taken here can be very useful for the initial exploration of patterns 
of activity across novel conditions particularly in light of advancements in whole-
brain error control methods (Poldrack, 2007). It also avoids the pitfalls associated 
with more constrained ROI choice biases in the absence of previous imaging work 
and evidence specifically related to the subject matter.  
 
Similarly, due to the correlational nature of aspects of the data, we must be cautious 
of interpreting findings in explanatory causal ways. For example, it is not possible to 
conclude that findings relating to musical experience demonstrate the plasticity of 
attribution skills through experience in ambiguous settings. All we can say is that the 
data and findings are though consistent with this being the case. Strengthening the 
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evidence presented here will require experimental setups that compare attribution 
performance effects following interventions that either maximise or minimise 
ambiguity. Furthermore, to determine the extent to which this idea can generalise 
from music-making to other activities, as suggested in Chapter 2, experiments will 
need to tap into multisensory, ambiguity-promoting strategies found in joint-
behaviours other than music. The finding of the present research provides a starting 
point for assessing and monitoring the behavioural and neural effect of such a 
procedure over time. For example, reduced misattribution coupled with a reduction 
of brain connectivity with the anterior DMN could indicate a positive effect that can 
be examined alongside clinical changes such as the quantity and quality of psychotic 
experiences during, and following an ambiguity-promoting intervention.  
 
 
6.5. Summary and conclusions 
 
In conclusion, despite the manifold questions that remain, the behavioural and 
neuroimaging findings of this research provide initial support for the proposed role 
of ambiguity in agency and lead to further testable hypotheses. The study not only 
confirms the link between action attribution deficiencies and positive schizotypal 
traits, but also suggests that such deficiencies may be related to difficulties in 
processing ambiguity between action outcomes belonging to self or other. Data 
showing musical experience to be associated with reduced misattribution and 
associated neural correlations of task performance within ambiguous conditions 
leaves open the possibility that action attribution style is malleable, and that 
extensive experience in intricate joint-action could improve self-other processing 
abilities. The present work more specifically constitutes a step towards 
understanding the source of between-individual variability observed in agency 
performance. The relevant clinical question of whether experience-based 
improvement in action attribution can lead to a reduction of hallucinations and 
delusions is a worthwhile avenue for future investigation. However more insight into 
behavioural and neural responses to ambiguity is also required. Developing this 
research may extend the range of therapeutic interventions, for example, through the 
design of maximally ambiguous environments that can be titrated by individuals to 
maintain benefit while controlling feelings of distress. Given that the aetiology of 
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various mental disorders may be viewed as the mind misinterpreting its own 
experience of itself and of other (Fonagy & Campbell, 2015), the praxis of self-other 
ambiguity has the potential to contribute to a more refined understanding of the 
interconnections that exist between mental heath difficulties and, more importantly, 
an awareness of the contexts that promote mental wellness throughout life. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Revised Launay Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) 
 
Waters, F. A., Badcock, J. C., & Maybery, M. T. (2003). Revision of the factor 
structure of the Launay–Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R). Personality and 
Individual Differences, 35(6), 1351-1357. 
 
 
This questionnaire is concerned with certain experiences you might have had in your 
life. Please rate each question using the scale: 
 
0 = Certainly does not apply 
1 = Possibly does not apply 
2 = Unsure 
3 = Possibly applies 
4 = Certainly applies 
 
 
1. No matter how hard I try to concentrate, unrelated thoughts always creep into my 
mind 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
 
2. In my daydreams I can hear the sound of a tune almost as clearly as if I were 
actually listening to it 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
 
3. Sometimes my thoughts seem as real as actual events in my life 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
 
4. Sometimes a passing thought will seem so real that it frightens me 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
 
5. The sounds I hear in my daydreams are generally clear and distinct 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
 
6. The people in my daydreams seem so true to life that sometimes I think they are 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
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7. I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
8. In the past, I have had the experience of hearing a person's voice and then found 
that no-one was there 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
 
9. On occasions, I have seen a person's face in front of me when no-one was in fact 
there 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
 
10. I have heard the voice of the Devil 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
 
11. In the past, I have heard the voice of God speaking to me 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
 
 
12. I have been troubled by hearing voices in my head 
 
0  1  2  3  4 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Tolerance of Ambiguity Scale (ToA) 
 
Original source: Budner, S. (1962). Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality 
variable. Journal of personality. 
 
Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with them. Fill in the blanks with the number from the rating scale 
that best represents your evaluation of the item. 
 
Rating Scale 
1       Strongly disagree 
2 Moderately disagree 
3 Slightly disagree 
4 Neither agree nor disagree 
5 Slightly agree 
6 Moderately agree 
7 Strongly agree 
 
 
1. ____ An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer probably doesn’t 
know much 
2. ____ I would like to live in a foreign country for a while 
3. ____ There is really no such thing as a problem that can’t be solved. 
4. ____ People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the joy of 
living 
5. ____ A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are 
always clear 
6. ____ It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one 
7. ____ In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple 
problems rather than large and complicated ones 
8. ____ Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don’t 
mind being different and original 
9. ____ What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar. 
10. ____ People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don’t know how 
complicated things really are. 
11. ____ A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or 
unexpected happenings arise really has a lot to be grateful for. 
12. ____ Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient 
information. 
13. ____ I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all 
or most of the people are complete strangers. 
14.  ____ Teachers and supervisors who hand out vague assignments give one a 
chance to show initiative and originality 
15. ____ The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better 
16. ____ A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking 
at things 
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Scoring Key 
Having intolerance for ambiguity means that an individual tends to perceive 
situations as threatening rather than promising. Lack of information or uncertainty, 
for example, would make such a person uncomfortable. Ambiguity arises from three 
main sources: novelty, complexity and insolubility. These three subscales exist 
within this instrument. 
 
High scores indicate a greater INTOLERANCE of ambiguity. To score the 
instrument, the even numbered items must be reverse-scored. That is, the 7s become 
1s; 6s become 2s etc. After reversing the even-numbered items, sum the scores for all 
16 items to get your total score. 
 
The 3 subscales also can be computed to reveal the major source of intolerance of 
ambiguity. Here are the items associated with each subscale. 
 
Item Subscale Item Subscale Item Subscale Item
 Subscale 
1 I 5 C 9 N 13 N 
2 N 6 C 10 C 14 C 
3 I 7 C 11 N 15 C 
4 C 8 C 12 I 16 C 
 
(N) Novelty Score (2,9,11,13)  _____ 
(C) Complexity Score (4,5,6,7,8,10,14,15,16) _____ 
(I) Insolubility Score (1, 3, 12)     _____ 
 
TOTAL SCORE    _____ 
 
Novelty indicates the extent to which you are (in)tolerant of new, unfamiliar 
information or situations. 
 
Complexity score indicates the extent to which you are (in)tolerant of multiple, 
distinctive or unrelated information. 
 
Insolubility indicates the extent to which you are in(tolerant) of problems that are 
very difficult to solve because, for example, alternative solutions are not evident, 
information is not available, or the problem components seem unrelated to each 
other.  
 
Remember, the higher the score(s) the more intolerant of ambiguity you scored. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE) 
 
Mason, O., Linney, Y., & Claridge, G. (2005). Short scales for measuring 
schizotypy. Schizophrenia research, 78(2), 293-296. 
  
1= Yes; 0= No 
  
1. Do you stop to think things over before doing anything? 
2. Can some people make you aware of them just by thinking about you? 
3. Does a passing thought ever seem so real it frightens you? 
4. Are you a person whose mood goes up and down easily? 
5. Do you find the bright lights of a city exciting to look at? 
6. Would you like other people to be afraid of you? 
7. Are you usually in an average kind of mood, not too high and not too low? 
8. Do you often overindulge in alcohol or food? 
9. Does your sense of smell sometimes become unusually strong? 
10. Do you frequently have difficulty in starting to do things? 
11. When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even though there is 
nothing there? 
12. Do you feel that your accidents are caused by mysterious forces? 
13. Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them? 
14. Do you often feel like doing the opposite of what other people suggest even 
though you know they are right? 
15. Do you find it difficult to keep interested in the same thing for a long time? 
16. Do you love having your back massaged? 
17. Are you much too independent to get involved with other people? 
18. Do you often feel the impulse to spend money which you know you can’t 
afford? 
19. Do you prefer watching television to going out with people? 
20. Do you like mixing with people? 
21. Is it hard for you to make decisions? 
22. Do you ever have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for reasons that 
you do not understand? 
23. Have you ever felt the urge to injure yourself? 
24. Are you easily distracted when you read or talk to someone? 
25. Has dancing or the idea of it always seemed dull to you? 
26. Is trying new foods something you have always enjoyed? 
27. When in a crowded room, do you often have difficulty in following a 
conversation? 
28. Do you consider yourself to be pretty much an average sort of person? 
29. Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams? 
30. Are you easily confused if too much happens at the same time? 
31. Do ideas and insights sometimes come to you so fast that you cannot express 
them all? 
32. Have you often felt uncomfortable when your friends touch you? 
33. Do you think that you could learn to read other’s minds if you wanted to? 
34. Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or shocking? 
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35. Have you sometimes sensed an evil presence around you, even though you 
could not see it? 
36. Have you ever thought that you had special, almost magical powers? 
37. Do you ever have the urge to break or smash things? 
38. Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other people have already 
gathered and are talking? 
39. Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words 
are all mixed up and don’t make sense? 
40. Are there very few things that you have ever enjoyed doing? 
41. Do you often have difficulties in controlling your thoughts? 
42. When you look in the mirror does your face sometimes seem quite different 
from usual? 
43. Do you feel very close to your friends? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
